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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to describe how the concept of the subject and subjectivity, 
in its necessary relation to the concept of infinity, is envisaged in the work of Jaques 
Derrida. His idea of deconstruction has challenged accepted notions of the subject, 
giving rise to new ways of describing the production of knowledge and meaning. 
Thus his interpretations of the subject, in its various forms, have been used to 
construct a representation of the subject which cannot be reduced to its traditional 
conceptualisation. 
The thesis consists of a series of "deconstructive" readings based on 
Derrida's earlier, more theoretical essays on the interpretation of the subject and 
subjectivity. This set of readings is meant both to describe the logical possibilities 
of thinking the concept of the subject offered by deconstruction, and to trace the 
movement of thought that Derrida's early writings instigate. 
The thesis consists of an introduction which outlines the theoretical problems 
and approaches to thinking the concept of the subject and subjectivity. The. main 
body comprises four sections, the first being a short conceptual history of the 
subject from Descartes, Kant and Hegel. The second describes the possibility of 
establishing a relation of the subject to an objective world, and centres on Husserl's 
concept of the phenomenological subject. The third describes the possibility of 
establishing an objective sense in relation to subjective thought, and deals with 
Foucault's socio-historical account of the Cartesian Cogito. The fourth describes the 
possibility of providing a true description of the subject's meaning in a reading of 
Lacan. The thesis concludes with a description of the necessary relation of the 
concept of the subject to the concept of a transcendent infinity, and how this relation 
makes possible, and is more "original" than, traditional conceptions of the subject. 
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Knowing What Someone Means 
One of the underlying motivations for writing a thesis on the subject and 
subjectivity is the difficulty which many people, including myself, have in 
knowing or understanding what someone else means, or even what I myself 
mean. This problem is never simply a theoretical one, for it affects most areas 
of our day-to-day living. There are, for example, the practical difficulties of 
getting on with someone when you don't speak their language or share their 
customs and practices. Or, the commonplace misunderstandings which arise 
from misread letters, misinterpreted gestures or misheard tones of voice. 
There are also the more formal questions about whether and what we can 
know or understand in general, and upon what basis this knowledge is 
founded. 
In the Western tradition of modem philosophical thought this problem 
is approached through the concept of the subject. This concept was first 
formulated by Descartes in terms of the judging subject of the ego cogito 
ergo sum. One of the major reworkings of the concept of the subject was 
undertaken by Kant in terms of the ideal transcendental subject. The thought 
of Spirit in Hegel represents a translation of the transcendental subject, and, 
in this century, it is taken up by Husserl in terms of the phenomenological 
transcendental subject. These major transformations of the concept of the 
subject probably mark out the scope of Western understanding in general. 
For, on a lesser scale, the concept of the subject forms an almost 
unquestioned basis for most theories of knowledge, communication, and 
understanding, for example, in Habermas's theory of ideal communicative 
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situations, ' or Searle's theory of speech acts. ' The knowledge acquired by the 
positive Sciences can be said to rely to a great extent on the general division 
between subject and object, for, in the absence of such a division, we could 
hardly conceive of a scientific object. 
Over the last hundred years both the relevance and the dominance of 
this concept have been intensely challenged by different thinkers, not least 
Nietzsche and Heidegger. Structuralists such as Barthes and Foucault have 
attacked the subject as being nothing more than an effect of underlying 
structures of language or discursive practices. Such so-called post-modem 
thought has often defined itself in terms of its attack upon and disdain for 
modernity's conception of the sovereign subject. Has not the reign of the 
subject, in all its various forms, finally been dashed to the ground in the 
critical wave of post-modem'thought? Has not the edifice of Metaphysics, 
which supported these structures, finally collapsed, leaving the philosopher 
new tasks and new ways of thought to explore? Is the concept of the subject 
still useful? 
However, such'hypotheses on the collapse of the concept of the subject 
present certain problems in their internal logic. If all knowledge is essentially 
metaphysical, as certain self-proclaimed "metaphysical" systems of thought 
hold, such as Kant's, Hegel's, or, more recently, Husserl's, then this relation 
must be problematic. This would then mean that there is necessarily a 
difficulty in "knowing" of this "collapse, " or of knowing anything at all. 
To think that one knows of such a "collapse, " whether of the 
"subject, " the "author, " or of "metaphysics, " is not the same as the thought 
1 Cf. Habermas, J., The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. 
2 Cf. Searle, J., "Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. - 
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of such a collapse, nor as actually knowing of such a collapse. Thought, 
represented in the subject as the Cogito, is not necessarily the same as 
knowledge, and both are traditionally differentiated from thinking that one 
knows, in other words, belief. Until we have thought through the relation 
between these formations, we are, as Heidegger said, nowhere near to 
thinking the end of either "metaphysics" or the "subject. " It is certain that, 
unless we understand knowledge in a radically different light, we cannot 
speak here of knowing such a relation. This thesis is an attempt to approach 
and, if possible, to describe, the "subject" of such a "knowing, " in the 
relation between the Cogito and its reflection in traditional modes of 
knowledge. 
Reading the Concept of Subjectivity. 
Given this general problem of conceiving knowledge in terms of the concept 
of the subject we are immediately faced not simply with a problem of method, 
but with a problem of thought itself. How are we to think, and to describe the 
subject? In what*ways does this concept offer itself to a reading which does 
not merely repeat the traditional ways of conceptualising it? 
In Being and Time, 3 Heidegger articulates this problem by reminding 
us that the Greek understanding of human existence as Zoon logon echon, 
which Heidegger translates as "that living thing whose being is essentially 
determined by the potentiality for discourse" [BT p. 47], has, together with the 
guiding thought of the logos, dominated Western thought since Plato and 
Aristotle. Almost every subsequent attempt at understanding the nature of 
human existence translates this thought, without placing it fundamentally in 
3 Heidegger, M., Being and Time. Referred to as BT. 
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question. Heidegger takes the example of both Descartes and Kant, and their 
formulation of the subject as the essence of human thought, as the ground of 
rationality. He holds that both take over the definition of man as animate 
rationale, without ever questioning the nature of the being designated by such 
a term. 
For Heidegger the thought and question of Being is forgotten by 
modem Western philosophy. Thus, in Being and Time, he urges a return to 
this forgotten question, arguing that, without an understanding of what the 
word "Being" means, especially in the form of the third person "is, " we 
cannot hope to understand what we mean to say when we state that we know 
what something "is. " Asking the question of Being is the work of 
metaphysics, and the metaphysics characterised by the Cartesian concept of 
the subject must forget to ask what the being of the subject is. 
However, it can be plausibly argued that the trajectory of Heidegger's 
reading of metaphysics also takes us away from the question of the subject, 
eclipsing it in the more general question of Being. If we wish to stick to this 
question of the subject then it is more profitable to turn to other contemporary 
readings of the subject and subjectivity, which have attempted to describe the 
conditions and relations of the subject without reducing it to either the 
substantial or the ideal subject of the tradition. 
One of these interpretations is provided by Emmanuel Levinas. In 
Totality and Infinity, ' Levinas launches an attack on Western philosophy's 
concern for Being, whether in the mode of a forgetting of the essence of 
Being, or of a remembering of this forgotten essence. This, he argues, 
provokes a war of competing interpretations, all striving in the name of the 
4 Levinas, E., Totality and Infinity. Referred to as Ti. 
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"true" meaning of Being to establish a totality, which is how Being is always 
interpreted in the West. For Levinas the concept of Being, understood as 
totality, is always envisaged or represented in terms of war. He thus holds 
that Western philosophy can only understand the world in terms of war, a war 
which it perpetuates: 
War does not manifest exteriority and the other as other; it 
destroys the identity of the same. The visage of being that 
shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which 
dominates Western philosophy. Individuals are reduced to being 
bearers of forces that command them unbeknown to themselves. 
The meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is 
derived from the totality. The unicity of each present is 
incessantly sacrificed to a future appealed to to bring forth its 
objective meaning. For the ultimate meaning alone counts; the 
last act alone changes beings into themselves. [TI p. 21-22] 
He launches this attack upon Western philosophy through a radical defence 
of subjectivity, attempting to formulate a thought which would be other to 
that of the war fought in the name of a totality of Being. This defence of 
subjectivity is based upon a reading of the Cartesian subject in its necessary 
relation to a transcendent infinity which both precedes and exceeds all 
predicative determination. In other words, the relation of the subject to a non- 
constituted idea of infinity forms the condition of the subject's power of 
judgement, its ability to ask, and try to answer, the general question "what 
is? ", but without itself ever being legitimately subject to this question. For 
Levinas, the relation to a transcendent infinite, expressed in the subject's idea 
of the infinite, is prior to, and exceeds, the question of Being. It is upon this 
basis that he builds his defence of subjectivity against the search for an 
objective totality of Being, positing this relation to infinity as a more radical 
relation to Being: 
The harsh law of war breaks up not against an impotent 
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subjectivism cut off from being, but against the infinite, more 
objective than objectivity. [TI p. 25-26] 
If we return to Descartes, we see that his idea of infinity was nothing other 
than the idea of God. This idea has, as Heidegger teaches us, committed 
Western thought to a Christian theological grounding, in which the thought 
of Being is inescapably bound up with the thought of God, stamping the 
Western thought of Being - metaphysics - with the character of what 
Heidegger terms onto-theology. In this light, how could a defence of the 
subject take one beyond Western metaphysics? Surely it stays strictly within 
this domain, and even reinforces it? 
However, in his essay on Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics, "5 
Derrida offers wholehearted support to Levinas's reading of Descartes' 
subject in its irreducible relation to infinity. This is perhaps even more 
remarkable than Levinas's attempt to dislodge the thought of Being from the 
perspective of the subject, because, elsewhere, Derrida deconstructs what he 
perceives as traditional theories of the subject, for example, in Husserl, or in 
Lacan. In both cases he argues for the more or less Nietzschean view that the 
subject is a fiction. 
On the other hand, in his reading of Foucault's Madness and 
Civilisation, ' he supports the traditional interpretation of the Cartesian 
Cogito, that its meaning both exceeds and precedes all possibility for error, 
which means that it is, in itself, infinite, and transcends all predicative 
determination. Derrida, like Descartes, Kant, and Husserl, argues that the 
meaning of the ego cogito is prior to all historical determination. 
This, however, appears incoherent. Either the subject is constituted in 
5 Derrida, J. "Violence and Metaphysics, " in Writing and Difference. 
6 Foucault, M., Madness and Civilization. Referred to as MC. 
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relation to a possible transcendent infinite, or it is itself, in its thought, 
transcendent and infinite. Both perspectives, however, are arrived at within 
the grounding of an objective knowledge; they are the necessary conditions 
of Reason's episteme. This means that Reason itself was, in its very 
foundation, rent between two unassimilable summits of transcendence. 
This is what Derrida's strategy of deconstruction is designed to trace. 
It differs from Levinas's point of attack in that it performs a constant dialogue 
with and within Reason itself. From within the structure of this abyss the 
strategy of deconstruction can, from a certain perspective, be said to be the 
attempt to allow the language of Reason, its syntax, to resound with tones 
other than that of the voice of Reason's authority and totality. This differs 
from Levinas's attempt, in so far as Levinas opposes to "the objectivism of 
war a subjectivity bom from eschatological vision. " [TI p. 25]. 
Levinas appears, at least in teens of tone or style, to want to replace 
the authority of Reason with the authority of a radical alterity which would 
necessarily disrupt this totality and this authority. Although it would be right 
to say that one can never be so certain with Levinas whether this is really so, 
one can read explicitly in Derrida that for him it is not. 
Derrida's strategy is guided by two insights. The first is that Reason 
itself cannot be simply reduced to a totality, and that not all of its concepts 
are exhausted by such a reading. This means that the disruption and 
dissemination of totality is a necessary conjunction already at work within the 
language of Reason (the logos), and is promoted by certain concepts which 
always exceed systematic totalitarian matrices such as Being as a whole, or 
Presence. This is why, for example, he promotes the re-reading of ancient 
texts, not simply because the mimetic and dissembling play of Reason is more 
evident in these texts, but also because the repression of this play is also more 
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evident. 
The second insight is his conception of the nature of the sign. This 
revolves around the possibility of conceiving language in general. Derrida's 
understanding of language revolves, on the one hand, around the relation 
between conceptuality in general, and the concept of language in particular. 
On the other hand, but simultaneously, it orientates itself around the relation 
between the concept of language and what this concept is able to designate 
or mean, and what it cannot designate. 
Although this appears paradoxical, it is necessitated by the logic of the 
concept of language in general. For Derrida, the language of reason has 
always interpreted the meaning of Being in general as Presence. If this is so 
then there "is" meaning within this language only insofar as meaning is 
present, or presentable. The concept or idea of something is thus the 
(presented) meaning of that thing, i. e. the presentation of what it "is. " Any 
concept must designate both a unity and a totality, for it must conform to the 
law of non-contradiction. According to this view something cannot have a 
meaning if it is simultaneously present and not-present, for then it would 
mean both something, and nothing. Meaning is thus always present both as 
a unity, and as a totality. Thus the concept of language, with respect to its 
conceptuality, must designate language in terms of a meaning which is both 
unified and total. Amongst all other concepts, however, that of language 
presents a unique case. For, no matter what else is designated by the concept 
of language, it has always been traditionally understood as the medium in 
which meaning is articulated and communicated. This means that the concept 
of language necessarily limits or modifies conceptuality in general, because 
language is conceived as that within which the meaning of every concept, and 
the meaning of conceptuality itself, is articulated. Derrida, in 
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Grammatoloev, 'puts it so: 
However the topic is considered, the problem of language has 
never simply been one problem among others. But never as 
much as at present has it invaded as such, the global horizon of 
the most diverse researches and the most heterogeneous 
discourses, diverse and heterogeneous in their intention, method 
and ideology. ... This inflation of the sign "language" is the inflation of the sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation itself. Yet, 
by one of its aspects or shadows, it is itself still a sign: this 
crisis is still a symptom. It indicates ... that a historico- 
metaphysical epoch must finally determine as language the 
totality of its problematic horizon. It must do so not only 
because all that desire had wished to wrest from the play of 
language finds itself recaptured within that play but also 
because, for the same reason, language itself is menaced in its 
very life, helpless, adrift in the threat of limitlessness, brought 
back to its own finitude at the very moment when its limits seem 
to disappear, when it ceases to be self-assured, contained, and 
guaranteed by the infinite signified which seemed to exceed it. 
[OG p. 6] 
The D(ferance8 and Trace of the Subject 
This understanding of language in relation to conceptuality provides us with 
a lever with which we can pry open a reading of the subject without simply 
either negating or ontologising it. Derrida's grasp of language forms the basis 
of his interpretation and use of Heidegger's (but also Freud's) idea of the 
trace [die Spur]. If the relation between language and conceptuality is such 
that the traditional conception of meaning (as the infinite and transcendent 
signified) reveals itself as inadequate in its application, then neither this 
inadequacy, nor the system of conceptuality in which it is situated, can be 
revealed in terms of this order of conceptuality. 
7 Derrida, J., Of Grammatology. Referred to as OG. 
8 C£ Derrida, J., "Differance, " in Margins of Philosophy. 
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Derrida argues that because conceptuality is the order of knowledge 
in general, then neither its structure, nor its inadequacy in fulfilling what it 
sets out to achieve, can be objects of knowledge. This non-adequation, and 
the system of conceptuality which it simultaneously indicates and eradicates, 
are not signalled within the order of either sensibility, or of intelligibility. This 
does not mean, however, that this economy of indication and eradication is 
illegible. The non-adequation of the system of conceptualisation indicates this 
system precisely through its eradication or crossing out. This movement and 
structure contained within the relation between language and conceptuality 
is what Derrida understands by the arche-trace, which he describes with the 
help of his neologism dferance. Before seeing how Derrida can help with 
a reading of the subject we should take a brief look at this word. 
Dferance is, above all, not a "real" word which already exists in a 
given language. It is made up, and therefore belongs to the realm of the 
imaginary or the possible. One can, as Derrida does, explore the possible 
meanings of this "word" through its imagined relations with similar words. 
In this way he describes how a given material sign can take on meaning in the 
first place. He therefore constructs a semantic analysis in which different 
meanings gather around dferance, in order to trace the conditions of 
possibility of meaning in general. 
The first important similarity is with the French word difference. This 
similarity is acoustic, in that there is no difference in the pronunciation of the 
two words.. Here Derrida quickly shows that there are certain necessary 
differences in language whose meaning exceeds all forms of sensible 
presentation, whether auditory or visual. Derrida holds that these differences 
can only be indicated, or traced, in non-phonetic writing, the structure of 
which exceeds its simple presentation. Thus, the difference between these 
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two words, an "e", or an "a", cannot be heard. If one resorts to a phonetic 
writing in order to articulate this difference, then one will fail. This difference 
can neither be seen nor presented, because it cannot be pronounced. 
This means that, contrary to a whole tradition in which writing was 
always understood as both secondary to speech and representative of 
phonetic utterances in which meaning first became present, non-phonetic, 
non-meaningful marks play a constitutive role in the presentation of meaning. 
If a "meaningful" difference is to be found between difference and dferance 
(and, from the point of view of writing, there is obviously a difference) then 
this difference can only be signalled non-phonetically through the difference 
between the "e" and the "a". More generally, language is made up in part 
from marks which in themselves have no meaning, and only take up meaning 
in relation to other differentiated marks. For example, the mark "-" in itself 
strongly resists the identification of a meaning, although in a chain of 
differentiated signifiers one or more meanings may well be possible. 
Derrida thus attempts to set d(drance within such a chain of signifiers, 
an attempt which he playfully terms a semiotic analysis. Since there is no 
acoustic difference between dfdrence and dfdrance, he begins with the 
Latin root of the verb form of dfdrence - dyerre, from which the verb 
dfdrer is derived. In French this verb has two distinct meanings, which, in 
English, have separated out into two words - to differ and to defer, 
These two meanings themselves refer to at least three other meanings. 
To differ can either mean that two objects differ from one another, or that one 
differs in opinion. In French this is expressed in the difference between les 
differents (different things) or les dferends (different opinions), both of 
which sound exactly alike. Both indicate distance between two elements. To 
defer, on the other hand, has the temporal sense of putting something off until 
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later. 
The point is that the French word difference cannot refer to either the 
polemical or the temporal sense of dLerer, whilst dferance can, because the 
"a" corresponds to the present participle dferant. This active form, however, 
cannot itself refer to difference. The ending of dferance performs a 
neutralisation of the active form, without rendering the word simply passive. 
The "ance" in French denotes a suspension between active and passive 
forms, creating, as it were, a middle voice between dyerer and difference. 
What, however, does this highly speculative and tendentious analysis show 
us? And, how can it help with our analysis of the subject? 
It is within the context of conceptuality and truth that differance takes 
up its play, and delimits the possibility and impossibility of the classical 
notions of truth and conceptuality in general. As we have pointed out, Derrida 
puts forward the thesis that the matrix in which truth, conceptuality and 
meaning function is presence. He holds that our conceptions of truth and 
conceptuality always refer to and use this term in order to maintain their 
general validity as determinative ways of thought. Presence is referred to 
firstly in the sense of a making present in the clear presentation (expression 
and demonstration) of the original meaning of something. This gives rise to 
the idea of truth as the indubitable demonstration of the meaning of something 
in-itself - what it essentially "is. " Secondly, presence is referred to in the 
sense of coming into, or nearing, the presence of this meaning, in which truth 
is understood as the adequation of a representation to the concept or idea 
which it is meant to represent. This means, in terms of judgement, that 
something is true only when its meaning is made present, or transparent, and 
that the expression of this meaning is adequate to its concept. 
Derrida's point is that this assumes that we already know what 
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presence itself means, that its meaning is, in itself, present to us. Drawing 
heavily on Heidegger, Derrida argues that the meaning of this term always 
refers to other terms which are never present. For example, in Heidegger's 
analyses of the presence in terms of a temporal modality he shows that we 
cannot understand the meaning of the present without a prior conception of 
the future. The meaning of the future, however, is such that it is never 
present, it is always "yet to come. " 
This suggests, however, that conceptuality in general, insofar as it 
relies upon the meaning and value of presence, cannot offer accurate 
descriptions of what our world means for us. If truth is always understood in 
terms of the presentation of meaning, and yet the meaning of this presentation 
can never be presented, then the conception cannot be true. Derrida thus 
argues that maintaining that. conceptuality can offer us a true picture of our 
world and ourselves amounts to an act of repression in which a structurally 
necessary undecidability is forcefully kept from view. This amounts to 
maintaining that a false picture of the world is true, and that its meaning, and 
ours, is wholly and transparently, in some way or other, presentable. 
Derrida thus proposes the term dferance in order to describe this 
movement of repression and the decidability of meaning, but without 
repeating the violence of this repression. He does not offer us an alternative 
conception of the structure or meaning of the world or ourselves with this 
term. However, the structure of dferance is such that it simultaneously 
exceeds a presentation of its assignable meaning or meanings. This movement 
of excess, which he terms writing under erasure, simultaneously describes or 
traces the difference between the notions of spatial difference, differences of 
opinion, and temporal deferral, all of which are necessary if we are to 
describe anything at all. Without the idea of spatial difference, in other words, 
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the relation or referentiality between two points, we could not describe the 
world in terms of a realm of distinguishable things "outside" of us. Without 
the idea of differences of opinion we could not describe people in terms of 
different points of view. And without a notion of temporal deferral we could 
not describe anything in terms of duration or "passing away" for we could not 
describe an "interval" of time. 
The movement of differance traces all of these meanings, and does so 
more adequately than the traditional concepts of identity and difference, 
which can only refer to discrete present identities, that is, to one present 
meaning at a time. This is because all of these conceptions are simultaneously 
necessary to a description, all are at work in every description, and yet the 
meaning of each concept can never be fully presented, because each refers 
to the others. The economy of differance is such that its meaning is 
dependent upon elements which can never be present. This demonstrates that 
there is necessarily a non-appropriable surplus to the value of presence. In 
terms of the traditional notions of causality this surplus would be an effect of 
presence which actually causes or produces presence as an effect itself. 
Since, however, the very language of causality begins to break down, Derrida 
prefers to think of this effect as a trace of that which cannot be reduced to 
presence, but is necessary to its articulation. 
This suggests that insofar as we can understand and conceive this 
"breakdown" of truth and conceptuality, we are forced to admit that these 
values are undergoing a transformation. It goes without saying that this 
transformation lies beyond our present ways of categorisation and 
description, and well beyond the scope of this thesis. But we can go some 
way to understanding the nature of this transformation, following the 
footsteps of Derrida. For, what his various readings of Western thought 
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suggest is that whilst certain values and concepts, such as presence, are 
losing their hold, there always have been certain values and concepts within 
this tradition which resist this dominance, and throw it into question. 
It would be impossible here to trace all these conceptual resistances, 
or even all of those which Derrida has himself thematised. What this thesis 
will provide is rather a set of localised readings of the idea of the subject and 
subjectivity. The aim of these readings will be to describe or trace certain 
repressional effects and conceptual resistances which organise themselves 
around the representations of subjectivity. In order to do so these readings are 
based upon and orientated around certain of Derrida's interpretations of the 
concept of the subject. 
It is Derrida's earlier, more "theoretical, " work which is concentrated 
upon in this thesis and forms the background for its thought. There are two 
reasons for this. 
The first is in order to investigate the logical or philosophical 
possibilities of thinking the concept of the subject. In part, Derrida's initial 
work consists in exhausting, and thus disseminating, the conceptual scope of 
traditional philosophical logic, whilst remaining within this scope. In other 
words, in his earlier writings, he takes the logical language of philosophy to 
the limits of its sense, where it can no longer support its intended meaning. 
In so doing he also provides "theoretical" descriptions of how and 
why this is possible. These descriptions "show, " or, more precisely, stage, 
how relations of meaning in language either necessarily exceed their logical 
characterisation, i. e. presentation, or how logical characterisation depends 
upon elements which cannot be presented in its terms. 
Thus, through following Derrida's earlier descriptions of the concept 
of the subject and subjectivity we should be able to trace its logical limits and 
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possibilities. 
The second reason concerns the specific texts chosen. These are 
"Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl's 
Phenomenology, " "Cogito and the History of Madness, "" and "Le facteur 
de la verite. "' 1 On the one hand these texts are thematically linked. They 
orientate the description of the subject offered in the thesis in that they cover 
the three relations necessary to the conception of the subject and subjectivity. 
They deal respectively with the necessary relation to a transcendent 
exteriority within the self identity of the subject; the necessary transcendence 
of the thought of the subject to judgement; and the relation of the subject and 
subjectivity to truth. 
On the other hand, the concept of the subject described through our 
readings of these texts serves. as a matrix through which we can trace at least 
one of the movements of the thinking of the subject in Derrida's writing. 
These three texts cover a time span from his first major publication in 1967 
("Speech and Phenomena"), to The Postcard, published in 1980. 
Within this time the beginnings of a transformation in Derrida's 
analytical language may be witnessed. Within the scope of these three texts 
we can witness a move from a more or less philosophical language, which 
remains within the logical strictures of the Western tradition, towards a 
language which, whilst not strictly psychoanalytical, utilises certain 
"concepts" and a certain movement of thought at work within Freudian 
9 Derrida, J., "Speech and Phenomena" in Speech and Phenomena And Other Essays on 
Husserl's theory of Signs. Referred to as SP. 
10 Derrida, J., "Cogito and the History of Madness, " in: Writing and Difference. Referred 
to as CHM. 
11 Derrida, J., "Le facteur de la verite, " in The Postcard From Socrates to Freud and 
Beyond. Referred to as PSF. 
20 
psychoanalysis. Thus the themes running through Derrida's later work, such 
as his idea of a logic of the spectre, " the idea of memorial debt, " and what 
one might term a phenomenology of personification and autobiography, " 
although made possible, and organised by the thought of dyerance, can be 
seen to owe much of their discourse to the more speculative moments of 
Freud. In his earlier work, Derrida states that "logocentric repression permits 
an understanding of how an original and individual repression became 
possible within the horizon of a culture and a historical structure of 
belonging. "" Yet it seems impossible to articulate this general state of 
repression without Freud's prior formulation of this concept. On the other 
hand, Derrida shows that this formulation remains indebted to the 
philosophical tradition, and indeed springs from it. 
This move is not a change of direction in Derrida's thought, for the 
earlier texts provide the theoretical background which necessitates this 
transformation. It is not that Derrida adopts a psychoanalytic discourse in 
order to replace philosophical discourse and its concepts. In other words, he 
does not engage in a psychoanalysis of the philosophical tradition in order to 
overcome this tradition. It is rather that he is concerned with the problem of 
writing in a language which is other, or goes beyond, the strictures of 
classical logic, without repeating and reinforcing these. 
Derrida shows that the practical application of psychoanalytic theory 
12 Cf. Derrida, J., Spectres of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the 
New International. 
13 C. Derrida, J., Of Spirit: Heidegger and The Question. 
14 Cf. Derrida, J., [he Ear of the Other: Otobioaranhv_ Transference. Translation 
15 Derrida, J., "Freud and the Scene of Writing, " in Writing and Difference, p. 197. 
Referred to as FSW. 
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is itself guilty of uncritically taking up traditional conceptuality and repeating 
the violence he finds evident within it. He makes it clear that its concepts 
"without exception, belong to the history of metaphysics, that is, to the 
system of logocentric repression .... "[FSW p. 197] 
However, in his readings of Freud, Derrida also emphasises the fact 
that certain elements in psychoanalysis resist reduction to this history of 
metaphysics, despite their collusion with it. He shows that Freud explicitly, 
although not always successfully, tried to distance his discourse from the 
philosophical tradition, and intended psychoanalysis to be a discourse "other" 
to that of philosophy. This double reading effectively demonstrates that 
psychoanalytic discourse represents a continuation of the traditional 
philosophical discourse, but marks a point at which this discourse begins to 
exhaust itself. Here rational, discourse is forced to refer to a movement of 
thought which exceeds its classical formulation. This occurs through the 
undermining of the status of its terms so that the explanatory truth of its 
concepts is called into question, and are opened to "new" interpretation, and 
to "other" ways of articulating thought. 
The thesis attempts to trace this movement of thought, within Derrida's 
writing, through the way in which he conceives the subject. It does this by 
assembling a series of readings orientated around the three essays by Derrida. 
These readings have a double function. Firstly they serve to background and 
deepen Derrida's portrayal of the subject within his writing. Secondly, 
through imitating Derrida's style of deconstructive reading, and by 
concentrating upon certain themes implicit within these readings, they serve 
to indicate the necessary movement of the thought of the subject in 
deconstruction. 
Thus the analytical language of the thesis follows and condenses the 
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change in Derrida's language. At the same time it traces the necessary 
"historical" development of this language. It progresses from the 
philosophical understanding and articulation of the subject in the first sections 
to the psychoanalytic understanding and articulation of the subject in terms 
of structures of repression in the last section. 
In effect we see how the psychoanalytic concept of repression, and its 
surrounding discourse, develops from the philosophical discourse in which 
the concept of the subject is embedded. We further see that, understood from 
the perspective of deconstruction, certain movements within psychoanalytic 
discourse resist their reduction to the history of metaphysics and can then be 
used to provide a re-reading of the concept of the subject. 
The Concept of the Subject. 
Let us return to the original question, which was how to know what someone 
means. How do I know that my representations aren't simply illusions? 
Whilst I might accept that my representations are real for me, I have no 
reference point from which I could validate this reality. Thus I might 
remember meeting a friend yesterday. It is indubitable that, in the instant I 
have this thought, that I feel as if I remember meeting a friend yesterday. 
What is not ascertainable is whether this memory itself is true. I could only 
validate this reflective judgement on the assumption that my memory is based 
upon the existence of a real external world. Since, from this perspective, the 
reality of my thought - the certainty or truth of its existence for me - 
transcends the reality or existence of the world, I cannot prove the existence 
of an external world. 
On the other hand, if I accept the existence of an external world, then 
I must also accept that its meaning transcends my thought - it exists outside 
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and beyond my subjective judgement. One might argue that this cannot be 
proved and we should therefore resign ourselves to the madness of Solipsism. 
However, there are good reasons for positing such a transcendent meaning 
beyond subjective thought. 1. If there were no reference to an external 
transcendence, then we could have absolutely no conception either of 
memory, or of error. I could never even posit a continuity between myself as 
someone who really thought that then, or who thinks now, in this instant. I 
could not even posit a distinction between myself as judging subject, and the 
"world, " or representations, which form the content, or object, of my 
judgement. And, if all my representations were true for me, I could have no 
conception of an error of judgement. 2. As Descartes convincingly argues, 
since we conceive of ourselves and our thought in terms of error, and yet 
have an idea of perfection, the source of this idea cannot be the subject itself. 
I must make reference to an "outside, " the meaning of which transcends my 
judgement. What this transcendence "is, " remains, of course, beyond the 
scope of my reflective judgement. 
As we have said, these two moments of transcendence within the 
thought of the subject present a seemingly impassable paradox. The concept 
of the subject must envelop and explain both of these moments together if it 
is to present its structure and meaning in truth. The philosophical tradition has 
attempted to tackle this logical conundrum from two angles, the first which 
we can term Cartesian realism, in which the reality of the objective world is 
assured by a transcendent God, the second is Kantian idealism, and its 
various forms. Idealism denies the objective reality of the world, holding that 
its meaning is solely derived from the subject. The true meaning of an 
objective world can only be presented in terms of its subjective 
transcendental conditions of possibility. 
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The first, however, relies upon the theological assumption of the 
existence of a benevolent divine being. As we have said, Descartes 
convincingly demonstrates that cognition must refer to a point or horizon 
"outside" the subject's scope of judgment if the subject is to be able to even 
think that it can determine or distinguish itself from an objective world. The 
meaning of this horizon is, however, transcendent to the subject's 
determinative or reflective cognition. This means that the subject cannot say 
what this horizon "is. " Yet Descartes argues that the possibility of an infinite 
being proves its existence, and that, as infinite, it must be good in relation to 
the subject's finite judgement, the truth of which it thus assures. This is an 
assumption which, obviously, can never be proved. The belief in the truth of 
my judgements upon this "objective" world remains simply a belief. 
The second relies upon the assumption that the transcendental 
conditions the subject's judgement are known to be fulfilled. This assumption 
can likewise never be proved. If one attempts to do so one runs into an 
infinite regress, because the condition of the subject's identity and faculties 
of judgement constitutes knowledge i. e. the conditions of demonstration and 
validation of meaning, in general. Kant argues that this condition is the 
transcendental schema in which a concept can be applied to an empirical 
intuition. Such schemata must be present both in the pure intuition of the 
categories and in empirical intuition. The pure intuition of time is the general 
condition for both the categories of judgement and empirical intuition in 
general. The schematism must, however, be differentiated from both the 
categories, and the images of empirical intuition in order that it perform this 
mediation. If it were not then we could not term time a pure intuition, for we 
could neither differentiate it from a category, applied to objects, nor an 
appearance in empirical intuition. However, by what means can we 
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differentiate it from either a category or an empirical intuition? We can 
neither know, nor represent time "in itself" and yet it must be present in both 
intellectual and empirical intuition. Can there be such a thing as a pure 
intuition of time, and if not, what secures the transcendental deduction, and 
the application of the categories to objects? In Nietzsche's words: 
it is high time to replace the Kantian question `how are synthetic 
judgements a priori possible? ' with another question: `why is 
belief in such judgements necessary? That is to say, it is time to 
grasp that, for the purpose of preserving beings such as 
ourselves, such judgements must be believed to be true; 
although they might of course still be false judgements! 16 
This is the situation which Derrida means to indicate when he says that the 
infinite signified no longer serves as a guarantee for the language which seeks 
to express it, namely the language of metaphysics. Descartes might have been 
able to believe in the infinite meaning of God to secure and assure the 
subject's judgement. Kant might have believed in the subject's infinite 
meaning over the world, in order to assure the meaning of its judgement. For 
Derrida, however, the language of metaphysics, in which this belief is 
couched, can no longer support the presupposition of an infinite signified. 
The coherence of the belief in such an infinite signified has begun to break 
up, and together with it, the coherence of the belief in truth. The economy of 
d(erance traces the breakdown or dissemination of this belief in an infinite 
signified by interrupting the self-identity of presence, reminding it, as it were, 
of its debt to an unassignable, non-appropriable, non original source, which 
would be neither present nor absent, but nonetheless necessary. 
We can witness this breakdown in the subject in terms of its relation 
to an infinite meaning, either in terms of the meaning of its thought as 
16 Nietzsche, F. Beyond Good and Evil, p. 24. 
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ultimately transcendent to all other meaning in the world, or in relation to the 
meaning of a transcendent externality, whether it be God, the world, or the 
empirical object. If we trace such a breakdown we should also be able to 
indicate what is at stake in the belief in the idea of the subject, in terms both 
of what it promotes and what it represses. Derrida's exemplary readings of 
the meaning and role of the subject and subjectivity in different areas of the 
human sciences, coupled with his use of such "concepts" as the trace, writing 
and differance, can help enormously in understanding the nature of this 
"breakdown. " 
A Rough Guide to the Thesis 
The analyses above have indicated the constellations of the meaning of the 
subject we need to explore in order to explicate its relation to the breakdown 
of the concept of the infinite, signified. These are: the referentiality, history, 
and truth of the subject; in relation to the interiority and exteriority, sense and 
non-sense, and proper and improper embodiment of subjectivity respectively. 
I have thus chosen to analyse Derrida's three texts: "Speech and Phenomena: 
Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl's Phenomenology, " "Cogito 
and the History of Madness, " and "Le facteur de la Write, " which are 
organised around these themes. 
These readings, however, need to be placed within a historical and 
theoretical background. This will be provided in the first section of the thesis, 
which will consist of close readings of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. These 
will be orientated around the paradoxical relationship the subject is obliged 
to maintain to what Derrida has termed the infinite signified. I have renamed 
this concept the transcendent infinite, in order to emphasise its theological 
connotations in Descartes, its paradoxical role in Kant, and Hegel, whilst 
maintaining the connotation of, an absolute meaning indicated by the infinite 
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signified. The purpose of these readings is to indicate that the "breakdown" 
of the transcendent infinite is not restricted to contemporary thought 
concerning the subject and subjectivity, but is rather inherent in the working 
of the language of Reason itself, over and above historical categorisation. 
From these readings I will draw out a theoretical matrix within which 
the readings of Derrida can be understood. Thus, in the reading of Descartes' 
Meditations" I will try to show that there are two necessary relations 
between the concept of the subject and the idea of the transcendent infinite. 
The first is in the necessary transcendence of the subject's Cogito itself, the 
second in the necessary relation of reflective judgement to a transcendent 
infinite. I will argue that the idea of the transcendent infinite must exceed 
reflective judgement since its meaning can never be presented, and yet forms 
the condition of possibility of reflective judgement. I will then argue that such 
a conception cannot be distinguished from a belief or fiction. 
The interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason18 will put forward 
the hypothesis that the enigma or aporia created by the two moments of 
transcendence within the concept of the subject is repeated by Kant's 
conceptions of time and space as pure intuitions. I will argue that the pure 
intuition of time, understood as the condition of possibility of the application 
of the categories to empirical intuition, presents an impossible condition to 
fulfill. I will argue that to know of its fulfilment would be a transcendent 
insight because we cannot demonstrate the possibility of a "pure" intuition of 
time separately from a "pure" intuition of space. Without this demonstration 
we cannot show that time is a condition of possibility of space in general, and 
17 Descartes, R. Meditations, in Discourse on the Method and The Meditations. Referred 
to as MFP. 
18 Kant, I., The Critique of Pure Reason. Referred to as CPR. 
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thus the condition of the application of the categories to empirical intuition. 
I will thus argue that the distinction between the ideal temporal and spatial 
manifolds also amounts to a belief or fiction. 
In the reading of Hegel I will concentrate upon the Lordship and 
Bondage section of the Phenomenology of Spidi19 in order to demonstrate the 
movement of truth in the Hegelian conception of the subject and its history. 
I will argue that the two moments of the transcendent infinite within the 
subject are taken up by Hegel in terms of the subject's formal identity and its 
substance. I will argue that these two moments cannot be reconciled in 
Hegel's historical conception of the phenomenological "we, " the 
establishment of which means the attainment of Absolute Knowledge for the 
subject. This is because the phenomenological "we" must be able to 
determine the movement of consciousness as an illusion which it appropriates 
and overcomes. I will argue, however, that the concept of death, as 
represented by the moment of Lordship, exceeds any determinate meaning, 
and thus cannot be an illusion of consciousness. I will thus suggest that the 
writing of a substantial history of the concept of the subject itself amounts to 
a process of belief or fabrication. 
The final chapter of this section will then highlight the structural 
aporias met in the preceding descriptions of the concept of the subject. The 
logic of these aporias will be used to suggest that the "concept" of the subject 
cannot itself be legitimately reduced to a determinate structure. This first 
section should therefore serve to undermine the idea that we are presenting 
a singular true narrative of the concept of the subject in the following 
sections. 
19 Hegel. G., Phenomenology of Spirit. Referred to as POS. 
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The remaining sections of the thesis will then consist of the readings 
of the three Derrida essays. These texts respectively concern themselves with 
Husserl's understanding of the phenomenological subject in relation to 
language, where we will be concentrating upon his Cartesian Meditations; " 
the social-historical account of the subject and reason offered by Foucault in 
Madness and Civilisation; and the practical application of the theoretical 
apparatus of the subject to fiction in psychoanalysis as described by Lacan 
in his analysis of Poe's The Purloined Lette r. 21 My readings of these texts 
attempt to condense part of the play of the meanings of the subject within 
Derrida's work up to 1980, in order to show how the subject is transformed 
in its "deconstruction. " 
I will attempt to show that Husserl's concept of a world is dependant 
upon a prior reference to an indeterminate, transcendent horizon. I will argue 
that Husserl unsuccessfully attempts to reduce this point of indeterminacy in 
meaning to the intentional structures of the phenomenological subject. I will 
attempt to show that the reduction of this reference to determinative horizons 
or concepts of time and space represents a repression of this referentiality. 
In the second interpretation of Derrida and Foucault I will attempt to 
show that it is impossible to reduce the transcendence of the subject's thought 
- the Cogito - to an external historical structure or narrative. Such a structure 
would secure the sense of the subject's judgement, just as Descartes uses the 
idea of God to secure this sense. I will argue that the positing of the truth of 
such a narrative cannot be legitimated, i. e. is a belief or fiction, and amounts 
20 Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Referred to 
as CM. 
21 Lacan, J., "°The Purloined Letter" in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 11. The Ego 
in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955. Referred to as PP. 
(Also found in The Purloined Poe- Lacan, D rrida, and Psychoanalytic Reading). 
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to a repression of the Cogito's necessary transcendence. 
In the final essay, on Derrida's critique of Lacan, I will attempt to 
demonstrate the role that the value of truth plays in the repression of the 
transcendent infinite through the determination of those moments of 
indeterminacy within the concept of the subject as moments of fiction: 
In addition to this I will situate these readings within a series of 
interpretations which both draw upon (or even imitate) the conclusions of 
Derrida's arguments, but also indicate the immediate wider theoretical 
background within which his texts are written. 
Derrida's reading of the vocative subject in Husserl will thus be 
backgrounded by a radicalised interpretation of the role of Dasein's 
primordial spatiality in Heidegger's Being and Time. This is in order to 
deepen the understanding of Derrida's notion of spacing. I will try to show 
how Heidegger's notion of spatiality interrupts the idea of the presentation of 
meaning in Dasein's world, in the movement of temporalisation. I will then 
try to show that reference to an open or indeterminate horizon forms the 
condition of determinate forms or ideas of both space and time. 
Derrida's analysis and criticism of a historical reduction and 
totalisation of the Cogito by Foucault will be preceded by an interpretation 
of Heidegger's reading of subjectivity in Nietzsche. ' It will be shown how 
Heidegger demonstrates that the concept of the subject and subjectivity 
makes a necessary reference to a prior but indeterminate concept of justice, 
against which reflective judgement can be shown to be illegitimate. It will be 
suggested that this is why the relation of reflective judgement to the infinite 
can be termed repressive. It will then be argued that he similarly reduces 
22 The reading will be of Heidegger's "The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead, " in: I 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Referred to as TWN. 
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Nietzsche's madman, or, more precisely, madness of thought, to the epochal 
history of Being, in just such a manner. This is to deepen the understanding 
of Derrida's notion of an ahistoricality within the subject's Cogito. 
The reading of Derrida and Lacan will be preceded by an interpretation 
of Freud's Beyond The Pleasure Principle' in order to show the collapse of 
the strict divisions between the theoretical and the practical, truth and fiction, 
fact and fantasy, which the emergence of the "concept" of the unconscious 
entails. This is in order to background Derrida's critique of Lacan's division 
between the real, the symbolic and the imaginary, and to enable a reading of 
the subject in terms of the "concept" of repression. 
The conclusion to the thesis remains part of the last section. This is due 
to the speculative nature of the thesis, in which the conclusion directs the 
reader back to a re-reading of the subject in terms of the structures of 
repression, without reducing the subject to these structures. The final 
thoughts on the concept of repression will attempt to indicate how this 
concept can be used to refer to "new" movements of thought. 
23 Freud, S., `Beyond The Pleasure Principle" in: On Metapsvcholog . Referred to as OM. 
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Section I: The Subject's Collapse: Descartes, Kant and Hegel 
1. Descartes' Path 
Descartes formulated the subject in the form ego cogito ergo sum, in the 
Meditations. This is proposed as a response to the problem of finite human 
knowledge in relation to a transcendent infinity. 
Descartes, however, had already formulated the demand in his 
Discourse on the Method. 24 Here he describes how he wanted to have a set 
of rules which could guide him with assurance through life: 
I always had an extreme desire to learn to distinguish true from 
false in order to see clearly into my own actions and to walk 
safely in this life .... But, after spending several years studying 
thus in the book of the world and seeking to gain experience, I 
resolved one day to study also myself and to use all my powers 
of mind to choose the paths which I should follow. [DTM 
pp. 33-34] 
We would do well to follow him a little way down these paths. Descartes 
perceived the problem of the subject's objective judgement as the problem 
of negotiating infinity. He expressed this problem in terms both of 
overcoming the stoic doubt found in Montaigne's Essais, and of a necessary 
relation between the subject and a transcendent infinity. 
Reason's Demand on The Cogito 
Perhaps Descartes' major insight was to posit the infinite, the transcendent, 
in relation to a finite human capacity for knowledge. Perhaps, as most 
traditional readings of Descartes assert, it was the perception that deception 
is a problem which lies at the heart of all knowledge. From this point of view 
one must overcome the universal doubt which follows from this possibility 
24 Descartes, R. Discourse On The Method, in Discourse on the Method and The 
Meditations. Referred to as DTM. 
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of being deceived, before one can be assured of the truth of one's knowledge. 
What is often neglected, however, is the role that Descartes' love of 
fictionalising plays in his philosophical theses. 
The question Descartes poses in the Discourse is: by what method can 
he choose the right path in life, and be assured of its truth? If he follows 
someone else, a teacher or mentor, he cannot be certain in himself because 
he has not yet reached a choice for himself: 
Having considered how a given man, with his given mind, being 
brought up from childhood among the French or Germans 
becomes different from what he would be if he had always 
lived among the Chinese or among cannibals; how, down to our 
very fashions in dress, what pleased us ten years ago, and will 
perhaps please us again before another ten years are out, now 
seems to us extravagant and laughable, I was convinced that our 
beliefs are based much more on custom and example than on 
any certain knowledge ... . Thus I could not choose anyone 
whose opinions it seemed to me I ought to prefer to those of 
others, and I found myself constrained, as it were, to undertake 
my own guidance. [DTM p. 39] 
In order to arrive at a decision Descartes is forced to become his own guide. 
If the subject is to be free of all prejudice then it must be alone in its 
judgement. He must secure his judgement in his own right, as his own, and 
as true. 
This is what is forced on the subject in the face of the possibility of an 
all-pervading sensory and intellectual deception. A subject's judgement 
cannot be fully justified before it has undergone this trial. On the other hand, 
the necessity of undergoing this trial, which takes Descartes to the very 
summit of thought with the statement ego cogito ergo sum, does not come out 
of the blue. He is constrained by the possibility of being deceived by the 
world. Not only that, for he must, at some stage, return from his summit, into 
this world. This is because his decisions and judgement can only make sense 
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insofar as they negotiate this possibility. 
However, if he has been coerced, that is, compromised by a force, to 
be alone in his decision, as the basis of a just decision, then this choice can 
never be entirely free, it can never come entirely from Descartes himself. This 
decision as to what is right can never answer the demands which set it in 
motion, but can only repress or hide this demand and will thus always be 
unjust, no matter how rigorous its course is. 
If Descartes wants to reach a justified decision about the course of 
action he should take, then we see that he is subjected to two simultaneous, 
but incommensurable, demands. On the one hand, he must demonstrate that 
his thought transcends any possible deception. In other words, he must show 
that the Cogito is infinite. The ego cogito ergo sum is the expression of this 
infinite transcendence. The problem arises when thought must make 
judgements upon the world. 
That is, thought must re-enter the world in order to make judgement 
upon it. Even though the Cogito asserts its own indubitability in the face of 
the possibility of absolute deception, this says nothing about the world, or the 
objects within it. If the subject realizes that it can be deceived in its reflective 
judgement about the world, then it must submit itself to a transcendence 
external to its judgement. The subject can only have the idea of being 
deceived if it already has the idea of a perfect state from which it is deceived, 
and this idea, as Descartes says, cannot come from a being whose state is 
finite, i. e. subject to error. This positing of the possibility of transcendence 
interrupts the transcendence of the Cogito. The sovereignty of the subject's 
judgement and decision in the face of this transcendence can no longer be 
maintained. 
In both cases, in that of the demands made upon the Cogito itself, and 
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the demands made upon the Cogito in relation to the world, the subject must 
stand in a relation to the transcendent infinite. And yet, neither case can be 
logically related to the other. Either the Cogito is transcendent to the world, 
the subject's representations of which are then simply a mode of thought, or, 
the world is transcendent to the Cogito's judgement, in which case this 
judgement is questionable. The subject's decision - Descartes' decision - is 
impossible. 
This path, however, is a strange one: 
I consider myself very fortunate to have found myself, from my 
early youth, on certain paths which led me to considerations and 
maxims out of which I have constructed a method ... .I shall be 
very happy to reveal in this discourse the paths I have taken, 
and to present my life as in a picture, so that each may judge it. 
... So my 
intention is not to teach here the method which 
everyone must follow. if he is to conduct his reason correctly, 
but only to demonstrate how I have tried to conduct my own ... 
. But, putting 
forward this essay as nothing more than an 
historical account, or, if you prefer, a fable in which, among 
certain examples one may follow, one will also find many others 
which it would be right not to copy. [DTM p. 28-29, my italics] 
Thus the Discourse on the Method offers us a thought which would remain 
both true to the demand for a rightfully directed reason -a reason which 
would remain just - and beyond that of the Kantian criticism of knowledge. 
It would remain just in that it would refuse to accord itself a prescriptive right 
over others. It would not proffer a judgement about the righteousness of its 
own truth for others. The knowledge that would be offered would be of the 
order of fiction, not truth. In Descartes, this demand for justice - for the 
incalculable, the transcendent infinite - almost overrides the attempt to justify 
human judgement and knowledge. 
I say almost overrides, because, of course, the Meditations represents 
just such an attempt. However, we can detect a certain hesitation when he 
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comes face to face with the transcendent infinite within the structure of the 
ego cogito. Thus we can read this fact of the possibility and impossibility of 
the subject's decision or judgement not only in the Discourse on the Method. 
We can also read it in the more rigorous, ostensibly more philosophical, 
Meditations. 
The Cogito's Flight, and The Fiction of Truth 
The argument of the Meditations is so well known that it probably does not 
strike us with the radicality of its thought. However, we can still learn much 
from it, especially when the subject is posited in terms of the relation of the 
Cogito to infinity. In the Meditations, this relation to the infinite is expressed 
twice: first as the relation to the fiction of the evil demon, and secondly as the 
relation to the infinite being par excellence, namely God. For the Descartes 
of the Meditations these two moments must remain separate. The deceiving 
demon is evil because deception is both morally bad, and finite. It cannot, for 
instance, deceive me in my existence. God, however, as infinite, is also 
infinitely good, and, therefore, would not deceive us, and thus secures the 
truth of our carefully founded judgements. 
These two moments, however, can be seen to be one and the same. If 
we follow the text closely, it is the idea of God which first appears in the role 
of a possible deceiver, within the scope of his infinite power. Descartes has 
already shown that judgements about the corporeal world can be thrown into 
doubt, through his example of dreaming. He then goes on to ask about the 
certainty of intellectual judgements "which deal with simple and general 
things, without bothering about their existence or non-existence. " [MFP p. 98] 
These also come into question when he asserts that: 
I have for a long time had in mind the belief that there is a God 
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who is all-powerful and by whom I was created and made as I 
am. And who can give me the assurance that this God has not 
arranged that there should be no earth, no heaven, no extended 
body, no figure, no magnitude, or place, and that nevertheless 
I should have the perception of all these things, and the 
persuasion that they do not exist other than I see them? ... It 
is 
possible that God has wished that I should be deceived every 
time I add two and three or count the sides of a square, or form 
some judgement even simpler, if anything simpler than that can 
be imagined. [MFP p. 98] 
The fiction of God as deceiver first gives rise to the fiction of the evil demon 
as deceiver. Descartes then suspends this thought of a deceiving God by 
saying "allow that all I have said about God is a fiction" [NIFP p. 64]. He 
cannot, at this stage, be certain, and there are obvious reasons for not 
asserting in public that God is a deceiver. 
Instead of taking this risk, Descartes replaces this thought of a 
deceiving God with the malign demon. However, this substitution is only 
possible within the opening created by the possibility of deception. This 
possibility of being deceived rests upon a fiction which describes this 
possibility. The scope of such a possibility is infinite. When the subject 
demonstrates its existence in the face of this infinite possibility its meaning 
effectively transcends any finite determination: 
There is therefore no doubt that I exist if he deceives me; and let 
him deceive me as much as he likes, he can never cause me to 
be nothing, so long as I think I am something.... I am, I exist, 
is necessarily true, every time I express it or conceive of it in 
my mind. [MFP p. 103] 
At this absolute summit of thought, "I am, I exist, " the meanings of the 
subject's Cogito exist in terms of a possibility, that of the transcendent 
infinite. 
This is why it is not possible to distinguish between the idea of God 
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and the fiction of the evil demon in Descartes. Both exist in terms of a 
possibility which is only possible itself in relation to the idea of infinity. The 
ideas of infinity give the sense of possibility in general. This is because 
possibility in general represents that which is not determined, and in order to 
conceive this it is necessary to have an idea which exceeds the determination 
of its meaning by judgement in general. This idea is infinity. Since both the 
idea of God and the idea of the evil demon are posited within the locus of the 
infinite, in relation to the Cogito, neither can be either true or false, good or 
bad. In other words, they are both fictions, and the Cogito will still have a 
meaning, or meanings, no matter what this fiction is, so long as it thinks. 
Descartes' differentiation of the demon and God thus rests upon the 
idea that one is malign, whilst the other is good. It is the goodness of God 
which in the end secures our judgement about the world, and it is this security 
that is rendered fictional. 
It is only within this fiction that one can put forward the hypothesis that 
there is a deceiving God (or demon), that deception is morally degenerate, 
that God, as perfect, is necessarily good, and therefore would not deceive us. 
But, these steps in Descartes argument are only hypothetical - one cannot 
know whether they are true. 
The fiction of the malign deceiver is therefore a fiction within a fiction. 
This is because the self-exceeding idea of a transcendent infinite forms the 
irreducible condition of both fictionality and truth. This possibility of 
fictionalisation - the transcendent infinite - is therefore the condition of 
possibility of all moral characterisation and judgement, including those which 
are applied directly to it. In itself, however, it stands beyond such 
judgements. 
However, even if the subject's Cogito has meaning within the 
39 
transcendent infinite, and even if we can show that the fiction of God and the 
fiction of the demon are one and the same, this is only half of the story. It is 
one thing to assert "I am, I exist, " whilst I am thinking this - this is, after all, 
something of a tautology. It is another thing to assert that this has meaning 
outside of my thought. If the subject's Cogito is infinitely transcendent, as we 
have argued, if its meaning lies beyond every finite determination, then how 
can the subject even conceive that there is a world outside of it, that it is not 
entirely alone, that it even exists for longer than the blink of the eye of its 
thought? 
With such questions we arrive at the chasm of the subject's relation to 
the transcendent infinite. We do not have the resources to chart this chasm: 
the meaning of the relation is indeterminate. We can only leap over it, to see 
it, as it were, from the side of the transcendent infinite, in which the 
transcendence of the world is posited. 
In the third Meditation Descartes tries to prove God's existence. What 
concerns him is the validity of his judgements about the sensory world, which 
he thinks a perfect being, such as God, would always guarantee. He must 
therefore, as it were, fall back into the world. For whilst the subject's Cogito 
is indubitable, its meaning, or meanings, being infinitely transcendent, 
Descartes remembers that other judgments, pertaining to the sensory world, 
are not. The transcendence of the Cogito cannot explain this fallibility of 
judgement. It is, after all, infinitely valid: 
If I were to consider the ideas [of things outside me] alone as 
certain modes or fashions of my thought, without wishing to 
relate them to anything else, they could scarcely give rise to any 
error on my part. [MFP p. 116] 
If this is true then the paradox raised is that if I am in error about the world, 
then how can I be sure that it exists, that there is something outside of me? 
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Descartes once again returns to a fiction, that is, to a possibility, within which 
the subject is inscribed, but this time as secondary. 
He must show that there is meaning beyond the subject's Cogito. In 
order to achieve this he must think of something which the subject can 
conceive of, but which cannot originate in the subject. In other words he must 
demonstrate that the ego cogito can never be entirely alone. He must show 
that it cannot be without a possible external content, a relation to a 
transcendent externality which guarantees that the ego thinks something: 
Suppose some one of my ideas has so high a degree of 
representative reality that I am sure the perfection so 
represented does not inhere in myself, either in its own proper 
form or in some higher form; and that therefore I myself cannot 
be the cause of that idea: From this, I must conclude, it 
necessarily follows that I am not alone in the world; there is 
something else - the cause of the idea in question. [MFP p. 82- 
83] 
This idea is the idea of the infinite, of infinite perfection, of God. This excess, 
the infinite, is the mark of an externality necessary to every decision, to every 
judgement, every assertion, which the ego can make. The recognition of the 
finitude of the subject's reflective judgement means that this idea cannot 
originate in the subject. Its content exceeds its form. This means that there 
must be a meaning transcending that of the Cogito. As such it renders an 
absolutely true and objective judgement impossible, because it transcends the 
scope of such a judgement. This transcendent infinite, which amounts to the 
infinite possibility of (the fiction of) a world, thwarts the sovereignty of the 
subject's judgement because it exceeds all finite determination. 
Any judgement about such a transcendence will thus be of the form "I 
think" rather than "I know, " and would thus escape possible verification. 
Both truth and error belong to the order of the transcendent infinite, as does 
41 
the point of thought itself, the Cogito, since it can only be established within 
this possibility which exceeds all definable order. 
The transcendent infinite only "occurs" in the mode of possibility, 
never of actuality. Statements in this mode are thus never "real, " or the true 
expression of a reality. Rather they are of the order of the possible or 
probable - we cannot know whether they are real or irreal, true or fictional. 
The problem here is that such statements form the basis in which the concepts 
of truth, reality, knowledge and, eventually, existence, can be expressed or 
even thought. This means that, from the perspective of these concepts 
themselves, an irreducible moment of fictionality must be present in all these 
concepts, even though what they represent cannot admit to this moment. 
However, the fiction of a malign deceiver, and a good non-deceiver, 
is absolutely necessary to Iescartes' project of establishing a ground for 
legitimate judgement. Only if this fiction is true can he decide with certainty 
that his judgement is justified. Yet, because it is a fiction, the truth of which 
is demanded by the structure of such a decision, it renders this decision 
impossible. Simultaneously, the possibility of this fiction of the truth - the 
transcendent infinite - demands of the Cogito itself that it be reckoned with. 
This necessity of the transcendent infinite in relation to the Cogito 
means that the calculable horizon of the Cogito's judgement is necessarily 
interrupted by the thought of the infinite. The subject, as we have seen, is 
always experienced in terms of a radical schism between the transcendent 
infinity of the Cogito itself, and the transcendent infinity of the thought of the 
world beyond it. And yet without this thought, this demand posed by the 
transcendent infinite, the ego could not think! 
Thus, the surface of Descartes' texts is not as uniform as could be 
believed. The establishment of the Cogito (or Cogitos) in the face of the 
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transcendent infinite is a thought which disrupts a uniform reading of the 
Cartesian subject. 
2. Kant: The Transcendental and The Transcendent 
Kant criticised Descartes for supposing one could be certain only of the 
existence of the "I. " Knowledge of objects in Descartes rested upon the belief 
in a material world, the reality of which could not be ascertained. This belief 
in a material world could not, from the perspective of the subject, be 
justified. This is because of the structure of thought and judgement itself. 
Both "I can know what "x" means, " and: "I can't know what "x" means" 
require an additional determination, in the form of "I think. " 
This is a fact, as Kant points out, which applies to all statements, and 
forms the ground of all subject rooted epistemology. It presents a problem 
because while "I know" presupposes "I think, " the reverse is not true. Thus 
it would appear from a formal perspective that knowledge of the Cogito is 
from the outset impossible, while this point, impossible to know, forms the 
condition of knowledge itself. This is what Kant says about this problem: 
Certainly, the representation `I am, ' which expresses the 
consciousness that can accompany all thought, immediately 
includes in itself the existence of a subject; but it does not so 
include any knowledge of that subject, and therefore also no 
empirical knowledge, that is, no experience of it. [CPR p. 246] 
And later: 
This proposition ["I think"], however, is not itself an 
experience, but the form of apperception which belongs to and 
precedes every experience; and as such it must always be taken 
only in relation to some possible knowledge, as a merely 
subjective condition of that knowledge. We have no right to 
transform it into a condition of the possibility of a knowledge of 
objects, that is, into a concept of thinking being in general. 
[CPR p. 336-337] 
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Kant's solution to this problem has influenced all subject orientated 
epistemologies since. However, the subject understood in the form of the 
Cartesian Cogito - the "I think" - still presents major problems to his system 
of thought. These problems remain despite his innovative understanding of 
the transcendental subject as the condition of possibility of objective 
knowledge. 
This is because he cannot simply negate this point of the subject - the 
"I think"- as a formal unity without and before content, because it forms no 
object which can be subject to objective knowledge. This point can never be 
experienced, and, according to Kant, there is no objective knowledge without 
experience. Without this experience, the unity of subject and object in 
judgement, i. e. the application of the categories to empirical intuition 
according to the pure forms of intuition in the synthetic unity of apperception, 
is a hypothesis for which we can have no evidence. At the same time it is a 
necessary condition of knowledge. This condition rests upon the 
presupposition that there are objects the appearance of which it is possible to 
know, and that there is a synthesis of subject and object in judgement. But 
how can Kant demonstrate that this condition is fulfilled? How can he show, 
a priori, that objects of our knowledge are appearances synthesised by the 
subject's faculties of judgement? Surely the demonstration of this fulfilment 
lies beyond the scope of the cognitive faculties of the subject, and thus 
represents a transcendental illusion, or matter of belief? 
Cogito, Knowledge and Belief 
We can explain this fall into transcendental illusion as follows. For Kant we 
are able to objectively know phenomenal appearances. These conform to the 
structures of our understanding. These structures thus form the transcendental 
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conditions of the subject's cognition of an object in experience. The 
transcendental principles, or rules of knowledge, represent the only 
apodictically true knowledge the human subject can have. 
Transcendental principles only legitimately apply to possible objects 
of sensible experience, and form the a priori conditions of possibility for true 
judgements about these objects. The logical form of these principles is always 
"if p then q" where q is always presupposed as the necessary logical 
condition of p, but not necessarily vice versa. This is of interest within the 
Kantian problematic when "p" represents a synthetic judgement, and "q" is 
thus the necessary condition of this synthetic judgement. A synthetic 
judgement is where two or more heterogeneous elements are unified within 
a predicative statement of the form "x is y. " 
This is, for Kant, the only possible way in which a material extension 
of knowledge can occur. 25 It is through this extension that we can express 
something true without this expression simply being a tautology (which Kant 
terms an analytic judgement). The judgement "the table is round" is therefore 
a synthetic judgement because the scope of both concepts is not necessarily 
the same. The predicative statement thus represents a material extension of 
both concepts. 
Within the locus of this materiality the question is raised how such a 
judgement can really be true or false? What is therefore needed is an 
absolutely necessary (a priori) synthetic judgement, which describes the 
possibility of the synthesis of sensation with thought itself: 
Obviously there must be some third thing, which is 
homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the 
25 Cf. Allison, H. E., Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, p. 
76 for an extended explanation of material extension in relation to synthetic judgements. 
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other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the 
application of the former to the latter possible. This mediating 
representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical 
content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect 
be intellectual, it must in another be sensible. Such a 
representation is the transcendental schema. [CPR p. 181] 
The schematism represents one of the most enigmatic and obscure points of 
the Critique of Purre Reason, but it also plays the central foundational role. 
This is the hinge upon which all the distinctions which are at work in the 
book are hung. It is also the point at which we experience the difficulty of 
establishing the difference between thought and knowledge of the subject, 
without them falling into a transcendent belief which can be neither true nor 
false. 
Kant holds that this hinge is articulated in the pure intuition of time as 
the general condition of the synthetic unity of apperception. This possibility 
of unification forms the a priori ground of all possible objective judgements. 
Kant argues that without it there could be no objective knowledge at all, 
which, for Kant, amounts to no meaning at all. " It simultaneously forms the 
condition of both inner (purely subjective) sense and outer (objective) sense 
in the unifying structure of the copula "is, " without which no predicative 
statement could be expressed, and no judgement arrived at. 
The problem arises, however, in the cognition and legitimation of the 
structure of time, understood as the condition of the synthetic unity of 
apperception. The problem occurs both in the positing of time as the 
condition of the unity of the manifold in the apperception of "objective" 
appearance, and in the relation of this unity to the "I think. " 
26 For Kant the categories have a meaning beyond their sensible application, but this has 
no relation to an object. The meaning of the pure concepts of understanding is thus 
"purely logical, signifying only the bare unity of the representations. " [CPR pp. 186-187] 
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The condition of possibility of the apperception of the appearance of 
an outer world, and the objects within it, is the pure a priori intuition of 
space. Kant holds that we cannot conceive of an appearance in general 
without the prior intuition of space, but since one can think of space as free 
of all appearances, this intuition is not dependent upon them. It is rather the 
pure subjective form of all sensible "outer" intuition, which must be present 
in every appearance. Since this form must contain an infinite number of 
appearances or representations Kant argues that it cannot be a concept: 
Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now every 
concept must be thought as a representation which is contained 
in an infinite number of different possible representations (as 
their common character), and which therefore contains these 
under itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as 
containing an infinite number of representations within itself. It 
is in this latter way, hpwever, that space is thought; for all the 
parts of space coexist ad infinitum. Consequently, the original 
representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept. 
[CPR. pp. 69-70] 
The subject's a priori intuition of space is how Kant tackles the Cartesian 
problem of the subject knowing an "exterior" material world. In Descartes 
this problem is resolved by the reference to a transcendent infinite, which is 
then determined in the belief of a benevolent God who would not deceive us 
in our perception. In Kant it is our pure intuition of space which brings this 
reference of the subject to infinity into appearance. However, thinking the 
spatiality of the subject thus presents something of a problem. Although the 
thought of space as the reference of a point to infinity no doubt forms the 
condition of all determined appearance, and all forms of geometry, 27 it is 
27 Kant is wrong in his belief that space can only be described a priori in terms of 
Euclidean geometry, which is a determinate description of space. However, his initial idea 
that there must be a reference to infinity in our idea of space actually serves to explain the 
(continued... ) 
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difficult to see how this intuition can be a representation present in 
appearance. As Kant indicates above, it exceeds conceptual determination, 
so how can Kant say that its representation "is" a pure intuition, which 
accompanies all appearance? How can space, as the pure form of outer 
intuition, be determined in appearance, as it must be if the subject is to 
conceive of an object? 
Kant's answer to this is that the representation of space alone could not 
determine anything. The condition of possibility of its representation, and of 
appearance in general is time. The manifold of time is the condition of the 
"inner" sense of the subject, the unity of the manifold of consciousness. Thus 
Kant posits that the representation of time must accompany every intuition in 
order that intuition, whether sensible or intellectual, be brought into the unity 
of apperception, in the subject's judgement: "x is y. " The representation of 
time is homogeneous with both the intellectual and the sensory faculties, yet 
it is neither a concept nor an empirical intuition. The different determinations 
of time, in accordance with their ordering of space mediate the categories in 
a sensible form. 
Thus time, and its determinations, form the schemata of the pure 
concepts of understanding through which the concepts can be mediated or 
applied to empirical intuition - i. e. determinate forms of space. In order that 
this be demonstrated, however, it must be differentiated from the two. That 
Kant thinks this is possible is clear: 
27(... continued) 
condition of possibility of other geometries. The mathematical description of a Gaussian 
surface, for example, relies upon the relation between a zero point and infinity, in which 
geometric relations are described in terms of a tending either towards zero or towards 
infinity. 
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The schema is, properly, only the phenomenon, or sensible 
concept of an object in agreement with the category. [CPR 
p. 186 my italics] 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, however, Kant describes the difficulty of 
perceiving such a phenomenon. The original representation of time is 
necessarily infinite since it relates to the possibility of an infinite succession. 
This means that time, like space, must exceed its conceptualisation. Every 
determinate or conceptual form of time would then represent an illegitimate 
judgement upon the form of time. Such a determination could only be 
possible on the basis of the prior condition of outer appearance, but as Kant 
says about time: 
It cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it has to do 
with neither shape nor position, but with the relation of 
representations in our inner state. And just because this inner 
intuition yields no shape, we endeavour to make up for this 
want by analogies. We represent the time-sequence by a line 
progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series 
of one dimension only; and we reason from the properties of 
this line to all the properties of time, with this one exception, 
that while the parts of the line are simultaneous the parts of time 
are always successive. [CPR p. 77] 
Thus, we must resort to a spatial metaphor in order to describe the form of its 
temporal intuition. More importantly, in every determination of time, without 
which there would be no schemata, and no application of the categories to 
objects, we must resort to its modification in space. We cannot differentiate 
the schema of time, or even its pure intuition, without ' determining it, and this 
can only take place on the condition of an "outside" already being present. 
The pure intuition of time is thus already "spatialised, " just as space is 
already "temporalised" when we represent it as pure intuition. In other words: 
there is no pure intuition of space or time. We could never know of such an 
intuition, and neither can we justify the differentiation of the two forms of 
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intuition. 
This fact disturbs the hierarchy of distinctions set up in Kant's 
epistemology. This is because, for Kant, objective knowledge only arises 
through the proper application of the categories to sensible intuition. Sensible 
intuition is always the reference of a judgement to an external, empirical, in 
other words, spatial, realm of objects outside of the inner intellectual sense 
and horizon of the subject. If the spatiality of the subject is determined by the 
subject's inner realm i. e. time; then it cannot in turn to determine the anterior 
constitutive condition. In other words, the distinction between an outer and 
inner sense is already dependent upon a spatial determination. The subject's 
synthesis of its spatiality cannot then be dependent upon its synthesis of its 
temporality, represented as the synthetic unity of apperception. 
Thus, the synthetic unity of apperception is a principle which would 
force us to transgress the limits of the proper application of Reason, " to make 
statements about what is essentially unknowable, the noumenal, as an 
expression of a necessary relation to the transcendent within the Cogito. 
Doing this is necessary, however, if Kant's edifice is to be founded upon a 
transcendental basis, rooted in experience, as he intended it to be. It thus rests 
upon a truth which, for the truth of the system, could never be anything other 
than an illusion. 
This would obviously have catastrophic results for his system of 
objective knowledge, because at its heart would lie an illusion. This illusion 
28 Cf. Transcendental Dialectic: "ve are concerned only with transcendental illusion, 
which exerts its influence on principles that are in no wise intended for use in experience, 
in which case we should at least have had a criterion of their correctness. ... I mean actual 
principles which incite us to tear down all those boundary-fences and to seize possession 
of an entirely new domain which recognises no limits of demarcation. ... A principle which 
... takes away these 
limits, or even commands us actually to transgress them is called 
transcendent. " [CPR pp. 298-299]. 
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would be the constituted unity of the subject, the synthetic unity of 
apperception. This necessarily transgresses its attempted appropriation by the 
epistemological system. 
It thus appears that the very heart of knowledge, its innermost centre, 
the most subjective point of the subject, lies outside the scope of possible 
knowledge of objects. This outside, traced by the non-appearance of the unity 
of apperception, cannot be described simply as a negative pole of experience 
or a determinable non-experience. It rather subsists or desists within the 
distinction between experience and non-experience, as its non-verifiable but 
nonetheless necessary condition. In other words, it both subsists between the 
horizons of intellectual intuition (the temporal horizon belonging to the inner 
subjective sense of the subject), and sensible intuition (the spatial horizon 
belonging to the outer objective sense of the subject), and, simultaneously, 
exceeds any determination by these horizons. 
This also suggests, however, that Kant's epistemological system 
represents precisely an attempt to appropriate and repress this illusory and 
excessive force and condition of the Cogito. It does so as the enforcement of 
the distinction between knowledge and belief on the one hand, but through 
the belief in the validity of this distinction. On the other hand, this belief, 
29 Lacoue-Labarthe uses the term desistance (desistement) to describe this ineluctable 
condition of the subjectivity of the subject. It forms the condition of a theoretical subject, 
a theory of the subject, of its determination, and is thus insisted upon by this 
determination, but simultaneously resists and deconstitutes or disperses this determination 
through its excessive insistence. This infinite play of the ineluctable within the "subject" 
is described by Lacoue-Labarthe as an irreducible rhythm according to which the subject 
is (de)constituted in its theorization, in the fiction of its theorization. Although I cannot 
follow this up within this thesis, his reading of the subject through its a necessary relation 
to an irreducible, undeterminable rhythm -a subject understood as the subject of a certain 
style of writing - resonates with, and, to a great extent, shapes my reading of the 
"subject" C. For example, "Typography, " p. 116 and "The Echo of the Subject, " p. 141 
and pp. 174-175, in Lacoue Labarthe, P., Typog=hy: Mimesis; Philosophy. Politics. 
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lying at the heart of Kant's epistemology, a project which tries to eliminate 
belief from its program, would undermine the objective validity of this 
distinction. 
3. Hegel: The Profit of Phenomenology 
Hegel recognised the split inherent in the subject. His attempt to overcome 
this breach differed from both Descartes and Kant in that it entailed a 
historical dimension. Within this history of Reason the subject would be 
destined to overcome its duality, finally arriving at the unity of absolute 
knowledge. History is thus a key element in Hegel's understanding of the 
subject and Reason. Like Kant before him, he realizes that if conceptuality 
in general is to be understood, then our conception of time must be made 
transparent. For Hegel, however, this means gaining an understanding of the 
history of conceptuality in particular, and time and history in general. 
Hegel does not simply offer us a history of philosophy, in which the 
subject represents the final form of this history. He also puts forward a 
philosophy of history, which will affect history just as much as history will 
move philosophy. It is when these two moments coincide that the subject will 
overcome its duality. Its formal unity will coincide with its substantial unity 
at the point of absolute knowledge. This is not to be understood in the banal 
sense of knowing everything there is to know. It is rather that once these two 
moments of the knowing subject coincide, knowledge and Reason can 
develop no further. This is because development, rationality's telos itself, has 
been overcome, any development in knowledge has already been understood 
and accounted for, before it can historically take place. 
Our reading will focus upon 'a moment in the development of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit in order to demonstrate that this moment cannot be 
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overcome, and will always return to disrupt the supposed unity of the subject. 
Thus we will focus our attention upon the formal moment of the 
phenomenological foundation of the subjectivity of the subject in the so- 
called master-slave dialectic. This moment is the necessary risk of the 
sovereign consciousness of the master in the face of death. Before doing so, 
we should recall Hegel's criticism of Kant, and his understanding of the 
transcendental subject. 
Hegel's Understanding of Kant 
For Hegel, Kant's conception of the essence of the subject as the 
transcendental unity of apperception, is in principle correct, but severely 
limited in its application. This conception of the self is merely the minimal 
formal expression of the self's identity in relation to its object. The true 
meaning of the self for Hegel can only be realised insofar as it is recognised 
in the face of another self. This is expressed by Hegel in the relation between 
the sovereign consciousness of the Master and the slavish consciousness of 
the bondsman. 
Hegel's critique of Kant's conception is that Kant does not take the 
transcendental subject to its full conclusion. Kant's basic premise is that we 
can only know a priori what we ourselves invest in the objects of our 
judgement. Hegel's argument is that if this is so, then the limitations to the 
subject's knowledge which Kant envisages, namely the thing-in-itself, i. e. the 
noumenon, cannot in reality be limitations. If the subject only knows what it 
itself puts into things, and it knows that the thing-in-itself is there, even as a 
supposed limitation, then this cannot be something which the subject does not 
know, for it must have constituted this limitation itself. It must therefore 
implicitly know what the thing-in-itself is, because the thing-in-itself is 
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constituted by the subject's knowledge. 
For Hegel, the supposed duality or limitation of the subject, witnessed 
in both Descartes and Kant, is an illusion caused by the historical failure of 
thought to understand the transcendental nature of the subject properly. This 
unity is implicit within every stage of Reason's development, each stage 
appropriating the preceding conceptual formation, making its particular 
illusion of duality explicit for thought precisely through this appropriation. 
Thus Kant's positing of a limitation to the subject's knowledge in the 
form of the unknowable thing-in-itself is an illusion for Hegel. Nonetheless, 
historically it is a moment which the development of the subject has passed 
through, and must therefore be accounted for as a necessary moment of the 
subject. This moment is essential because if the very concept of history and 
historical development is constituted by the subject, then every moment 
within this development must have a constituted meaning for the subject. 
What Hegel must show is that the constituted meaning of each of these 
moments is a fiction. 
It is precisely this formal moment of establishing the subject's identity 
and the overcoming of the duality contained therein which Hegel accounts for 
in the master-slave dialectic, albeit in a highly allegoric manner. In the section 
entitled "The Truth of Self-Certainty" Hegel describes the formal 
phenomenological conditions of possibility for the historical formation and 
sublation of the Kantian subject. He says: 
The notion of self-consciousness is only completed in these 
three moments: (a) the pure undifferentiated `I' is its first 
immediate object. (b) But this immediacy is itself an absolute 
mediation, it is only as a supersession of the independent object, 
in other words it is Desire. The satisfaction of Desire is, it is 
true, the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or the 
certainty that has become truth. But the truth of this certainty is 
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really a double reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness. 
Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self, 
posits its otherness or difference as a nothingness, and in so 
doing is independent. ... A self-consciousness exists for a self- 
consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only 
in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become 
explicit for it. [POS p. 110] 
What Hegel is here describing is Kant's Copernican turn, and its inherent 
sublation. In the first moment Hegel describes the object of consciousness as 
the undifferentiated `I' because Kant holds that we can only know a priori 
and immediately what we ourselves put into objects. This idealist position 
supersedes the material dualism of Descartes, and the empiricism of Locke 
and Berkeley, in that the independence of the known object is negated. The 
object in-itself does not appear to the transcendental subject, only its 
appearance as constituted by the subject. 
In Descartes the only thing that was absolutely certain for the 
consciousness of the subject was its own identity. In transcendental idealism 
Hegel holds that one quickly perceives that self-consciousness is the only 
object that consciousness can possibly have. This means that the articulation 
of an independent object is in fact the articulation of the desire of self- 
consciousness. 
Since transcendental idealism has shown that the notion of an object 
independent of self-consciousness is an illusion, the articulation of such an 
object is the articulation of self-consciousness's 'desire for objective 
independence. If this independence is to be "objective" then it must be 
affirmed by something other than that particular self-consciousness. The self- 
affirmation of the independence of self-consciousness can only ever be 
"subjective, " the subject of pure whimsy. And yet the only object which self- 
consciousness can have is self-consciousness. Hegel concludes that this 
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articulation is therefore the expression of the desire to be independently 
affirmed or recognised by another self-consciousness. We thus arrive at the 
necessity of the master-slave dialectic. 
The independence of self-consciousness is expressed in terms of its 
pure subjectivity, the Kantian unity of apperception, `I=I. ' It is the 
independence expressed in this unity that self-consciousness desires to be 
recognised by an other self-consciousness. In principle this means that self- 
consciousness must recognise another self-consciousness as itself fully 
independent, and vice versa. 
This "other" self-consciousness, the double of the first, since self- 
consciousness can only have itself as an independent object, is committed to 
doing exactly the same. For Hegel the self-consciousness of the subject is, at 
this stage, split through and through. This play between "two" self- 
consciousnesses is simultaneously two moments of a single but utterly 
divided consciousness, which seeks to overcome its own otherness, whilst 
seeing its independence in this otherness: 
this action of the one [self-consciousness] has itself the double 
significance of being both its own action and the action of the 
other as well. For the other is equally independent and self- 
contained, and there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the 
origin. ... Thus the movement is simply the double movement of 
the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same 
as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and 
therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does 
the same. [POS 112] 
This split in the transcendental subject forms an intersubjective foundation of 
the self-consciousness of the subject. Since a transcendental intentional 
consciousness, which is essentially what the Kantian subject is, can only 
intend meaning insofar as it constitutes meaning itself, the meaning of any 
form of "otherness" must originate in the subject itself. Hegel therefore 
56 
effectively locates this split in the historical development of the concept of 
self-consciousness itself. Only so can he coherently argue that self- 
consciousness is both singular and double. 
Historically, the Kantian concept of the subject was such that an 
externality or otherness independent of the subject was posited. This meant 
that the idea of two independent self-consciousnesses was believed to make 
sense. From Hegel's standpoint, however, at the point of absolute knowledge 
in which the subject is understood as the concept of Spirit, this belief is an 
illusion. I 
This means that the actual split in self-consciousness, dividing it into 
two, arises because the concept of the subject has not yet been coherently 
reconciled with itself. The phenomenological `we' of Hegel's narrative 
already knows where self-consciousness will arrive, in the unity of this `we. ' 
Thus, from this perspective, before the movement of the dialectic has taken 
place, Hegel says of the "two" self-consciousnesses: 
Each is for the other the middle term, through which each 
mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for 
itself, and for the other an immediate being on its own account, 
which at the same time is such only through this mediation. 
They recognise themselves as mutually recognising one 
another. [POS p. 112] 
This is the essence of the Hegelian conception of self-consciousness in the 
subject. Hegel realizes the condition of the meaning of a self in the mutual 
recognition between "two" separate self-consciousnesses, which will later 
show themselves to belong to the same concept, to be two instances of the 
same concept. Each understands itself as' an autonomous being-for-self 
through the mutual acknowledgement of the other. 
In formal terms this means that each self-consciousness functions as 
a total mediation of the other, and each sees itself as totally reflected in the 
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other. Since the other is nothing other than self-consciousness, then self- 
consciousness is the pure medium of itself, to itself. In this total mediation 
there would be no "other" as an independent, external object, alien to the 
subject's intentional sphere, but rather a transcendental self mediated 
between two of its moments. These two moments will eventually be subject, 
in the form of a pure subjectivity expressed as I=I, and the substance of that 
subject, expressed in the community of the transcendental "we. " 
The master-slave dialectic is thus the formal phenomenological account 
of the split in the unity of the essence of self-consciousness, namely into 
subject and substance. This split must be passed through in order that the 
phenomenological "we" of Hegel's narrative - the "we" which knows - can 
celebrate "the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk" [POS 
p. 26]. This phenomenological "we" therefore profits from every one of the 
previous shapes of consciousness. However, if we now turn our attention to 
the "sovereign" moment of consciousness we may be able to see that the 
phenomenological "we" has not yet invested its time that it may legitimately 
draw its profit. 
The Master and the Slave 
Before achieving the mediated recognition of itself in its other, self- 
consciousness must prove that its subjectivity stands above all other concerns 
in the face of the other self-consciousness. Thus ensues the struggle for life 
and death in which the master-slave dialectic begins. Both self- 
consciousnesses act in the same way, and both are compelled to assert the 
absolute truth of self-certainty in the face of the other. In other words, both 
are brought together in a confrontation, in which both seek the annihilation, 
or negation, of the other. It is a literal fight to the death. In order to 
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understand this we should bear in mind that Hegel understands intentional 
cognition as an act of negation, in which its object is appropriated as 
belonging to the intentional sphere of the subject, whilst its being-for-self, its 
autonomy, is destroyed. This is effectively the expression of self- 
consciousness as Desire, a Desire which appropriates everything other unto 
itself. When an individual self-consciousness faces another, in the bid for self 
recognition, the recognition of the autonomy of the "I=I" above all else, then 
self-consciousness will, in accordance with its Desire, attempt to negate what 
is other to it. In this case it is the other self-consciousness: 
The presentation of ... self-consciousness consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing 
that it is not attached to any specific existence as such. This 
presentation is a twofold action: action on the part of the other, 
and action on its own part. In so far as it is the action of the 
other, each seeks the- death of the other. But in so doing, the 
second kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; 
for the former involves the staking of its own life. [POS p. 113] 
This life and death struggle cannot end in death if self-consciousness is to go 
on. Capitulation from one side must ensue, for if the singular moment of pure 
subjectivity were to destroy its other, then its sovereign autonomy could not 
be recognised. Self-consciousness must risk death, but cannot fall into its 
hands. Without this risk, self-consciousness would not, on the one hand, learn 
"that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. "[POS p. 115] Thus, 
in the face of death, self-consciousness, the so-called consciousness of the 
bondsman, capitulates. On the other hand, self-consciousness must 
experience and learn the fallacy of pure being-for-self, expressed in the 
sovereign consciousness of Lordship. This self-consciousness, so' Hegel 
argues, has risked death above all else, and shown himself superior to the 
bondsman, whom he now rules: 
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In immediate self-consciousness the simple `I' is absolute 
mediation, and has as its essential moment lasting 
independence. The dissolution of that simple unity is the result 
of the first experience; through this there is posited a pure self- 
consciousness, and a consciousness which is not for itself but 
for another, i. e. is a merely immediate consciousness, or 
consciousness in the form of thinghood. Both moments are 
essential ... ; one 
is the independent consciousness whose 
essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent 
consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be 
for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman. [POS 
p. 115] 
The slavish consciousness is therefore only there to recognise the whims of 
the dominant consciousness, to do its bidding, to carry out its wishes as work. 
The consciousness of the Lord, however, does not recognise this slavish 
consciousness, it is merely a tool to do his bidding. The recognition is 
therefore asymmetrical, and, in terms of the principle of recognition, must be 
false. The work of the slave forms, for Hegel, the condition of history itself. 
The dominant consciousness does not simply represent the consciousness of 
a ruling class, which literally builds a civilisation as a monument to its 
memory through the work of its slaves. It also represents the Platonic forms, 
and their formal relation to a corporeal world in which one acts in accordance 
with these forms. The essence of this form of consciousness is, for Hegel's 
phenomenological "we, " necessarily historical. Without the monuments, and 
scripts, created in the memory of this consciousness, we would know nothing 
of it. The essence 'of this memory is, however, not the dominant 
consciousness which ordered it, but the slavish consciousness which built it. 
As for the slavish consciousness itself, it recognises the need for life 
above its own autonomous self-consciousness. It thus concedes its autonomy 
to the victorious self-consciousness. The slavish consciousness is defined by 
its dependence upon life, its fixation with the worldly realm of things. It 
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cannot overcome the necessity of life, since to do so would mean facing death 
by risking its life in battle. 30 The slavish consciousness is unable to 
completely negate, and thus conceptually appropriate, life. The consciousness 
of the slave is established as derivative and secondary to that of its master. 
His identity is dependent in every sense upon that of his master. However, 
insofar as he is dependent upon the master, this dependency becomes 
transformed into a relation to what Hegel terms thinghood. In other words, 
the slave must work in order to stay alive. He is dependent upon his ability 
to shape the things around in accord with the wishes of his master. 
Thus, since the slave has to do the work of the master he has to 
partially negate the world in order to create the artifacts of the master's 
desire. Through this submissive activity, the activities of obedience, learning, 
and creating, work is realised as the actualisation of the ideas of the master 
in the objective world of things. Thus, it is through the deferral of Desire, the 
desire of the slave, that the idea takes on reality, and is realised as an 
objective thing in the world. The Slavish consciousness, however, also 
recognises its own autonomy in its power to negate the world, and to create 
30 Hannah Arendt reminds us what was necessary to be considered a free man in the 
Greek Polis: "Whoever entered the political realm had first to be ready to risk his life, and 
too great a love for life obstructed freedom, was a sure sign of slavishness. Courage 
therefore became the political virtue par excellence, and only those men who possessed 
it could be admitted to a fellowship that was political in content and purpose and thereby 
transcended the mere togetherness imposed on all - slaves, barbarians, and Greeks alike - 
through the urgencies of life. " And then in a footnote: `philgpsychia ("love of life") and 
cowardice became identified with slavishness. Thus, Plato could believe that he had 
demonstrated the natural slavishness of slaves by the fact that they had not preferred death 
to enslavement (Republic 386A). ... To understand the ancient attitude toward slavery, it is not immaterial to remember that the majority of slaves were defeated enemies and that 
generally only a small percentage were born slaves. ... Greek slaves usually were of the 
same nationality as their masters; they had proved their slavish nature by not committing 
suicide, and since courage was the political virtue par excellence, they had thereby shown 
their "natural' unworthiness, their unfitness to be citizens. " Arendt, H., The Human 
Condition, p. 36 & n. 30. 
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in accordance with its Desire through its work: 
Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of 
what he truly is. In the moment which corresponds to desire in 
the lord's consciousness, it did seem that the aspect of 
unessential relation to the thing fell to the lot of the bondsman, 
since in that relation the thing retained its independence. Desire 
has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby 
its unalloyed feeling of self. But that is the reason why this 
satisfaction is only a fleeting one, for it lacks the side of 
objectivity and permanence. Work, on the other hand, is desire 
held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work 
forms and shapes the thing. [POS p. 118] 
The slave thus comes to recognise his autonomy in his work. For the worker 
must shape precisely what he feared in his confrontation with the sovereign 
consciousness of the lord. What he actually feared was negating the object 
before him, appropriating it and making it his own. In other words, the slavish 
self-consciousness's fear of death prevented it from negating the independent 
being-for-self of the master, and making itself independent. This moment of 
absolute fear, however, which instills the need for obedience and service, 
teaches self-consciousness how to appropriate independence. This is in a way 
which will not destroy the "other" self-consciousness, that is, the other 
moment of self-consciousness, in which case true recognition could not take 
place: 
For, in fashioning the thing, the bondsman's own negativity, his 
being-for-self, becomes an object for him only through his 
setting at nought the existing shape confronting him. But this 
objective negative moment is none other than the alien being 
before which it has trembled. Now, however, he destroys this 
alien negative moment, posits himself as a negative in the 
permanent order of things, and thereby becomes for himself, 
someone existing on his own account. ... [I]n fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that 
he himself exists essentially in his own right. [POS p. 118] 
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The asymmetrical recognition of the master and slave cannot satisfy desire, 
because the master is never recognised by an equal. True recognition can only 
occur through the mediation of work, in which the object is negated. This 
negation leaves behind it a permanent mark in the form of the monument - the 
worked upon, or negated, object. This permanence is nothing other than the 
mark of self-consciousness in history. It reminds self-consciousness, or 
presents it with the evidence of what it is: the substantial negativity of the 
pure being-for-self of the subject. In other words, the slavish consciousness 
sees itself as established, as having its essence in external reality. This is 
nothing other than the permanent or eternal mode of the existence of the 
object. The self of the slave thus realises itself in terms of the historical 
mediation of itself in its own work. Its essence is historical, and eventually 
history, its concept and its deyelopment, will bring self-consciousness to the 
absolute knowledge of the phenomenological "we. " 
This, at least, is the story as Hegel tells it. But what about the moment 
of pure immediate being-for-self of the master? Surely it was that moment in 
consciousness which undertook the necessary risk of a life and death struggle 
which wedged the absolute fear of death into the heart of the slavish 
consciousness and drove it to work? What exactly is its meaning in 
consciousness? Hegel simply internalises the split between the independent 
and dependent consciousness, determining it as an illusion for the 
phenomenological consciousness, but is this really so simple to do? Perhaps 
there never was an illusory sovereign consciousness of the master which had 
faced the risk of death? This, of course, would have heavy repercussions for 
the journey of the phenomenological "we" through Hegel's Phenomenology 
of Ste. Without this moment of risk, and the subsequent moment of work, 
there is, in terms of Hegel's logic, no true history, and there is no "we. " 
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The importance of the master in this dialectic is that its moment of self- 
consciousness serves as a formal pivot, around which the true form of self- 
consciousness establishes itself. Once this has been achieved the self- 
consciousness of the lord is revealed as illusory and inessential, and is 
appropriated as such. This is because, as has been said, this aspect of self- 
consciousness never achieves the full recognition necessary to the 
establishment of the substantial form of its being-for-self. It is recognised 
only by the slavish consciousness, which mediates its truth. This means that 
the dependent inessential consciousness of the slave is actually the 
articulation of the truth of the lord, because it is this consciousness which 
affirms the essence of his identity. Because his pure being-for-self is not 
recognised by an independent self-consciousness, but a dependent one, he 
cannot be certain of his own objective independence. It is itself still purely 
subjective, and therefore inessential: 
The latter's [the lord's] essential nature is to exist only for 
himself; he is the sheer negative power for whom the thing is 
nothing. Thus he is the pure, essential action in this relationship, 
while the action of the bondsman is impure and unessential. But 
for recognition proper the moment is lacking, that what the lord 
does to the other he also does to himself, and what the 
bondsman does to himself he should also do to the other. The 
outcome is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal. In this 
recognition the unessential consciousness is for the lord the 
object, which constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself.... 
What now really confronts him is not an independent 
consciousness, but a dependent one. He is, therefore, not certain 
of being for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his 
truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its 
unessential action. [POS p. 116-115] 
As such the meaning of the self-consciousness of the lord is revealed to self- 
consciousness in general, to the phenomenological "we, " as a false 
consciousness, an illusory moment of consciousness. Nonetheless, in order 
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to reach the stage of the phenomenological "we, " self-consciousness had to 
endure and experience both the risk of death, and the absolute fear of death. 
If the lord did not truly risk his life against the slave, then the object of the 
slave - the pure being-for-self of the master - would no longer have proved 
its independence. This independence could no longer be the truth of the slave. 
Equally, if the slavish moment of consciousness did not recoil in absolute 
angst in the face of death, represented in the master, then it could not grasp 
that its work was done in the name of absolute negativity, of pure being-for- 
self, and could not appropriate the work of negativity for itself. Work does 
not simply defer desire, it defers the specific desire for death, and in this way 
overcomes or appropriates the negativity of death as its own. In Hegel the 
work of self-consciousness is also a work of mourning. Thus Hegel says of 
self-consciousness and fear: 
it [the self-consciousness of the slave] has experienced this its 
own essential nature. For this consciousness has been fearful, 
not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its 
whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced 
the fear of death, the absolute Lord. ... If it has not experienced 
absolute fear but only some lesser dread, the negative being has 
remained for it something external, its substance has not been 
infected by it through and through. Since the entire contents of 
its natural consciousness have not been jeopardised, determinate 
being still in principle attaches to it; having a `mind of one's 
own' is self-will, a freedom still enmeshed in servitude. ... [I]t is a skill which is a master over some things, but not over the 
universal power and the whole of objective being. [POS pp. 117- 
119] 
Thus self-consciousness, if it is to overcome its fundamental split into subject 
and substance, must undertake a real risk, and experience an absolute fear 
of death. But if the Phenomenology of Spýil is to fulfill its aim, the 
phenomenological "we" which necessarily passes through these historical 
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shapes of consciousness must also re-experience this moment of risk and 
dread if it is to understand its formation and arrive at absolute knowledge. 
Unless it brings this memory back to life, the phenomenological "we" cannot 
understand what it itself means, because it cannot phenomenologically 
experience what it has already passed through. 
The question is whether this is possible. The phenomenological "we, " 
which is Hegel's own historical perspective, has already passed through this 
historical shape of consciousness. Although it has not yet relived this 
moment, it already knows this moment, and its outcome in principle. It 
knows that there can be no actual life or death struggle, no risk of destruction 
and therefore no fear of death for self-consciousness. Is death ever faced in 
the phenomenology of Spirit, does otherness ever really come into question 
in the development of the concept of Spirit? If so, then not from our, or 
Hegel's perspective, which is the perspective of the unified subject, the `I' 
unified in the communal `we. ' But if not, then this phenomenological `we' 
cannot understand its own historical passage, and without this passage and 
understanding, then there is no absolute knowledge, there is no communal 
`we. ' 
And how could we experience the point of pure being-for-self, the 
point of the master? Meaning, always the meaning of the self-consciousness 
of the subject, only occurs with the opening of work and history - specifically 
the work of memory. But the moment of mastery in self-consciousness - the 
infinite transcendence of the `I=I'- arrives before history has began, before 
the slave has begun to work. The moment of mastery occurs in the risk of 
battle, and this risk comes before the opening of history, the work of the slave 
for the master. The meaning of self-consciousness is, however, according to 
Hegel, historical, and this risk of the master is not. The phenomenological 
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`we' cannot, therefore remember or relive this necessary moment of self- 
consciousness, precisely because it occurred for another. This other has no 
meaning in Hegel, or rather, its meaning is forgotten in the historical 
movement of spirit. 
This is likewise true of the fear of death which spurs the slave onto 
work. It may or may not be true that self-consciousness experiences this 
absolute fear of death, but it is impossible to relive it from the perspective of 
the phenomenological "we. " From this perspective we already know that self- 
consciousness cannot die. If either moment is destroyed in death then self- 
consciousness could not have arrived at the perspective of the 
phenomenological "we" It is from this perspective that we know in advance 
what the principle of recognition is. Since recognition forms the foundation 
of spirit, and the overcoming of the duality of subject and substance in which 
the phenomenological "we" is situated, then we already know that 
recognition has taken place, and that neither the master nor the slave died 
either in battle or in servitude. There is no need to fear death - historically 
there was never any death of self-consciousness, not even the chance of it - 
the phenomenological "we" cannot experience that which, for it, can never 
happen. 
The Economy of Truth 
What then is the status of the absolute knowledge possessed by the 
phenomenological "we, " at the end of its historical journey, in which it 
remembers and relives the former shapes of self-consciousness? Can it really 
be that subject is reunited with substance at the end of time? Is it really true 
that the subject now exists in-itself as pure being-for-self, and as being-for- 
self, in-itself? Is the unity of apperception, the "I=I" now substantially 
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reflected and mediated in the communal "we, " and vice versa? 
If we examine the structure of the experience that the 
phenomenological `eve" has in the master-slave dialectic, we will see that the 
answer to these questions evades us. We will find we cannot answer these 
questions because this experience threatens the very structure of these 
questions themselves with an undeterminable non-meaning. It decentres the 
subject and its meaning as the locus of thought. This unsettles the whole of 
Hegel's system, which itself centres around the transcendental subject. 
Specifically, the phenomenological consciousness of the communal 
"we" of absolute knowledge - Spirit - is utterly unable to re-experience the 
moment of pure being-for-self of consciousness - articulated as the master's 
risk of life and death. It is also utterly unable to re-experience the moment of 
absolute fear of the slavish consciousness in the face of death. Both these 
moments are absolutely necessary to the formation of spirit proper. 
The point is that these moments of consciousness are a necessary 
experience to the Hegelian system, and yet the consciousness which this 
system produces cannot experience them. The phenomenological "we" is a 
fully historical consciousness. This means that its meaning only obtains 
insofar as it is substantially historical, i. e. permanent, eternal and 
remembered. The experience of risk and absolute fear, however, can never 
be, especially in the Hegelian sense, a moment of memory. Memory is, for 
Hegel, internalisation and appropriation - this is the essence of the dialectical 
development of Spirit. True memory is the property of the phenomenological 
`eve" which sees through the illusions of its preceding forms. Once the reason 
for the risk and the fear is known, i. e. remembered, there is no possibility of 
remembering such an experience. As such both risk and fear of death are 
moments which precede, and exceed, historical consciousness, as its 
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condition of possibility. These moments of consciousness are the pure 
transcendence of self-consciousness's pure being-for-self - the "I=I, " in other 
words, the Cogito. 
The truth of the phenomenological "we" is thus a lie. It speculates 
upon an experience which it cannot remember or determine. Only the other 
can "have" this experience, except it cannot remember it. However, Hegel's 
historical subject conveniently forgets to remind itself that it cannot remember 
having that particular experience. This forgetfulness is extremely beneficial. 
The profit on the speculation of the phenomenological "we" is nothing other 
than absolute knowledge - that it does not actually properly belong to spirit, 
but to the other, is something worth forgetting. The lie consists in acting as 
if the phenomenological consciousness has actually had that experience, and 
can determine its meaning as being illusory. If Hegel's historical subject is to 
attain absolute knowledge in the form of the phenomenological "we" then it 
cannot ascribe the possibility of the experience of death to what amounts to 
the totally other of the system, that which it fails to appropriate, but must 
repress if it is to reach its aim. It is not so much a matter of simply letting the 
moment of pure being-for-self embodied in the lord fall to the ground, it is 
rather that the phenomenological consciousness can never know whether the 
lord actually had this experience (let alone what it meant). This means that 
the master-slave dialectic is itself also a fabrication on the part of the 
phenomenological "eve, " in that it ascribes a determinate meaning to this 
experience of the essentially other, when such an experience must exceed all 
such determination. 
And what does this mean for the phenomenological "we"? Hegel has 
already outlined the consequence: 
determinate being still in principle attaches to it; having a `mind 
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of one's own' is self-will, a freedom still enmeshed in servitude. 
Just as little as the pure form can become essential being for it, 
just as little is that form, regarded as extended to the particular, 
a universal formative activity, an absolute Notion; rather it is a 
skill which is a master over some things, but not over the 
universal power and the whole of objective being. [POS p. 119] 
The subject in Hegel, like that in Descartes and Kant, remains breached in its 
essence, between its formal identity and its substance, expressed by Hegel as 
history. They represent two moments of infinite transcendence in relation to 
one another, corresponding to the moments of the Cogito and God in 
Descartes, and the unity of apperception and space in Kant. All have posited 
the subject in terms of a reconciliation of these two moments. If this 
reconciliation is not possible, however, it is Hegel who has already pointed 
to what the subject as the form of consciousness amounts to: a power of 
fabrication. Thus the subject can at least take a profit from its fabrication, but 
only at the expense of what is other to the subject's cognition, for only 
through its repression does the subject have something to say. 
4. The Aporias of the Subject 
This brings us back to my original question, how to know what someone 
means? In the foregoing analyses, my original question has undergone a 
certain transformation. Drawing the threads of this transformation together is 
perhaps now possible. 
Firstly, however, we should examine the filaments teased out from this 
question "How to know what someone means? " in these cursory analyses of 
the subject. We can, under the general heading of the transcendent infinite, 
and in strict relation to it, detect three aporias. These are as follows: 
1. The necessity, and simultaneous impossibility, of the reflective subject 
knowing what the transcendent infinite objectively is in relation to the Cogito, 
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if the objectivity of the subject's judgement is to be justified. We have 
implicitly followed this aporia in our reading of Descartes. Here we saw the 
necessity of Descartes' positing of an infinite transcendence stretching 
beyond the scope of the subject's judgement. The concept of the subject must 
refer to this transcendent infinite if its judgement is to have a "subjective" or 
representational content. From this we can provisionally conclude that the 
concept of the subject includes a necessary referentiality in the direction of 
the transcendent infinite. However, we also saw that if the subject is to be 
assured of the truth of its representations or judgements then it must be able 
to determine the meaning of this transcendent infinite. Descartes attempts to 
achieve this through a determinate notion of a non-deceiving God. We have 
seen that such a determination is illegitimate, and amounts to a belief or 
fiction. Such a fiction represents the repression of all reference to a 
transcendent infinity. `Descartes' belief in a subject rooted objective 
knowledge is thus based in this repressional fiction. 
2. Again, the necessity, and the simultaneous impossibility, of the subject 
reaching an objective decision, or judgement, within the Cogito itself, as to 
whether the subject's judgement is justified, in the face of the transcendent 
infinite. We have witnessed this in our reading of Kant. Here we saw how it 
is necessary to account for a condition within the subject, on the basis of 
which the truth of my representations or. judgements can be justified. This 
condition is the pure intuition of time, which is the subjective condition that 
determines the possibility of judgement of an empirical object which appears 
"outside" the subject. This is because it determines the possibility of this 
"outside, " i. e. space, in general. We have seen, however, that space is 
necessarily represented as infinite, as is time. 
This means that neither condition can be legitimately subject to a 
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determination. Time and space, however, can only appear or be represented, 
insofar as their respective forms are determined in the apperception of an 
object in judgement. Such an appearance or representation of either time or 
space thus once again represents a repression of the subject's necessary 
referentiality to a transcendent infinite. The' positing of the conditions of a 
pure intuition of time, and a pure intuition of space is in no way verifiable, 
and therefore represents a belief or fiction. Kant's belief in a subject rooted 
transcendental knowledge is thus also based upon a repressional belief or 
fiction. 
3. Finally, the necessity and simultaneous impossibility, of the subject 
knowing, when it thinks it has arrived at such a decision, whether its 
assertion is true. 'I We have seen this in our reading of Hegel. Here we saw 
how Hegel takes over the Kantian representation of the subject in terms of 
transcendental idealism, thinking that, in principle, such a system articulates 
the true form of the subject. He must, however, account for the reconciliation 
of the formal identity of the subject - the Cogito - with its true and proper 
substance, the representational content of the subject's judgement, which 
31 The difficulty of defining the "structure" of these aporias in such a fashion is almost 
immediately apparent, as is the dislocative force of the thought of aporia as such. The 
demand for a justification of the assertion of the "structure" of such aporias actually insists 
upon such a set of distinctions, and simultaneously renders these distinctions, insofar as 
they express, or present themselves, insofar as they are true, invalid and illegitimate. These 
distinctions are both necessary and impossible - they collapse in upon themselves precisely 
because, legitimately, they remain indistinct - the interwoven threads of a textual fabric. 
The condition of this textual fabrication (which includes "meaning") is described by 
Derrida as the movement of differance. This movement describes the possibility and 
impossibility of a fundamental a differentiation of meaning which is, according to these 
aporias, simultaneously both a) temporal and spatial (both temporal and nontemporal); b) 
meaningful and meaningless (a meaning which entertains the possibility of being both 
justified, sensible, rational, and illegitimate, senseless, irrational); c) true and fictional (a 
meaning which entertains the possibility of being both truly fictional and fictionally true). 
Meaning as such could not presented, could not be expressed or said. We can therefore 
never express the determinate meaning of these aporias. Cf. Derrida's essay 'Differance. " 
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Hegel interprets as History. Both these moments are infinite in relation to one 
another, and thus Hegel must demonstrate how the concept of the subject 
unites and transcends these two moments of infinity in absolute knowledge. 
In order to so he must show that the history of the subject offered in absolute 
knowledge is the true and proper substantial form of the subject. He must, in 
other words, show that the memory of the phenomenological "we" in relation 
to infinity is true. However, we have seen that this is impossible because the 
subject's "experience" of infinity is always indeterminable, and, as such, 
cannot be determined in its recollection. Hegel's determination of the 
subject's "experience" of the infinite as a fiction or illusion of consciousness 
(in this case the subject's experience of its mortality, represented by the 
moment of Lordship and Bondage in consciousness), is itself illegitimate, and 
amounts to a belief or fiction. Hegel's narration of a true history of the 
subject's relation to the transcendent infinite thus represents a repressional 
fiction. 
If we are to do justice to the concept of the subject, all three of these 
(impossible) conditions must be met and accounted for. The first thing that 
all these aporias demand is that we do justice to the concept of the subject 
and its subjectivity, in its necessary relation to the transcendent infinite, 
without repeating the repressions in which the concept of the subject is 
bound. In order, in the first instance, to assume that one exists as subject, one 
is already answering, is already subsisting in, this demand of the transcendent 
infinite. 
This, of course, does not mean that this demand cannot be ignored, 
hidden away, repressed - these are all ways of answering this demand, but are 
only possible in the face of it. In fact, when one adheres to the traditional 
concepts of being, truth, and knowledge, which fall under, and. are 
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conditioned by, a general matrix of presence, it appears impossible to avoid 
this repression of the revolutionary, irruptive, force of the transcendent 
infinite's demand upon thought. 
This almost unavoidable repression of the demand of the transcendent 
infinite is, however, traceable, through its necessary illegitimacy, in which 
this repression is enforced. Although we cannot recognize a system in itself, 
it is nonetheless possible to read a more or less systematic attempt or wish to 
enforce the laws and edicts of such a system. We can read this wish through 
the fact that the enforceability of its laws is illegitimate, according to the 
logic and order of these very laws. The irruption of the transcendent infinite, 
its dislocation of the determinable horizon of the subject, can therefore be 
read through the more or less systematic attempt to enforce its repression 
through the attempt at controlling the excessive force of these three aporias 
within a system of regulated distinctions. 
The Question of Method: "Deconstruction" 
This raises the question of a critical method. How are we to demonstrate, to 
communicate, to thematise and order, the repressional violence and 
mechanisms of this order in which the concept of the subject is set - the order 
of Reason, which is, in effect, order in general - without repeating these very 
structures, and their violence? How are we to write legitimately on the 
concept of the subject? How are we to avoid the structures of repression 
inherent in perhaps the most dominant discourse in the "West, " a discourse 
which obtains its rule, a rule which structures our perception, our reality, 
through the violent denial of the possibility of any other discourse having a 
sense other than its own? 
This question is by no means new, and has troubled many 
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contemporary thinkers. It could be said that its form has, in one way or 
another, structured much of this century's thought. It forms, however, one of 
the central preoccupations of the writings of Jacques Derrida. His strategy of 
writing, which has been named (perhaps too hastily) deconstruction, is 
perhaps one of the most consistent and enduring attempts to engage with this 
question today, consisting as it does of over twenty five years of response to 
this problem. 
The problem is that we cannot legitimately write in the name of this 
transcendent infinite. This would mean determining its meaning and 
regulating a disruption of the so-called traditional structures of Reason from 
the vantage point of this name. However, the belief in the existence of such 
structures already belongs to the order of Reason itself, as does their 
denouncement. 
This means that we are not in a position to decide whether a violence 
carried out in the name of the transcendent infinite is any more or less 
legitimate than the violence of the order it would disrupt. It is perhaps this 
undecidability - its vertiginous play - which forms the condition of the need 
to answer this incessant call for legitimacy inscribed within the relation 
between the subject's Cogito and the transcendent infinite. 
In his essay "The Afterword"32 Derrida describes this space of and 
play of undecidability as follows: 
The third [meaning of jeu] remains heterogeneous both to the 
dialectic and the calculable [the orders of sensibility]. In 
accordance with what is only ostensibly a paradox, this 
particular undecidable opens the field of decision or of 
decideability. It calls for decision in the order of 
ethical-political responsibility. It is even its necessary condition. 
32 Derrida, J. "The Afterword", Limited Inc, referred to as LI. 
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A decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the 
calculable program that would destroy all responsibility by 
transforming it into a programmable effect of determinate 
causes. There can be no moral or ethical responsibility without 
this trial and passage by way of the undecidable. Even if a 
decision seems only to take a second and not to be preceded by 
any deliberation, it is structured by this experience and 
experiment of the undecidable. [LI p. 116] 
The obvious question which arises here is: if undecidability in general 
constitutes the positive possibility of a decision in general, then how is one 
to decide what constitutes this particular space of undecidability? 
This is precisely the paradox which Derrida refers to in the above 
citation. It has further implications with regard to "this particular 
undecidable. " For if this particular undecidable "calls for a decision in the 
order of ethical-political responsibility, " it itself remains structurally vague 
or ambiguous. Whilst it enables, for the above cited reasons, a decision 
entailing an ethical-political responsibility, it also limits what might be termed 
the full realisation of such a decision. 
For Derrida, any discourse which makes a truth claim relies upon an 
implicit understanding and appropriation of its historical context, as a context 
which has produced the conventions which underlie the discursive formations 
in which a truth claim can be posited. These conventions themselves have 
been produced by a `primordial' decision of thought. 33 It is thought of as 
primordial principally because it has decided (or defined) the discursive order 
through which we are able to conceive of history as a context upon which 
basis discourse is able to make truth claims: 
33 In Derrida the thought of this decision is further complicated since the thought of such 
`primordiality' of decision as producing a history of meaning is rigorously called into 
question by his discourse. Cf. for example, Positions, pp. 49-50. Referred to as PS. 
76 
What is called "objectivity, " scientific for instance (in which I 
firmly believe, in a given situation), imposes itself only within 
a context which is extremely vast, old, powerfully established, 
stabilised or rooted in a network of conventions (for instance, 
those of language) and yet, still remains a context. And the 
emergence of the value of objectivity (and hence of so many 
others) also belongs to a context. We can call "context" the 
entire "real-history-of-the-world, " if you like, in which this 
value of objectivity and, even more broadly, that of truth (etc. ) 
have taken on meaning and imposed themselves. [LI p. 136] 
Within the historical constellation which we have here specified as the 
subject, within which the modem understanding of "objectivity" and "truth" 
is organised, the relation of the subject's thought to the transcendent infinite 
can be understood as the relation of its meaning to its (essentially non- 
presentable) context. This irreducible relation to a context means that it is 
always possible to transcribe or reiterate the traditional meaning and truth of 
the subject within a new context. This possibility, which is the condition of 
meaning and truth in general, belies the claims of these concepts (and 
conceptuality in general) to an absolute authoritative position. For, in a new 
context, this truth"and meaning of the subject will be necessarily transformed. 
This transformation -a necessary violence, without which there would be no 
signification - in effect undermines this truth and meaning by what amounts 
to its parody through the imitation of its logic. 
It is thus that Derrida, whilst holding that meaning can only be "written 
within the grammar and lexicon of metaphysics, "34 in other words, the order 
of Reason, attempts to write a discourse "meaning-to-say-nothing"[PS p. 14]. 
In order to answer the demand of the undecidable - the relation to the 
transcendent infinite - and not to repeat the repressive violence inherent in 
34 Margins of Philosophy p. 63. 
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Reason, he suspends judgement in writing. 
He does this in general by transcribing "the grammar and lexicon of 
metaphysics" into registers and contexts other than its own. He then follows 
the logic prescribed by this lexicon within this new context in order to 
demonstrate, analyse and undermine the repressional violence exercised in 
the name of this order. The contexts in which this lexicon is transcribed are 
chosen by him as those which the order of reason has already claimed to 
determine, and yet which, a priori, must resist or exceed this determination. 
Thus, by performatively demonstrating this excessive force of both context 
in general, and of the particular contexts which Reason always tries to 
appropriate as its own, into its own categories, Derrida both undermines the 
truth of this determination, and dissipates the effective force of its institution. 
This is thus the work of the dissemination of the order of reason inherent in 
his strategy of writing, and comprises a strategy of double reading. 
In the course of his work he has in several places analysed or 
"deconstructed" the subject, not only in its representation in philosophical 
discourse, but also in its representations in social-historical and 
psychoanalytic discourses. However, remembering my guiding question of 
how to do justice to what someone means, and, taking Derrida's strategy of 
writing into account, reading these analyses can never simply be a question 
of recounting what he means by the subject, and what the subject means after 
his analyses. How is one to intervene, in a writing which ostensibly means 
nothing according to the traditional categories of truth and meaning? This is 
the demand made upon us if we wish to take the relation of the Cogito to the 
transcendent infinite (in Derrida's terms: the relation of the meaning of a text 
to its formative but non-assimilatable context) into account, which we must 
do if we are to do justice to the meaning of the subject. 
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This is a question of strategy. It is clear from the nature of Derrida's 
writing that we cannot simply adopt or take over his strategy of analyses. We 
could never repeat, for example, the unique temporal context in which these 
analyses were written, the historical demands made at the time in question. 
It is, however, always both possible and necessary to recontextualise and 
reorganise these texts in accordance with the demands made by the analysis 
of the Cogito in relation to the transcendent infinite. This would be in order 
to both produce and to dissimulate "new" meaning or meanings of the subject 
within Derrida's texts. In so doing it should be possible to demonstrate, or to 
perform the production of the subject's meaning in its necessary relation to 
the transcendent infinite without reducing either Derrida's text, or this 
relation, to a determinate horizon of meaning. The truth of the subject, as we 
have already begun to glimpse, could always be a fiction. But this fiction is 
by no means meaningless. It is with these facts in mind that we can begin to 
explore Derrida's reading of the subject and subjectivity. 
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Section II: The Transcendence of the Subject's Exteriority 
Part I: A Spatial Shadow of the Transcendental Subject 
These deaf-mutes have learned 
only a gesture- language, but each A picture is conjured up which 
of them talks to himself inwardly in seems to fix the sense 
a vocal language. " - Now, don't unambiguously, ... the form of 
you understand that? But how do I expression we use seems to have 
know whether I understand it?! - been designed for a god, who 
What can I do with this information knows what we cannot know; he 
(if it is such)? The whole idea of sees the whole of each , 
of those 
understanding smells fishy here. I infinite series and he sees into 
do not know whether I am to say I human consciousness. For us, of 
understand it or don't understand course, these forms of expression 
it. I might answer "It's an English are like pontificals which we may 
sentence; apparently quite in order put on, but cannot do much with, 
- that is, until one wants to do since we lack the effective power 
something with it; it has a that would give these vestments 
connection with other sentences meaning and purpose. 
which makes it difficult for us to In the actual use of 
say that nobody really knows what expressions we make detours, we 
it tells us; but everyone who has go by side-roads. We see the 
not been calloused by philosophy straight highway before us, but of 
notices that there is something course we cannot use it, because it 
wrong here. is permanently closed. (35) 
In the early part of the twentieth century the Cartesian thought ego cogito 
ergo sum supposedly underwent a radical revitalisation in the form of 
Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Transcendental 
phenomenology is, for Husserl, the reinvention of philosophy according to the 
radicalisation of certain Cartesian motifs, which he considers to constitute the 
core of thought itself. 
For Husserl, statements about the world of which we are conscious can 
only be true insofar as they are based upon a priori apodictic evidence. This 
35 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, para. 348 & 426. 
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evidence arises specifically from the rigorous phenomenological descriptions 
of the all-embracing transcendental laws which govern the transcendental 
subject in its intentional constitution of objects of consciousness. This new 
science, grounded in the indisputable truth of Descartes' famous maxim, and 
true to the spirit of Descartes' radical venture, promised to secure the 
foundations for a new kind of knowledge which would be absolutely certain. 
In his essay "Speech and Phenomena" Derrida attempts to demonstrate 
that Husserl's enterprise is not only false but impossible. He holds that, 
although phenomenology is one of the most rigorously critical discourses in 
the Western philosophical tradition, the powerful critical tool of 
phenomenological description misses, or even avoids, the dismantling of 
certain concepts which are uncritically taken over from this tradition. 
For Derrida, the problem is not just that these concepts are simply 
taken over, and remain uncriticised, and thus form an unjustified space within 
phenomenological discourse. It is that they form the very condition of a 
philosophical project in general, and that their criticism would threaten 
Husserl's project in its entirety. 
Thus, if certain grounding concepts in Husserl's enterprise remain 
internally uncriticised then this means that his project is, in one way or 
another, unjustified, and thus cannot realize its intention. This illegitimacy of 
Husserl's project is absolutely necessary to its articulation. The concepts 
which Derrida holds that Husserl uncritically takes over are organised under 
a general matrix in which being in general is always interpreted as simple 
undivided presence. Being in general is, for Husserl, always that which falls 
r 
into the realm of intentional conscious life, and conscious life is always what 
is present to the intentional subject. Thus, this interpretational matrix, which 
Derrida believes to have dominated the philosophical tradition since at least 
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Plato, " imposes itself through the determination of the conditions under 
which the subject can be objectively articulated. This determination means 
that being in general is always articulated as the present intentional 
consciousness of the subject. In other words, Derrida holds that Husserl's 
analyses of the structures of the intentional consciousness belonging to the 
transcendental subject operate with, and are founded upon, an uncritical 
conception of the language in which the subject is articulated and articulates 
itself - the language in which the subject has meaning. This language, holds 
Derrida, is the language of presence. 
Derrida's contention is that Husserl's uncritical conception of language 
reduces meaning, in general, to presence, and the meaning of the subject, in 
particular, to what it can immediately and transparently express to itself, in 
what it says in its vocative enunciation. Within the operation of this 
36 This can be understood in terms of Derrida's deep set interpretation of the "genesis" 
of the conceptual network termed metaphysics from Ancient Greek philosophy right up 
until contemporary philosophy. The'Greek word for Being - on - has always been thought 
in relation to its determination in truth (aletheia - translated as unveiling) as ousia and 
parousia, translated as presence, a conceptual constellation within which Being can only 
be understood within its own inherent telos. As soon as Being, which as Heidegger says, 
"is the transcendens pure and simple" [BT p. 62] and as such undefinable, is determined 
within this network, Being's revelation in truth can never yet be present but is always 
promised as something yet to be presented, as something yet to come. This temporal 
structure of the telos maintains its dominance in its historical translation and sedimentation 
through this (impossible) promise. This promise of an original restitution -a presentation - 
of the meaning of Being - is an onto-theological determination of Being which effectively 
closes off any and every reference which would extend outside of this constellation by 
denying meaning to every mark which would transgress its self-constituted boundaries, 
defined in terms of the revelation or presentation of Being as Presence. Such a mark, 
however, includes Being understood as transcendens. In effect this constellation 
constitutes, in Freudian terms, an unsuccessful repression of its own proper origin, which, 
in the terms of this constellation, can neither be original, nor proper. Derrida attempts, in 
his work of deconstruction, to disturb the enforcement of this repression by emphasising 
both the necessity of the transgression of these self-imposed boundaries to the formation 
of this conceptual constellation, and the impossibility for this constellation to acknowledge 
this necessary transgression. 
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reduction, a certain spatialisation or spacing inherent within language itself, 
which Derrida will show to be necessary to the constitution of meaning, is 
repressed. This repression occurs when meaning is understood as the 
presence contained in the living speech of the subject. 
Before we analyse Derrida's reading of Husserl, we should look at 
what such a spatialisation within the language and meaning of the subject can 
in fact signify. Surely meaning, especially when considered in relation to the 
intentional subject, can only be understood as an ideality? Spatiality can, as 
such, only be understood insofar as it is ideal, and its structure can only be 
presented within the ideal temporal horizon of presence, of what "is. " How, 
then, can we, and how does Derrida, conceive of such a spacing or spatiality, 
and what role can it play in the ideality of the subject's meaning, if, in its 
conception, it is always reduced to this ideality? 
One of Denida's acknowledged influences is Martin Heidegger, who 
also criticised Husserl's conception of the transcendental subject and 
intentionality. In Being and Time, Heidegger displaces the traditional 
conceptions of time in philosophy as the "now, " or the simple present, by 
drawing upon Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the horizonal 
structures of intentional temporality. Heidegger departs from Husserl's 
analyses, even if not from phenomenology itself, in several decisive ways. 
One of the most important moves away from Husserl is the displacement of 
what Husserl considers to be the purely intentional sphere of meaning by 
Heidegger's "concept" of Dasein or being-there. 
Briefly stated, Dasein is neither subject nor object, but rather the space 
or context in which meaning in general can signify. Dasein is the existential- 
ontological condition which enables the signification of being to be 
questioned. Heidegger effectively uses this concept to decentralize and 
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destabilise the traditional idea that meaning is located within the present(able) 
interiority of the subject's intentional sphere. Meaning, for Heidegger, can 
only signify within a context for which meaning is there, that is, already out 
there, in an already existent world. For example, the meaning of a door, this 
door which stands before me, is such that it is there before my subjective 
judgement. Its "spatial" existence means that its being has a meaning beyond 
my subjective determination of its meaning. Its "spatiality" means that it is 
always possible that this door has another meaning, other than that which it 
has for me, for example, that it can be seen and used by someone else. 
The spatiality of Dasein thus plays a decisive role in Heidegger's 
existential analyses of the meaning of Being. In order to come closer to what 
Derrida can mean by such a spacing within the meaning of the subject, and 
meaning in general, we will closely read and interpret Heidegger's account 
of the relation of spatiality to meaning in general. To do this we must read the 
meaning of Dasein's spatiality, as analysed in Being and Time. 
Firstly, we should take a brief look at Husserl's notion of 
transcendental subjectivity in order to outline the general problematic inherent 
in his project of phenomenology. In this short analysis we will attempt to 
sketch the relation between the subject's other and its spatial horizon, 
understood as the horizon which makes intentional appearance possible, in 
order to contextualise our reading of Heidegger. 
5. What Husserl omits 
The problem can be formally expressed as the solipsism of the transcendental 
subject in phenomenology. This is the inability of the Husserlian 
transcendental subject to experience and articulate something which is other 
than itself. 
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Husserl rejects this particular objection of solipsism by arguing that all 
meaning is constituted within the intentional transcendental subject, and 
signifies only insofar as it belongs to this constitutive sphere. For Husserl 
there is, in the end, no meaning other than that which is constituted within this 
intentional sphere, by the subject, for the subject. This constitutive sphere 
thus forms the basis of objective determination of what is other than my ego: 
Restricting ourselves to the ultimate transcendental ego and the - 
universe of what is constituted in him, we can say that a division 
of his whole transcendental field of experience belongs to him 
immediately, namely the division into the sphere of his ownness 
(an experience in which everything "other" is "screened off') - 
and the sphere of what is "other. " Yet every consciousness of 
what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in the 
former sphere. ... Within and 
by means of this ownness the 
transcendental ego constitutes, however, the "Objective" world, 
as a universe of being that is other than himself - and 
constitutes, at the first level, the other in the mode: alter ego. 
[CM p. 100] 
Insofar as there is an other, somebody, or something else, the meaning of this 
other is always constituted on the basis of the Same. This meaning is 
constituted within the sphere of the transcendental subject to which it is 
ultimately reducible, and by which it is ultimately regulated. Yet there still 
remains the problem of how this universal synthesis of the transcendental 
subject can constitute something which is truly other to it. How could this be 
possible without the subject risking, or rather factually instituting, the rupture 
of the universality of its sphere of ownness or Sameness? 
This same problem is admitted by Husserl, but is articulated at another 
site in the intentional analysis, as the problem of infinite regression which 
occurs in the conception of internal time consciousness: 
The fundamental form of this universal synthesis, the form that 
makes all other syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all 
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embracing consciousness of internal time. ... The distinction between (internal) time itself and the consciousness of (internal) 
time can be expressed also as that between the subjective 
process in internal time, or the temporal form of this process, 
and the modes of its temporal appearances, as the 
corresponding "multiplicities. " As these modes of appearances 
which make up the consciousness of internal time, are 
themselves "intentive components of conscious life" 
["intentionale Erlebnisse"] and must in turn be given in 
reflection as temporalities, we encounter here a paradoxical 
fundamental property of conscious life, which seems to be 
infected with an infinite regress. [CM p. 43] 
This infinite regression occurs at the very heart of Husserl's phenomenology 
itself, the subject's reflection of itself, the subject's identification of its own 
identificatory synthesis. The infinite regress occurs because, as soon as the 
subject has identified this temporal synthesis in the necessary passing by of 
appearances, then this identification itself passes by as an ideal appearance, 
which is simultaneously identified, i. e. idealised, in the consciousness of the 
subject's internal time flow, ad infinitum. 
Thus, the constitutive idealisation, which is- essentially the 
transcendental epoche, essential to establishing the apodictic certainty of the 
transcendental subject, cannot be essentially differentiated from a 
phenomenal appearance. However, the securing of phenomenology as a first 
science, rests in establishing this division, in apodictically verifying an 
original constitutive horizon which does not fade as soon as it appears. 
This is, in fact, a restatement of the problem of the identification of the 
other within the thought of phenomenology. Husserl, for his part, contends 
that the charge of solipsism is misdirected against phenomenology: 
Transcendency in every form is an immanent existential 
characteristic, constituted within the ego. Every imaginable 
sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called 
immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of 
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transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes 
sense and being. The attempt to conceive the universe of true 
being as something lying outside the universe of possible 
consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two 
being related to one another merely externally, is nonsensical. 
They belong together essentially; and as belonging together 
essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only 
absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If 
transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, 
then an outside is precisely - nonsense. [CM p. 84] 
The question then arises how true reflection can be possible? If there is no 
outside, then from which vantage point can the subject look upon itself, 
reflect upon itself as an object for consciousness and not a "mere" 
appearance? 
More precisely, if the meaning of the other is objectively constituted 
"within" the intentional consciousness of subjectivity, then reflection "in the 
other" is rendered possible, but the recourse to an absolute truth of 
subjectivity is lost in appearance. Reflection can no longer decide whether the 
phenomenon appearing before its eye is truly an appearance in accordance 
with its a priori constitutive syntheses, or, whether it is merely the 
appearance of an appearance. This is because the constitutive syntheses are 
themselves an appearance for consciousness, and at the "deepest level" of 
intentional analysis. 
If, as Husserl says in his next sentence, "But even nonsense is always 
a mode of sense and has its nonsensicalness within the sphere of possible 
insight" [ibid. ], then there can be no essential justification for an essential 
difference between sense and nonsense within the realm of ownness which 
marks the ideality and universality of transcendental subjectivity. Without this 
differentiation there can be no absolute or apodictic verification of the true 
sense of an object intended within and by the transcendental subject. This is 
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because one no longer has recourse to an essential differentiation between the 
ontical and ontological status of the intended object. 
Thus either "otherness" has no place within transcendental subjectivity, 
in which case it falls into solipsism, or else its quest for a reflective truth is 
rent apart by the space, the paradox of the infinite regress, opened by the 
necessary appearance of temporality as a phenomenon of consciousness. In 
order to conceive of time in terms of its appearance or phenomenality in 
consciousness we must resort to the reference to a spatial horizon, as we saw 
in our reading of Kant. The necessity of this reference to a "spatial" horizon 
means that time cannot form the final or original constitutive horizon of 
meaning for the subject. This means that a) the spatial horizon of the 
phenomenological transcendental subject cannot be reduced to, or wholly 
determined by the subject's temporal horizon and b) we can then no longer 
talk of a constitutive temporal horizon independent of a spatial horizon and 
vice versa, and that neither horizon can originally constitute or determine the 
subject's intentional meaning. 
This problem can be expressed otherwise as Husserl's neglect of the 
irreducibility of the subject's relation to infinity which would exceed the 
temporal determination of the transcendental subject. This structure is such 
that it would both render the subject possible, and simultaneously rend it 
asunder, in the face of a necessary relation to its non-constituted infinite 
other. 
We can now read the structure of this relation in the first sections of 
Heidegger's Being and Time, where he analyses the existential-ontological 
horizons of meaning. We will focus in particular upon his understanding of 
Dasein's spatial horizon in relation to the possibility of signification, as 
articulated in the structures of Dasein's primordial and irreducible Being-in. 
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It will be argued that the clue to Heidegger's subjection of the traditional 
conceptions of time to a radical trembling, articulated as the ecstatic 
temporalisation of temporality, is implicitly held within these structures. The 
analyses of these structures should also help us to grasp Derrida's 
understanding of the need for an account of an irreducible "spacing" within 
language, and the relation of the subject to its (non-constituted) other. 
6. The Meaning of 
In Being and Time Heidegger sets out to clarify the conditions under which 
the word Being can take on meaning and generally come into question. For 
Heidegger, meaning only arises insofar as there is an interpretational structure 
within which Being can take on a sense. He holds that without a relationship 
between such an interpretational structure and the word Being we could never 
even begin to say what something "is. " Nothing could take on meaning, 
because meaning is indissociable from the interpretational structure formed 
around the particular verb forms of the word Being. 
For Heidegger, we must first ask about the meaning of the word Being 
before we can begin to legitimately ask about the meaning of the things 
around us, about the meaning of the entities we see before us in our everyday 
living. Historically, that is, in Western history, such a question has nearly 
always been posed from within the resources of the philosophical tradition, 
but even here, Heidegger holds, the question of the meaning of Being has 
always been passed over in favour of the question of the meaning of 
particular entities. The problem is that because the question of the meaning 
of Being is almost only found, even in this derivative form, in the language 
of philosophy, this language, and this way of posing the question of the 
meaning of Being, has effected and dominated this meaning, and in such a 
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way as to shroud other ways of questioning and experiencing it. 
However, even if we have no direct way of questioning the meaning 
of Being itself, even if the proper orientation towards this question is already 
shrouded in the very fact of the necessity of an orientation toward Being (if 
both the orientation and the word Being are to take on significance), this 
orientation and this meaning remain a fact. As Heidegger says: 
We do not know what `Being' means. But even if we ask `What 
is "Being"? ', we keep within an understanding of the `is', 
though we are unable to fix conceptually what that `is' signifies. 
We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that 
meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague 
understanding of Being is still a fact. [BT. p. 25]. 
This orientation toward Being, this vague understanding of the word "Being, " 
its usage in everyday language, in general inquiry, is also expressed in this 
rough and ready language as- a way of being. 
In fact, the first half of Heidegger's analysis of the question of Being, 
demands that we pay close attention to the lexical scope of the word "way" 
in relation to the word "Being. " One of the conditions of the multiple senses 
of this word, in terms of a way of being, is that something has this way of 
being as its own Being. As condition of the scope of the sense of the word 
"way, " as used in this phrase, something has, as its "way of being", a vague 
understanding, an asking of, a having access to, even a rough, shrouded 
indeterminate access to, the meaning of this word Being. Heidegger terms this 
entity, which has these orientations towards Being as it own being, Dasein. 
Without this entity, the phrase "way of being" would lose even its rough and 
ready sense, for there would be nothing to have a way of being. 
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Displacing the Cartesian Subject 
This consideration of the conditions of asking about being, as a way of Being, 
is meant to displace Descartes' thought of the ego cogito ergo sum. 
Descartes, holds Heidegger, was prejudiced by the thought of the medieval 
scholastics. ' Because of this, Descartes never questioned the being of the res 
cogitans (a thinking thing), assuming that it was a finite ens creatum, created 
by the ens infinitum, God. It is through this interpretation of the nature of the 
res cogitans, that Descartes can think that God would secure our objective 
judgement. This is because God is posited as the final ens increatum, the true 
source of all things. We have already seen that a determination of the ens 
infinitum as ens increatum must be illegitimate, because the ens infinitum 
must exceed the finite judgement of the res cogitans. 
Far from providing a. radical new foundation for the knowledge of 
entities, Descartes merely carried over the old structures of thought which he 
wished to criticise. These structures stretch back to ancient Greek thought, 
where Descartes' thought of the subiectum, as that within which things come 
to appear, is a translation of the Greek thought hypokeimenon. Heidegger 
thus elsewhere says that, in Descartes: 
the very essence of man itself changes, in that man becomes 
subject. We must understand this word subiectum ... as the 
translation of the Greek hypokeimenon. The word names that- 
which-lies-before, which, as ground, gathers everything onto 
itself. This metaphysical meaning of the concept of subject has 
first of all no special relationship to man and none at all to the 
137 
After Descartes, however, Being is almost always understood in terms of the 
present intentional conscious scope of the subject, where the subject is 
37 Heidegger, M., "The Age of the World Picture, " in The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, p. 128. 
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always considered to be the minimum condition of man himself. Heidegger 
does not pose the question of Being, and its disclosure in Dasein, in order to 
simply overcome and do away with Cartesian thought. This is, after all, a way 
of understanding Being, especially in the way it closes off the question of 
Being. In order to comprehend the question of Being, what it is to question 
something like the word "Being, " we must be able to pass through the 
different historical ways of asking and answering this question, so that we can 
begin to understand how this question is approached in modem times. 
What he does argue is that the concept of the subject and subjectivity 
presents a highly abstract way of thinking of our world in terms of a relation 
between a minimum judging subject, and a represented world of objects. 
Heidegger uses the concept of Dasein, and the phenomenological analyses 
and descriptions stemming from this concept, to try and make clear how 
artificial and abstract subject based ways of grasping the meaning of Being 
actually are. 
7. The Practical Nature of Consciousness 
Heidegger puts this problem of our abstract ways of conceiving things in a 
practical context with his famous example of the hammer. Heidegger invokes 
the idea of tools in order to demonstrate the difference between the very 
abstract idea of seeing, or being conscious of, a thing as an object or 
appearance, something present-at-hand, and the seeing, or being conscious 
of a thing as it is used in an everyday context. 
This demonstration does not serve to justify a distinction between a 
pragmatic and a theoretical consciousness of things. Heidegger is rather 
concerned with clarifying the fact that a theoretical grasp of being, conceiving 
of things as present-at-hand has, since early Greek philosophy, obscured the 
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pragmatic "nature" of consciousness. What is radical about Heidegger's 
argument is that he shows that the theoretical "consciousness" obscures this 
pragmatic nature by insisting upon a clear cut distinction between theoria and 
praxis. Heidegger will thus show how when we look closely at the Greek 
idea of pragmata - mere things - it actually interrupts or threatens this 
distinction, calling the interpretation of being as the consciousness of what is 
present into question. 
The meaning of pragmata is rooted in the idea of things that we can 
use, the idea being that things in general are subject to control and ordering. 
Thus, for example, for Plato, the appropriate practical use of a thing is one 
which conforms to its idea, to its theoretical presentation as eidos. For, when 
a hammer is used, is taken in the hand to hammer a nail into wood, or a hole 
in a wall, although the person who hammers may be conscious of the hammer 
in the hand, the hammer is never presented to consciousness as something 
like an appearance which the subject simply "sees. " If one simply looks at a 
hammer in terms of its appearance, then its meaning as a hammer "in-itself' 
tends to fade away. One sees a geometric shape of certain mass and density, 
fabricated from certain materials. But, argues Heidegger, such a manner of 
seeing fundamentally misses the essence of the hammer, such a seeing is far 
removed from understanding its meaning. Even if this theoretical way of 
seeing stipulates that the hammer is a tool to be used in such and such a way, 
for such and such a purpose, it is still remote from the meaning of the tool 
itself. 
It is only when hammering with the hammer that its meaning as a tool 
reveals itself and is most intimately understood. One is not so much conscious 
of the hammer itself. The blur of its motion and the jarring of its strike can 
hardly be said to present the hammer in all its clarity to consciousness. 
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Indeed, if we take the example of driving a car along a well known route it 
is often the case that the driver is hardly aware of driving, let alone aware of 
the car, until his destination is reached. In driving the car, however, the driver 
has all the while almost all too well understood what it is to drive a car, what 
the car is there for. It is the same with the hammer. Its meaning is understood 
in terms of hammering, not in terms of its presentation to consciousness. 
Heidegger thus says: 
the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we 
seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our 
relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it 
encountered as that which it is - as equipment. The hammering 
itself uncovers the specific `manipulability' ["Handlichkeit"] of 
the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses - in 
which it manifests itself in its own right - we call "readiness-to- 
hand" [Zuhandenheit]. [BT p. 98] 
Obviously this understanding is not utterly unconscious or unthought. The 
meaning of the hammer is revealed in terms of the referentiality of its use, the 
in-order-to, and the towards-which the hammering is directed. Thus the 
hammer hammers a nail into the wall, in order that a picture may be hung, or 
the car is driven toward a destination, in order that a meeting may take place. 
Heidegger says that this understanding is therefore not "sightless" or "blind, " 
but is unthematic and non-theoretical. The hammer, and the car, are things 
ready-to-hand, and the understanding or use of things ready-to-hand never 
focuses simply and exclusively on the things themselves, but on their practical 
context, in the direction of what is going to happen, and in terms of what is 
needed in order that such and such a thing might happen. 
This explanation of the ontological understanding of things as ready-to- 
hand still leaves unexplained the fact that we do understand things as present- 
at-hand, in terms of a theoretical understanding, or an idea. Indeed, it is this 
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theoretical understanding which has allowed us here to undertake such a 
description of things as ready-to-hand. Even if the ready-to-hand is 
understood in terms of a referentiality towards other things ready-to-hand, the 
referentiality of the ready-to-hand cannot be devoid of reference to what is 
also present-at-hand. If there were never the appearance of an idea of what 
is to come, of what might or should be, then there would be no toward-which, 
or in-order-to, which the ready-to-hand thing might refer to. There must 
therefore be some manner in which things ready-to-hand can be conceived of 
as present-at-hand, in other words, as intentional objects of cognition. 
This is because it is always possible that certain situations can arise in 
which the ready-to-hand equipment is no longer adequate to the task at hand. 
The hammer, for example, could be the wrong tool for the job, in which case 
it becomes "conspicuous" (auffällig) through its unsuitability for the job at 
hand. Or it is lost, in which case it becomes "obtrusive" (aufdringlich) in the 
need to find it if the work is to be completed. Or else the hammer is broken, 
and becomes "obstinate" (aufsässig) in the attempt to repair it in order to get 
the job done: 
The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all 
have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of 
present-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand. But the ready-to-hand 
is not thereby observed and stared at as something present-at- 
hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still 
bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. [BT. p. 104] 
Heidegger's move here is especially interesting for our reading of the subject. 
In accordance with the tradition, which makes an absolute distinction 
between theoria and praxis, and designates the meaning of a defined term as 
a totality, Heidegger designates the referentiality of the ready-to-hand a 
totality. The referentiality of the ready-to-hand is only perceived, however, 
insofar as its "functional" totality can be interrupted. This interruption or 
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breakdown is articulated in terms of the present-at-hand. Likewise, if we 
attempt to conceive of a world of objects as merely present-at-hand, the 
resulting totality is interrupted by the resistance of the ready-to-hand 
equipment to thematisation. 
What this means is that the consciousness of things from a practical 
point of view and the conception of them from a theoretical point of view are 
intimately dependent upon each other for their respective meanings. Neither 
of these respective meanings - the meaning of a thing understood as object, 
present-at-hand to the conscious subject, or the meaning of a thing 
understood as tool or equipment (Zeug), ready-to-hand to be used by the 
conscious subject - will ever be free of a certain contamination or 
interruption of meaning from the other perspective. 
Both of these perspectives or interpretations are routed in the 
traditional understanding of consciousness and subjectivity, and are 
diametrically opposed to one another. Without this strict opposition between 
theory and praxis, reflection and action, intellectual and practical reasoning, 
the meaning of the subject's judgement, as the locus of intentional 
consciousness, could not make sense. The meaning of the subject's 
judgement depends upon a strict hierarchical division between its theoretical 
and practical realms. 
The Breakdown of Theoria and Praxis 
Perhaps the most familiar version of this original division between theoria 
and praxis, is Descartes' division between mind (or cognition) and body (or 
corporeal extended world). Here the subject's Cogito judges the empirical 
extended world, within which it acts, and reflects and decides upon the 
validity of its judgement. The subject's judgement effectively decides the 
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meaning of the extended corporeal world of objects, including its own 
corporeal action in this world. Without this division the subject effectively 
has no object about which to judge. 
Thus, when Heidegger shows that the two realms are a) not strictly 
divided, and b) not hierarchically arranged, he threatens the assumed 
sovereignty of the subject's judgement. The breakdown of this division would 
suggest that the source of the meaning of the subject, of consciousness itself, 
lies outside the subject, outside of the presence of intentional consciousness. 
This division breaks down as follows: The referential structure of the 
ready-to-hand, which is essentially nonthematic and inconspicuous, can only 
come to light in that it has already been disturbed and becomes obtrusive as 
the present-at-hand. The job that I should be completing also comes to light 
in this obtrusiveness. What I want to do becomes clearer when I am 
immediately prevented from carrying it out by the very tools I intended to 
use. I not only think about the missing tool, I think about other ways of 
completing the job and other tools which I might use. I tend to picture the 
task in its entirety, including other possibilities. 
What Heidegger is arguing is that an ideal representation issues from 
the breakdown of the referential totality of the ready-to-hand equipment. This 
present-at-hand picture of what should be presents the referentiality of the 
ready-to-hand as a totality. Yet the fact of this present-at-hand picture 
demonstrates that if there ever was such a totality, it has broken down. Even 
the representation of things being seen as either ready-to-hand equipment or 
present-at-hand entities is merely present-at-hand, and would therefore miss 
the "thing-in-itself. " What Heidegger appears to be tracing is not two 
interpretations of Being, but rather a fundamental abyss in the articulation of 
Being. The meaning of Being is articulated in the very interruption of its 
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articulation or interpretation as a totality. 
It is this experience which, he holds, gives rise to our understanding of 
a "world. " Whatever this meaning might be, it cannot be presented as a 
totality, which means it cannot be presented. The articulation (or 
presentation) of the meaning of Being always refers to a non-meaning beyond 
or outside the terms of the particular interpretation in which it is articulated. 
Thus, in the case of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, each 
interpretation of the Being of the world only has a meaning insofar as it 
makes reference to the other. The reference to the other means that this 
meaning can never be a totality - it always refers to that which is not and 
cannot be present. On the other hand, this reference to a beyond, or an other, 
forms the condition of possibility of interpretation in general taking on 
meaning. 
This breakdown of the referential totality of the ready-to-hand has thus 
already occurred even before anything has actually broken or gone missing 
because there never was a referential totality in the first place. This totality 
is rather presented to us in the present-at-hand representation of something 
like the meaning of the ready-to-hand. This understanding of the Being of the 
world of which we are aware is always already an interpretation, in which the 
thing is existentially given as being there. The world exists, and already has 
a meaning as a world, which effectively means that the existence of this 
meaning is already an interpretation. This interpretation is therefore obviously 
pre-theoretical, and primordial. Insofar as we understand something as 
something in this interpretation, then this thing is interpreted as already 
having a meaning. Insofar as it has a meaning it both exists and has being, as 
a totality: 
The concept of meaning embraces the formal existential 
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framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an 
understanding interpretation Articulates. Meaning is the "upon 
which " of a projection in terms of which something becomes 
intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore- 
having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception. In so far as 
understanding and interpretation make up the existential state of 
Being of the "there, " "meaning" must be conceived as the 
formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which 
belongs to understanding. [BT p. 193] 
It is only Dasein which can have or not have meaning. Unlike the Cartesian 
or Husserlian concept of subjectivity, in which meaning is constitutively 
intended by the transcendental subject, the concept of Dasein articulates the 
field in which meaning in general obtains. For it is only to Dasein that the 
disclosedness of entities takes place, and this concept is used precisely to 
resist the notion that the meaning of a thing is constituted within this field. 
Dasein is thus conceived as that entity "in" which both an opening and 
a limit point of a conceptual network is delimited, in which and through 
which Being is. This disclosure occurs in terms of an apophantic phenomenal 
world in which Dasein is `already' posited as that entity for which 
in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. ... Understanding 
of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being.... 
Thus Dasein's understanding of Being pertains with equal 
primordiality both to an understanding of something like a 
`world', and to the understanding of the Being of those entities 
which become accessible within the world. [BT p. 33] 
Thus there is no possibility of something like, Dasein without the open 
horizon of an already given world "within" which it finds itself, within which 
it can be. Simultaneously there is no world, no signification, without the 
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disclosive opening which Dasein "is. s38 Heidegger terms this constitutive 
horizon Dasein's Being-in-the-world. 
What is suggested here is that this horizon is, in the first instance, 
rendered possible by the spatiality of Dasein in which its being-there is 
understood by Heidegger as the relational possibility of Being-in. This is a 
basic ontological state which is characterised by, and renders possible, 
Dasein's de-severance [Ent fernung] and directionality [Ausrichtung], that 
is, Dasein's spatiality in the world. 
8. Space, Time, and Consciousness 
What we wish to argue is that the distinction between the totality of entities 
ready-to-hand and the totality of entities present-at-hand in the world 
collapses due to the nature of Dasein's spatiality. Furthermore, we would like 
38 As such, at this stage, the concept of Dasein resists humanistic or anthropologistic 
interpretations such as Sartre's translation of the term as human reality in Being and 
Nothingness. 
It is to be understood as the existential condition through which Being in general can take 
on significance. However, as Derrida suggests in his essay "The Ends of Man, " (Margins 
of Philosophy), this anthropological reading of Dasein, and Heidegger's project, is partly 
legitimated insofar as Dasein stands in an intimate relation with `us, ' understood, always, 
as man in general. He says, for example: 'just as Dasein - the being which we ourselves 
are - serves as an exemplary text, a good `lesson' for making explicit the meaning of 
Being, so the name of man remains the link or the paleonymic guiding thread which ties 
the analytic of Dasein to the totality of metaphysics' traditional discourse. ... We can see 
then that Dasein, though not man, is nevertheless nothing other than man. It is ... a 
repetition of the essence of man permitting a return to what is before the metaphysical 
concepts of humanitas.... The value of proximity, that is, of presence in general, therefore 
decides the essential orientation of this analytic of Dasein. " [pp. 126-127]. Although this 
is not directly our concern here, it should, in principle, be possible to show that the 
analytic of Dasein's spatiality, which was never completed in its relation to primordial 
temporality, would have served, probably against Heidegger's intention, to fracture and 
displace this orientation of the analytic of Dasein. In shaking the distinctions made 
between the ontic and ontological spatial significations of, respectively, nearness or 
proximity; and distance or farness, it should also set Being understood as presence into 
relief, since it is only within these distinctions that Heidegger's portrayal of the presencing 
of presence can operate. 
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to suggest that it is Dasein's spatiality which provides the initial lever to 
Heidegger's destruction of the traditional conceptions of time, and likewise, 
his destruction of the traditional subject. It is through these analyses that we 
hope to arrive at an understanding of what it can mean to state that meaning 
is already spatialised, as Derrida suggests in "Speech and Phenomena. " 
We have already seen in the previous brief accounts that the meaning 
of things, understood either pragmatically or theoretically, is always 
experienced in terms of a disruption of the totality which such an 
understanding implies. Dasein thus finds itself within a world of things the 
meaning of which is articulated in terms of an almost constant interruption of 
a precomprehended, or presumed, totality of relations. This presumption of 
the meaning of things, which Heidegger defines as a primordial "fore-having, 
a fore-sight, and afore-conception" [BT p. 193] is itself possible only on 
condition of its interruption. This means, in effect, that the meaning of things 
of which we are aware occurs only on condition of a relation or reference to 
a "primordial" indeterminacy or indefiniteness in our perceived world. 
However, before we can give a direct account of this indeterminacy, 
we must understand how it is arrived at. We must therefore examine the 
conditions of possibility of Dasein having something like a world in which 
things are encounterable for it. 
Dasein's De-severance 
Heidegger holds that in order that Dasein "have" a world in the first place, 
Dasein must have the ability to be touched by, and to be involved in, the 
world. This is described by a basic characteristic of Dasein: Being-in. This 
is, in the first instance, a dwelling, a being familiar with, a precomprehended 
orientation with respect to the things encounterable in the world. We have 
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already seen this characteristic articulated in terms of Dasein's interpretative 
understanding of things ready-to-hand. Such things are interpretatively 
understood as already having an existential meaning insofar as they 
projectively refer to a totality of equipment which is not yet "there. " Thus I 
hammer the nail into the wall in order that the cabinet may be hung up, in 
order that my things may be stowed away, etc. My interpretative 
understanding of the hammer, within which it takes on significance as a 
hammer, includes this projected totality of references. This totality, however, 
is at all times futural - it is never present. 
The meaning of the hammer will always include a reference to that 
which is not present, namely a futural horizon of meaning. This would seem 
to suggest that meaning is constituted from a temporal horizon. But, although 
Heidegger's analyses direct us to concentrate solely upon the temporal 
constitution of meaning, which includes Dasein's spatiality, we should also 
be aware of the importance of Dasein's spatiality in his analysis of meaning, 
and Heidegger's general wariness in dealing with the relation between 
Dasein's spatiality and its temporality. Heidegger himself says: 
the demonstration that this spatiality is existentially possible 
only through temporality, cannot aim either at deducing space 
from time or at dissolving it into pure time. If Dasein's spatiality 
is `embraced' by temporality in the sense of being existentially 
founded upon it, then this connection between them ... 
is also 
different from the priority of time over space in Kant's sense. 
[BT p. 418] 
Then, regarding the relation between spatiality and signification, he goes on 
to say: 
The ecstatical temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic 
of Dasein, makes it intelligible that space is independent of 
time; but, on the other hand, this same temporality also makes 
intelligible Dasein's `dependence' on space -a `dependence' 
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which manifests itself in the well known phenomenon that both 
Dasein's interpretations of itself and the whole stock of 
significations which belong to language in general are 
dominated through and through by `spatial representations. ' 
This priority of the spatial in the Articulation of concepts and 
signification has its basis not in some specific power which 
space possesses, but in Dasein's kind of Being. Temporality 
[also understands itself] ... from those spatial relationships 
which making-present is constantly meeting in the ready-to- 
hand as having presence, it takes its clues for Articulating that 
which has been understood and can be interpreted in the 
understanding in general. [BT p. 420] 
We would argue further, as Heidegger later does in his essay "Time and 
g Being, "39 where he rejects the derivation of space from time in §70 of Bein 
and Time, and indicates a common source of both time and space, that 
Dasein's spatiality is just as much irreducible in the constitution of meaning, 
as is its temporality. If we return to the example of the futural horizon in the 
meaning of the hammer, it is difficult to see how this referentiality is only 
temporal. If we examine it closely we will see that it must also be spatially 
determined. 
As was said above, the general condition of Dasein's spatiality is 
Being-in. Heidegger describes the general characteristics of this state as a 
familiar orientation within a world of entities which Dasein can encounter. 
Since Dasein's understanding of its world is always a projected 
understanding, this familiarity is itself a projected fore-conception of the 
totality of relations within which Dasein is involved. We have already seen 
that the meaning of things is constituted only insofar as the presumption of a 
totality of things either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, is interrupted or 
contaminated, by the other interpretative perspective. If we now interpret this 
39 Heidegger, M., "Time and Being, " in: On Time and Being. 
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schema in terms of Dasein's primordial spatiality and temporality, we see 
likewise that the familiar projected spatial totality of Being-in, can only be 
projected, and conceived, insofar as it is interrupted and contaminated by 
Dasein's futural temporal horizon, and vice versa. What we wish to suggest 
is that neither Dasein's temporal horizon, nor its spatial horizon, can be 
primordially constitutive of meaning in general, but that the constitution of 
both horizons rely upon a prior reference to a general indeterminacy of 
meaning. We think that it is this referentiality which Heidegger designates by 
the paradoxical movement of the temporalisation of temporality. 
In order to understand this idea of interruption as constitutive of 
meaning in our reading of Heidegger, we must first realise that when 
Heidegger talks of Dasein's spatiality, he means neither an objective, 
empirical space, nor a purely subjective intuition as in Kant. The spatial 
scope of Dasein does not describe a subject somehow outside the world, but 
capable of taking up a relationship to existing objects within the world, 
outside of itself, in some sort of objective subject-object relation. This is a 
theoretical attitude which already presupposes Being-in-the-world as its 
possibility: 
Dasein is never "proximally" an entity which is, so to speak, 
free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to 
take up a "relationship" towards the world. Taking up 
relationships towards the world is possible only because 
Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of Being 
does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand, 
outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can 
"meet up with" Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own 
accord, show itself within a world. [BT p. 84] 
Dasein's spatiality therefore describes the conditions under which we 'can 
have something like an understanding of space as either objective or 
subjective in the first place. It cannot be that my understanding somehow 
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imbues the objects surrounding me with spatial meaning. For, before I can 
even have a sense of a subjective inside and an objective outside, I must 
always already be spatially orientated within the world. 
Thus, for example, the table. upon which I write is not proximally 
experienced as a total object in space, removed at a certain distance from my 
body. That is only one of the possible descriptions of the relation between my 
body and the table. This would be a fairly artificial and sophisticated view of 
the situation in which my Dasein finds itself, the description of spatiality as 
it is in terms of the present-at-hand. Rather, Whilst I am writing, the table 
tends to be neither here nor there in relation to my being. It does not take on 
a significance as a spatial object, or an object in space, whilst I am 
concentrating on my writing. The kind of being which its has for me is that 
described by the ready-to-hand. 
As Heidegger says, "In Dasein there lies an essential tendency 
towards closeness" [BT p. 140] which means that Dasein's spatiality consists 
of affective rather than effective boundaries in that an object takes up space 
for Dasein insofar as it can touch or affect Dasein in some way or another, 
and is thus brought close to Dasein. But this is only possible if Dasein 
simultaneously "makes" space for the said object, bringing it into a 
differentiated state whereby it can affect or hold attention. For instance, if the 
table gives way, or sways due to my activity, it concerns me and comes into 
view. 40 It dictates the direction of attention and is de-severed from the 
40 The table is only meant as an extreme example of the interruption of our familiar 
orientation in the world. De-severance implies such an interruption, but this interruption 
need not necessarily be the breakdown of something. It can also simply be "bringing 
something into view, " or "taking notice of something. " In both cases de-severance is 
meant to describe how things come out of and recede into the background as they come 
to our attention. Heidegger's point is that in order to attend to something or other the 
(continued... ) 
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phenomenal distance which it beforehand had as being neither here nor there: 
"De-severing" amounts to making the farness vanish - that is, 
making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it 
close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be 
encountered close by as the entity which it is. [BT p. 139] 
We have already seen this phenomenon of interruption in our analyses of the 
distinction between the referential totality of the ready-to-hand and the 
totality of meaning expressed in the present-at-hand. These were explained 
in their temporal contexts, that Dasein's interpretative understanding projects 
a referential totality which is already interrupted by its temporal structure - 
this totality is never present. In other words, the referential totality projected 
in the meaning of the hammer includes a non-determinable relation to the 
future, and can therefore itself only be understood from the perspective of the 
present-at-hand, because it is not yet ready-to-hand. This interruption is here 
formulated in terms of the temporal horizon of the future, which leads 
Heidegger to determine the meaning of Dasein's being as the temporalisation 
of temporality. 
What we see, however, is that this projection must also be spatial, that 
there is no temporal horizon without a spatial horizon of Being-in which it 
necessarily interrupts. There could be no meaning to Dasein without the 
interplay of these two horizons. If a thing cannot be de-severed, through the 
interruption of the projected referential totality of the ready-to-hand, then it 
cannot take on meaning for Dasein. It remains immersed within the 
undifferentiated totality of its relations, and thus we cannot be conscious of 
it. However, without this de-severance in which a thing takes on its spatial 
(... continued) 
object of our attention must be actively differentiated from its surroundings, which are 
then perceived as distant. 
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signification we would also not be aware of the constitution of its meaning 
from Dasein's horizon of temporality. The "openness" of the temporal 
horizon of the future, into which the understanding of the thing as ready-to- 
hand projects the referential totality of the "in-order-to, " is open only on 
condition of Dasein's de-severance, for it is only in terms of de-severance 
that Dasein can appreciate something like a horizon. 
Thus de-severance is a limit structure of Dasein which is not simply 
related to the signification of a phenomenon "for" Dasein, but forms one of 
the conditions of possibility of the signification of a phenomenon in general, 
and thus always accompanies this signification. One could say it is the 
"space" in which a spatial signification can signify. It is not delimited -by 
distantiality - in objective measurable terms its range is immeasurable 
because its scope exceeds even the most distant star one can see, or the 
smallest particle one can detect because it is precisely the condition and 
space in which they can be detected. I can therefore never step outside or 
overcome my de-severant range: 
As Being-in-the-world, Dasein maintains itself essentially in a 
de-severing. This de-severance - the farness of the ready-to- 
hand from Dasein itself - is something Dasein can never cross 
over. ... Dasein can ... traverse the "between" of this distance [between two places], but only in such a way that the distance 
itself becomes one which has been desevered. So little has 
Dasein crossed over its de-severance that it has rather taken it 
along with it and keeps doing so constantly; for Dasein is 
essentially de-severance - that is, it is spatial. It cannot wander 
about within the current range of its de-severances; it can never 
do more than change them. [BT p. 142-143] 
De-severance is Dasein's horizonal delimitation as Being-there, and every 
horizon which Dasein "has" is always already "spatial. " However, we should 
not understand this "spatiality" as objectively measurable space which is a 
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reductive interpretation of Dasein's horizonal spatiality understood as de- 
severance. 
Dasein's Directionality 
De-severance does not exhaust Dasein's spatiality. Another constitutive 
condition of Dasein's spatiality is directionality. De-severance may open the 
differing spatial horizons within which I orientate myself and things take on 
significance for me, but it cannot differentiate between these horizons. In 
other words, it can account for the disruption of the projected referential 
totality of the ready-to-hand, but it cannot account for its referentiality. 
Directionality, or the referentiality of an orientation, is an irreducible 
condition of a phenomenon taking on significance: 
As de-severant Being. in, Dasein has likewise the character of 
directionality. Every bringing-close has already taken in 
advance a direction toward a region out of which what is de- 
severed brings itself close, so that one can come across it with 
regard to its place. [BT p. 143] 
Dasein must therefore always already be orientated within the world which 
is given to it as an open ended referential network of signs. These take on 
meaning only in their reference to the horizons opened in Dasein's de- 
severant Being-in. Only if Dasein has the character of directionality and is 
able to orientate itself toward something, which thus stands in a referential 
relation, can that phenomenon have significance as something. This 
significance arises insofar as Dasein is directed toward a horizon of meaning 
opened by Dasein's de-severance. Dasein is thus always already referred to 
such a horizon in its involvement in the world. This means that the meaning 
of this horizon must always be indefinite, because it is constituted through its 
reference to something else. This indefiniteness to which, or, as Heidegger 
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says, "whither" something always refers, can be understood as a contextual 
background. This background, whilst never being present, must always 
structurally be there. This whither, or context, Heidegger terms the region, 
in which things can have their place: 
"In the region of' means not only "in the direction of' but also 
within the range [Umkreis] of something that lies in that 
direction. The kind of place which is constituted by direction 
and remoteness (and closeness is only a mode of the latter) is 
already orientated towards a region and orientated within it. 
Something like a region must be discovered if there is to be any 
possibility of allotting or coming across places for a totality of 
equipment that is circumspectively at one's disposal. [BT 
p. 136] 
The region is the articulation of Dasein's spatiality in terms of a referentiality 
towards a horizonal opening, i. e. a context. This context is always, in relation 
to the signification of the- phenomena, itself nowhere. Its meaning is 
constituted through the reference of the ready-to-hand phenomena towards 
a projected totality of involvement. In this context the ready-to-hand 
phenomenon functions as a sign, and, indeed, only has meaning insofar as it 
functions as such. Dasein can concern itself with the ready-to-hand 
phenomenon in its possible usage, and is orientated by the phenomenon's 
referentiality as a sign for something. Dasein's deseverance and directionality 
consists of something like an indeterminate pointing toward the open horizon 
of the future: 
41 Cf. Being and Time: ¶ 24. "Space and Dasein's Spatiality, " where Heidegger writes: 
"In the phenomenon of the region we have already indicated that on the basis of which 
space is discovered beforehand in Dasein. By a `region' we have understood the "whither" 
to which an equipment-context ready-to-hand might possibly belong, when that context 
is of such a sort that it can be encountered as directionally desevered - that is, as having 
been placed.... In general the `whither" gets prescribed by a referential totality which has 
been made fast in a "for-the-sake-of-which" of concern, and within which letting 
something be involved by freeing it, assigns itself. " [BT., p. 145] 
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Circumspective concern is de-severing which gives 
directionality. In this concern - that is, in the Being-in-the-world, 
of Dasein itself -a supply of "signs" is presented. Signs, as 
equipment, take over the giving of directions in a way which is 
explicit and easily manipulable. They keep explicitly open those 
regions which have been used circumspectively - the particular 
"whithers" to which something belongs or goes, or gets bought 
or fetched. If Dasein is, it already has, as directing and 
desevering, its own discovered region. [BT p. 143] 
This means, however, that Dasein's spatiality cannot exist apart from its 
temporality and, furthermore, its "temporality" is conditioned by its 
"spatiality. " Without Dasein's spatiality there is no "sign" for temporality, 
and vice versa. In the context of our analyses of the ready-to-hand and the 
present-at-hand, the temporal horizon of the in-order-to is opened, and can 
only signify, insofar as there exists a spatial Being-in and toward-which. This 
means that the horizon of Dasein's meaning will always have both a spatial 
and temporal determination which are irreducible to each other. 
In other words the sign through which temporality is articulated must 
always take up "space. " Its meaning must always refer to a spatial horizon 
which, in terms of temporality, is other than time. Such a sign, which amounts 
to the sign in general, since we are here talking about the general conditions 
under which Being can signify, can never articulate, or present, a pure unity 
of meaning. On the other hand the meaning of the sign through which "space" 
is articulated must always refer to a temporal horizon which is not 
articulatable in terms of a spatial horizon. 
Thus, in order that time and space take on meaning for Dasein there 
must already be a "prior" reference to what is other, to what is non-present 
and non-presentable. This reference of meaning, of what "is, " of presence to 
an indeterminate non-presence or non-meaning, in which Dasein's 
"temporality" is already "spatialised, " and its ' "spatiality" is already 
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"temporalised, " is indicated in Being and Time by the general movement of 
the destructuring of the traditional conceptualisation of Being traced by the 
temporalisation of temporality. This movement can be said to mark the 
necessary reference of the horizon of time to its other, which means, so long 
as the meaning of Being is defined in terms of Presence, and in terms of time, 
we cannot determine this meaning, it remains obscured or forgotten. 
9. The Destructuring of Consciousness 
Reading Heidegger so, we find that what is structurally necessary to Dasein's 
being aware of something, of a thing having significance for Dasein, is a 
certain referential indeterminacy from out of which, and against which, 
phenomena can differ from one another. Only so can they have significance 
for Dasein. Our reading suggests that this structural indeterminacy arises from 
the interplay between Dasein's spatial and temporal horizons of meaning, in 
which the thing has meaning as a sign. 
This means, however, that the sign "in itself, " or thing as sign, can 
never have a meaning in itself. It must always refer beyond itself if it is to 
take on meaning. Thus, if we interpret meaning in general, positing the 
horizon of time as its existential condition of possibility, this horizon will only 
signify insofar as it refers "outside" of itself. If meaning in general is 
understood in terms of Presence then the condition that temporality signifies 
is that it already has a spatial signification. 
It is tempting to conclude from this that a sign only has meaning insofar 
as it is spatially contextualised, in other words, that we can only be aware of 
things within a spatial environment. This, however, misses the point of our 
analyses. If we interpret Heidegger so, we miss the fundamental movement 
of the destructuring of the traditional understanding of meaning and 
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consciousness, and it is this destructuring which forms the basic experience 
of Being and Time. 
We have already witnessed that in each stage of the phenomenological 
analysis Heidegger has taken the traditional distinctions which are used to 
describe our consciousness of the world and, rather than simply abandon 
them, he, as it were, turned them upon themselves. The distinction between 
the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, essential to his existential 
analyses, derives from the traditional distinction between theoria and praxis. 
This distinction forms the lexical matrix within which the distinction between 
eidos and hyle can take on a corresponding significance in reference to that- 
which-lies-before - hypokeimenon. Theoria and praxis articulate two 
different ways of seeing and dealing with the hypokeimenon, either in terms 
of its idea or form, or in terms of its physical matter. It is the articulation of 
hypokeimenon through theoria, in terms of the eidos which discloses the truth 
of that-which-lies-before. In modem terms this matrix is translated by the 
subject's consciousness in which its substance, its intentional life, is 
articulated in terms of form and matter, where the ideal form determines the 
meaning of corporeal matter. 
Heidegger unfolds the full lexical matrix of these distinctions, by 
phenomenologically showing what is necessary if these terms are to take on 
the meaning which is assigned to them. In doing so he destructures the very 
possibility of our experiencing the meaning of such a phenomenality, but this 
destructuring enables us to see what is meant by these distinctions, in the 
sense of what they are meant to express. It also shows that it is impossible for 
these distinctions to express what they are meant to. Thus we have seen that 
at each stage the terms of each distinction have been firstly overturned, in that 
Heidegger has concentrated on provisionally showing that the meaning of the 
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traditionally prior term is actually derived from its opposite. Since this 
overturning upsets the hierarchy of the opposition, through which the 
distinction normally obtains its meaning, this meaning is itself disturbed, until 
the language and syntax of the tradition reveals itself as inadequate to that 
which it seeks to express. 
If we take a last brief look at Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's 
spatiality, then we can see that Being-in cannot be regarded as an already 
spatial characteristic of Dasein. It is rather the mark or trace of the non- 
determinate relational condition through which Dasein has a spatial meaning, 
both in relation to time and to space. If Being-in is "grounded" in the 
temporalisation of temporality, then temporalisation must be simultaneously 
understood as a spatialisation which occurs "before" every defined temporal 
structure, i. e. the ecstatic horizons of past, present, and future. 
- Thus, in terms of the analysis, "before" Dasein can be-there, the there 
must be opened as a primordial space "within" which Dasein can be, as the 
disclosive openness of the there. The temporalisation of temporality, as 
constitutive of Dasein, "is" the space of Dasein's other, the possibility of 
Dasein's being-other, which "is" the future, the possibility of death, the 
reflection of a not-I in another, which interrupts the ipseity of Dasein. In other 
words, there can neither be space nor time in themselves. Insofar as they 
signify then they must have both the characteristics of the sign, expression 
and reference. Thus, insofar as "time" "is" it must be spatial. In our analyses 
of Derrida and Husserl we will see that we can expand this thesis in order to 
show that insofar as consciousness has a meaning, that it is constituted from 
a temporal horizon, it is also necessarily spatial. This play between the 
"spatiality" and "temporality" of the transcendental subject indicates a 
primordial reference of the subject to a non-determinable, non-presentable 
113 
meaning, which we have named the transcendent infinite. 
Part II: Husserl's Phenomenological Subject 
10. Derrida's Critique 
Our reading of Heidegger has indicated that Husserl's conception of the 
transcendental subject, like Kant's, rests on an inadequate interpretation of 
meaning. We have seen that this inadequacy revolves around the necessity for 
an account of referentiality. Since Husserl's transcendental subject should 
express a totality of meaning, and referentiality in general "means" the 
interruption of such a totality, Husserl's concept of the phenomenological 
transcendental subject cannot provide such an account. 
Furthermore, if, as we have argued, spatial referentiality is necessary 
to meaning insofar as meaning is understood in terms of presence, then the 
understanding of meaning from the perspective of the transcendental subject 
should stand in a definitive relationship to such a referentiality. This relation 
should be as follows: 1. Spatial referentiality can be shown to be necessary 
to the constitution of meaning in the transcendental subject. 2. This necessity 
threatens the viability of the transcendental subject's expression or 
presentation of its meaning. 3. Husserl's conception of the transcendental 
subject as the expressive locus of all meaning must therefore represent a 
repression of such a referentiality which tries to avoid such a collapse of the 
subject's meaning. 
We can now begin to look at the form of this referentiality in Husserl's 
transcendental subject. We shall approach this through Derrida's reading of 
Husserl in his essay "Speech and Phenomena. " Here Derrida both explains 
and demonstrates the necessary role of referentiality in the subject's 
constitution of meaning. He does this by revealing the phenomenological site 
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within which an essentially mediate spatial referentiality can be passed off, 
or interpreted, as the immediate and full expression of pure meaning. This site 
is the voice of the phenomenological transcendental subject. 
Derrida purports to detect a tension at the very heart of Husserl's 
phenomenological analysis. He holds this tension to be a decisive condition 
of phenomenological critique, whilst being produced by this critique as a 
symptomatic problem. Husserl's phenomenological project organises and 
orientates its analyses in terms of a resolution or reduction of this problem. 
This tension appears and reappears at several differing levels of 
Husserl's analyses. For example, one can detect it between the descriptive 
and the analytic or critical scope of phenomenology. 42 This is because the 
42 Cf. David Wood's reading of Husserl and Derrida in his book The Deconstruction of 
Time. Basically our reading of the two agrees with Wood's, but only up to a certain point 
where Derrida is accused by Wood of somewhat idealising Husserl, reducing, for example, 
his understanding of presence to the simple now. (Cf pp. 124ff). Wood goes on to assert 
that Derrida's argument "that difference opens up subjectivity to the outside is not one 
that he convincingly sustains. He succeeds at most in showing that a certain spatiality can 
in a rather abstruse sense be located within subjectivity. " [ibid p. 129]. It is here that Wood 
misses the point of Derrida's analyses (or refuses to see it, since he points it out at other 
stages of his argumentation). For Derrida never seriously argues that difference 
objectively grounds subjectivity. And he never seriously argues that a certain spatiality is 
located - how could it be "located"? - in either consciousness or subjectivity, which is why 
"space" is always in quotation marks for Derrida. What Derrida describes is what 
metaphysical argumentation commits itself to. It is within Husserl's argumentation, which 
is guided by his commitment to presence - to expressing what truly "is" - that difference 
and spatiality are necessary within subjectivity in order to supplement the presentation of 
the structures of subjectivity. Wood is absolutely right when he says this position is not 
sustainable, but this does not constitute an objection to Derrida's reading of Husserl, for 
this is precisely Derrida's point. Husserl's phenomenology cannot, in all seriousness, 
sustain the truth of its descriptions, because they lead to conclusions which the metaphors 
of truth, and knowledge, cannot, according to their own logic and premises, be used to 
describe. In these situations the language of philosophy finds itself exhausted, and simply 
resort to not mentioning these areas if it is to maintain the validity of its descriptions. If 
Derrida's "arguments" are no more or less valid than those of the tradition, this is because 
they are traditional, as Wood himself comments [ibid p. 127], and it is because they are 
traditional that they cannot be sustained. What they are, however, is strategical, and whilst 
Wood gives an account of strategy as argumentation, tackling it upon philosophical 
(continued... ) 
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critical register of Husserl's language will always attempt to institute an 
absolute separation between its descriptive and analytic components. 
The necessity of this separation is fairly obvious, because without it the 
validity of both registers would be endangered. This is due to the loss of all 
objective or exterior criteria from which a description can be critically 
evaluated and validated. That is, one could no longer decide whether a 
description were true or false. 
What is less obvious, and what Derrida shows, is that the impossibility 
of realizing and maintaining the separation between phenomenology's 
descriptive and analytic registers is itself a necessary condition for the ideal 
representation of such a separation. It has already been noted above that this 
tension occurs in phenomenology's description of the temporalization and 
intersubjectivity of the transcendental subject. Here one experiences firstly 
42(... continued) 
grounds, he underemphasises the point that Derrida writes on the margins of philosophy. 
For Wood, this is merely a case of risking sterility, that is, of not listening to what Derrida 
says, because he no longer conforms to the traditional requirements of wanting-to-say- 
something, of being committed to the truth, to presence. Wood never asks, however, what 
this sterility could comprise. He touches upon the themes of repression in Derrida, but 
never asks what kind of text is it that undermines, or supports such repression. That is, 
Wood misses both the political and ethical weight of Derrida's argumentation, which 
breaks down the traditional boundaries between philosophical and political discourses (Cf. 
His Of Spirit, in which he first discusses such a sterility in the context of the so-called 
Heidegger Affair. Also important are his "The Afterword" and "Restitutions, " in which 
these dimensions of Derrida's work are brought out. ) Derrida is concerned with the style, 
rather than content, of interpretation which Husserl uses, and its implications, and 
therefore mimics it, in order to draw out these implications, and to show the "truth" 
behind this discourse. Subjectivity is constituted neither from identity nor difference, but 
all these metaphors necessarily refer to a necessary indeterminacy of language, or of life, 
if one prefers, which they seek to cut out, to repress. This desire is never, in terms of the 
metaphors which express it, legitimate - it is, as Nietzsche points out, and both Derrida 
and Wood reiterate, a he. Its expression therefore falls into the realm of persuasion, of 
force, of politics as identity, as Lacoue-Labarthe says. The network of terms and analyses 
which Derrida has built up over the years, under the heading deconstruction, such as 
differance, serve as markers for a legitimate and necessary resistance to this desire. 
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the impossibility and necessity of grasping the separation between internal 
time itself and the consciousness of internal time, i. e. the appearance of time 
to consciousness. That is, one cannot experience the distinction between 
temporalization itself and the modal form in which it appears. Secondly one 
experiences the simultaneous impossibility and necessity'of grasping the 
meaning of the other qua other as something "outside" the scope of the 
transcendental subject. 
The phenomenological experiencing of both of these distinctions, that 
is, the substantiation of these distinctions, is absolutely necessary if the 
phenomenological subject is to be apodictically. grounded, "beyond all 
doubt, " and thus apodictically presented, rather than merely ideally 
represented. However, from the premises of the transcendental 
phenomenological subject it is impossible to obtain verification of this 
experience. This necessary experience is denied by the very idea of the 
constitution of the subject's meaning. As Derrida says: 
Let us note only, in order to here specify our intention, that 
phenomenology seems to us tormented, if not contested from 
within, by its own descriptions of the movement of 
temporalization and of the constitution of intersubjectivity. At 
the heart of what ties together these two decisive moments of 
description we recognize an irreducible nonpresence as having 
a constitutive value, and with it a nonlife, a nonpresence or 
nonself-belonging of the living present, an ineradicable 
nonprimordiality. [SP p. 6-71 
Derrida's critique centres around his perception that Husserl has, despite the 
radical intentions of phenomenology, non-critically taken up the traditional 
philosophical interpretation of language. This interpretation will dominate and 
direct the whole course of the phenomenological analysis. Derrida thus holds 
that Husserl: 
had, in a most traditional manner, determined the essence of 
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language by taking the logical as its telos or its norm. That this 
telos is that of being as presence is what we wish to here 
suggest. [SP p. 8] 
He holds that it is precisely Husserl's somewhat hasty treatment of language 
and his understanding of signs and signification which produces this tension 
in phenomenology. 
Derrida's reading is based on the interpretation of the nature of 
signification thaf Husserl gives in the first part of the Logical Investigations. 
Here Husserl makes a division between two heterogenous aspects of'the sign 
- expression, and indication. This division, holds Derrida, conforms to the 
traditional, metaphysical interpretation of language, and determines the whole 
of Husserl's phenomenological project. 
Derrida thus interprets Husserl as putting forward a doctrine of 
language in which there are two concepts of signification. * The first is 
expression, whereby a sign directly expresses its meaning. The second is 
indication, in which a sign refers to a meaning which is not included within 
the expressive sense of that sign. Ideally speaking an indicative sign can be 
understood as a present empirical or physical mark which points to a non- 
present meaning. Its signifying function consists purely in its referentiality to 
a meaning, in itself it has no meaning: 
According to Husserl there are signs that express nothing 
because they convey nothing one could call (we still have to put 
it in German) Bedeutung or Sinn. Such is the indicative sign. 
Certainly an indicative sign is a sign, as is an expression. But, 
unlike an expression, an indicative sign is deprived of 
Bedeutung or Sinn; it is bedeutungslos, sinnlos. But, 
nonetheless, it is not without signification, no signifying without 
the signified. [SP. p. 17] 
Derrida will later argue that this division commits phenomenology to a 
reference to spatialisation within meaning., However, within the 
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interpretational matrix which phenomenology uses, i. e. that of presence, this 
reference to a spatiality cannot be included within such an expression, 
because such a referentiality could never be purely present. Such a critique 
is possible because Husserl understands the indicative sign in terms of its 
empirical materiality, which is always contingent and inessential in relation 
to the express meaning which such a sign points to, or "carries. " 
This, in turn, means that Husserl thinks that the expressive sign takes 
priority over the indicative sign. This is because expression is considered to 
be the proper form of meaning - the meaning of an object is properly 
announced through its expression. Indication, on the other hand, can only 
point to a meaning, it can never properly express a meaning. In this context, 
meaning is understood by Husserl (and can only be understood) as what an 
expression ideally "means, " what an expression is meant to say, or really 
wants to say: 
Without forcing Husserl's intention we could perhaps define, if 
not translate, bedeuten by "mean" [or "want to say"; in French 
vouloir-dire], in the sense that a speaking subject, "expressing 
himself, " as Husserl says, "about something, " means or wants 
to say something and that an expression likewise means or 
"wants to say" something. One would thus be assured that the 
meaning (Bedeutung) is always what a discourse or somebody 
wants to say: what is conveyed, then, is always a linguistic 
sense, a discursive content. [SP p. 18] 
Expression is thus the proper form of meaning in that it embodies the ideality 
of meaning announced by the subject's expression of what it means. We have 
already seen in the Kantian conception of the subject that the "I think'' must 
accompany all of the subject's representations. Husserl, holds Derrida, is 
moving along the same lines of analysis, except that he has re-interpreted the 
"I think.. "proper to the subject, as "I mean ... ". 
Ultimately the expression of meaning must be understood from this 
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perspective, from meaning understood in terms of its ideality. We can 
understand this ideality as the meaning the subject wants to express - the 
meaning it would ideally express if the reproduction of the immediacy of the 
subject's "I mean... " did not always factually involve a mediation. This "I 
mean... " is essentially the subjective condition of the subject's intentional 
cognition, and thus expression is the essence and meaning of the subject's 
cognition. Expressed meaning is the subject's cognition. 
Indication thus ultimately always refers to this ideal expression of what 
the subject means in its intentional cognition. The indicative sign only has 
meaning insofar as it actually expresses a meaning, otherwise it only refers 
to an expressed meaning. This effectively means that Derrida takes Husserl 
to understand the subject's cognition as the self-evident expression of the 
subject's meaning. The indicative sign is then used by Husserl to explain the 
physical mediation of this express meaning (what the subject means, or wants 
to say) in communication between two separate subjects. This physical 
mediation is, in itself, meaningless, and only has meaning insofar as it refers 
to what the subject means to say. 
What could possibly be the objection to this understanding of 
signification in the subject? It is true that when I communicate with someone 
there must be some reference to a reality outside of my own subjectivity 
otherwise I could not locate someone else as being other than me. But surely 
Husserl is right in thinking that what I mean is constituted by my subjective 
processes alone as an internal expression of my thought. For example, when 
I think of an object, then surely it is not necessary for the meaning of my 
thought to refer beyond thought? Surely the meaning of, such an imagined 
object can only be strictly internal, constituted only by my imagination, and 
only present to my perception as such? Any reference to an empirical reality 
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beyond my subjective perception of the imagined object is surely inessential? ' 
This, however, is not really Derrida's point. Derrida is not strictly 
arguing that there is an irreducible empirical spatiality within signification, 
although at times it is easy to forget this. For Derrida "space, " "spacing" and 
"spatiality" are always in quotation marks when taken in relation to 
signification. This is because of two factors: 1. Derrida wants to avoid the 
question whether empirical extension is real. The quotation marks serve to 
suspend this question. 2. Derrida wants to show that the meaning given to 
spatiality within a conceptual system which resorts to using a division 
between time and space, between ideality and extension, not only exceeds its 
determination within that system, but exceeds the system of conceptuality 
itself. Writing "space" in quotation marks, serves to indicate the inadequacy 
of a conceptual system in general, i. e. the concept of conceptuality, to 
describe the entire scope of its elements. At some stage, the meaning of the 
"elements" of such a "system" will exceed the descriptive scope of the 
metaphor of the concept, indicating meanings beyond its powers of 
description. 
The concept of "space" is therefore an example of this general 
movement which Derrida ascribes to every conceptual system. His objection 
to Husserl is thus not that there must be spatiality in meaning. He does not 
argue that a meaning must always have empirical or physical extension, or 
that the meaning of the subject is constituted from the basis of its empirical 
extended world - its body, or that there really is difference "before" identity. 
All these arguments would simply be reversals of the stance taken by 
Idealism in general, and would probably belong to the same sources of dogma 
which Derrida is seeking to criticise. 
They are, furthermore, hardly viable positions to take against Husserl's 
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form of phenomenological Idealism, which consists of a whole battery of 
more than convincing arguments against such a position. Phenomenology's 
whole agenda seems designed to show that the only possible objects which 
answer to the demands of scientific thought are those described by 
transcendental phenomenology, in terms of their subjective conditions of 
possibility. Such an agenda surely means that objects are referred to only in 
their pure ideality, in terms of their possible meaning for consciousness, 
rather than their actual, or empirical status. 
It is here that Derrida's critique begins to function. He is strongly 
aware that Husserl cannot accept the possibility that meaning has real 
empirical extension - it is anyway, a highly dubious proposition. What 
Derrida tries to demonstrate is that Husserl's uncritical interpretation of 
language commits phenomenology at certain stages, to just such a view. As 
he says: 
What governs here is the absolute difference between body and 
soul. Writing is a body that expresses something only if we 
actually pronounce the verbal expression that animates it, if its 
space is temporalized. The word is a body that means 
something only if an actual intention animates it and makes it 
pass from the state of inert sonority (Körper) to that of an 
animated body (Leib). This body proper to words expresses 
something only if it is animated (sinnbelebt) by an act of 
meaning (bedeuten) which transforms it into a spiritual flesh 
(geistige Leiblichkeit). But only the Geistigkeit or Lebendigkeit 
is independent and primordial. [SP p. 81] 
This conforms to the traditional Cartesian doctrine of an absolute difference 
between Cogito and extensio, an opposition which phenomenology should, 
at least according to Husserl, have called in to question and displaced. Surely 
this is also the case. The refinement of phenomenological description should 
have surpassed this naive belief. 
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Derrida's argument is that it cannot because of Husserl's approach to 
language. This is because the distinction between expressive and indicative 
signs determines a whole set of distinctions without which phenomenology 
could not operate. 
Derrida's argument runs along the following lines. He holds that 
Husserl thinks there are two heterogenous aspects to the sign, the first being 
expression, the second indication. The expression of the meaning of 
something is the presentation of its ideal meaning, in the sense of what is 
meant, or what someone means to say. Expression therefore presents the 
essential in meaning. The indication of the meaning of something, on the 
other hand, is secondary to the expression of meaning. Indication is the 
empirical or physical mediation of the ideal meaning which takes place in, for 
example, communication, or any other form of signification which refers to 
a reality outside the subject's subjective perception. This includes reference 
to any material existence over and above the ideal existence of the subject's 
ego. Expression is therefore the essential manifestation of the subject's inner, 
subjective meaning - what I meant to say, what I meant when I thought x or 
y. Indication refers this meaning to an outside world, to an other person 
outside of myself, and is useful in transporting meaning, but ideally and 
essentially, has nothing to do with its constitution. Derrida points out that 
Husserl thinks that: 
we know already in fact that the discursive sign, and 
consequently the meaning, is always involved, always caught 
up in an indicative system. Caught up is the same as 
contaminated .... In 
fact and always (allzeit verflochten ist), to 
the extent to which the meaning, is taken up in communicative 
speech. [SP p. 20] 
He then locates his critique exactly at this point. Husserl has already made an 
essential distinction between the ideal inner subjective life'of the subject - its 
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structures of intentionality, and an external empirical world, a world of 
existent facts. This distinction lies hidden within the distinction made between 
expressive and indicative aspects of the sign. These two heterogenous 
functions of the sign already rely upon a clear cut distinction between what 
is intentional, i. e. the ideality of meaning, and what is factual and empirical, 
i. e. the physical or empirical indication of meaning outside the inner 
intentionality of consciousness. This distinction, however, is never 
phenomenologically justified, nor logically grounded. It amounts to a belief 
about the world which is never subjected to phenomenological critique. 
Derrida's claim goes much further than simply attributing a localised 
dogmatism to phenomenology. He believes that this distinction determines the 
whole of phenomenology's trajectory. This is because he detects a slippage 
in the distinction between the essential and factual levels of Husserl's 
analyses. For Husserl, meaning is essentially expression, but he says that it 
is factually impossible to separate expression from indication, because 
factually, signification always involves reference to an existent, empirical, 
physical world. This belief in a real empirical world is denoted by the very 
idea of a fact. 
However, if the very distinction between fact and intention has not yet 
been phenomenologically criticised and thus grounded, then this factual 
analysis applies to all signification. For, if signification is essentially 
expression, in the sense of the expression of an ideal intentionality, whilst 
indication is factually contingent to meaning, in the sense of an empirical sign 
for meaning, then the essential meaning of both elements of signification 
becomes obscure. In general the necessary distinction between de jure and 
de facto levels of analysis is dependent upon an essential distinction between 
the two aspects of the sign, in which their function and meaning is already 
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decided. The distinction between these two sorts of signs, however, is already 
de jure, and thus we are involved in a contradiction which does not allow us 
to separate the factual from the essential. If it is in fact impossible to separate 
these two forms of signification, then this fact, argues Derrida, must be 
essential to phenomenology: 
The whole analysis will thus advance in this separation between 
de facto and de jure, existence and essence, reality and 
intentional function.... And its de jure import, the right to a 
distinction between fact and intention, depends entirely on 
language and, in language, on the validity of a radical distinction 
between indication and expression. [SP p. 21] 
Derrida holds that this distinction between expression and indication thus 
governs the whole of phenomenology's trajectory, subjecting it to an internal 
tension, in which the necessary empiricity, or worldliness of the sign is shut 
out by the expression of meaning within the phenomenological reduction. 
Without this reference to an exteriority there would be no "inner" 
"subjective" expression of meaning. Simultaneously this exteriority of the 
indicative sign threatens the purity of the subject's inner expression with 
incoherence. In other words it threatens the subject with death, for it threatens 
to rupture the ideal solitude of the subjective "inner" life of the subject. This 
"inner" meaning of the subject is expression which is not yet exteriorised - 
its pure "I mean ... ". This can only be posited in terms of the exclusion 
by the 
transcendental reduction of all reference to a possible exteriority, to 
everything other than the subject. This exclusion is something which Husserl 
holds to be factually impossible, and Derrida argues to be essentially 
impossible: 
The meaning is therefore present to the self in the life of a 
present that has not yet gone forth from itself into the world, 
space, or nature. All these "goings-forth" effectively exile this 
life of self-presence in indication: We-now know that indication, 
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which thus far includes practically the whole surface of 
language, is the process of death at work in signs. As soon as 
the other appears, indicative language - another name for the 
relation with death - can no longer be effaced. [SP p. 40] 
The distinction between indication and expression, and thus essence and fact, 
inside and outside, and all the distinctions caught up in phenomenology's 
system, depend upon this effacement of the other by the meaning of the 
transcendental subject. Derrida's argument is basically that such a distinction 
is a fiction, a belief. It is not just that such a distinction has not been critically 
proved by phenomenology, but that it cannot be proved, because the 
distinction between the expression and indication of meaning is structurally 
undecidable. It is this undecidability, in this case represented by the 
relationship of the expression of meaning to a certain empiricity - the belief 
in a real external world, or an objective spatiality - whicli "contaminates" the 
phenomenological project from beginning to end. 
However, Derrida's critique of Husserl is centred on the , 
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the Logical Investigations. He himself admits that there is a question as to 
whether Husserl's later work is concerned with how knowledge is produced, 
or with founding knowledge per se. In order to see this it is necessary to read 
Husserl himself. The reading here will be restricted to his Cartesian 
Meditations, for two reasons: firstly, if Derrida is correct in his assertion that 
Husserl's division between expressive and indicative signs, set forth in the 
Logical Investi atg ions, dominates and determines the project of a 
transcendental phenomenology according to traditional metaphysical 
assumptions, then it should be possible to read the effects of this 
determination in the much later Cartesian Meditations. Secondly, if, as 
43 Husserl E., Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. 
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Husserl asserts, the foundation of an apodictically secured science rests in the 
apodictic verification of the intentional structures of the transcendental 
subject, and these meditations present such a verification, then it should be 
possible to analyse the guiding intention behind the phenomenological 
analysis and grounding of transcendental subjectivity within the scope of this 
book. This should then indicate at what stages the necessary referentiality of 
meaning interrupts and disturbs its full expression by the transcendental 
subject. We will concentrate upon the relation between the subject and the 
transcendency of its world. We will then look at Derrida's explanation of 
how it is possible to conceive of meaning as pure subjective expression i. e. 
ideality, without being able to realize the necessity of a reference to an 
irreducible exteriority. 
11. Husserl's Project 
Husserl's Cartesian Meditations effectively reintroduces a new Cartesian 
spirit into twentieth century thought in the form of a phenomenology of the 
transcendental subject. Husserl here proposes transcendental subjectivity as 
the essence and ground of phenomenology and hence of philosophy itself. 
Thus he says: 
following Descartes, we make the great reversal that, if made in 
the right manner, leads to transcendental subjectivity: the turn 
to the ego cogito as the ultimate and apodictically certain basis 
for judgements, the basis on which any radical philosophy must 
be based. [CM p. 18] 
Husserl wished to establish transcendental phenomenology as a thinking 
within which the old assumptions and prejudices of scientific and 
philosophical discourse could be criticised. This radical critique should, 
simultaneously, provide a new, absolutely secure ground for philosophical 
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investigation into the nature of the world. 
Husserl can be read according to these and other stated intentions, 
which include the wish to remedy a corrupt metaphysics. This, holds Husserl, 
according to a very traditional reading of the philosophical canon, has 
become distorted and impure due to "metaphysical adventure" carried out in 
the spirit of "all speculative excess" [CM p. 139]. Husserl therefore intends 
to cure metaphysics of this wanton excess, to bring it back to its proper path 
of thought through its radical phenomenological critique. 
If Husserl is read solely in this light then we are strongly tempted to 
agree wholeheartedly with Derrida's criticism that Husserl repeats the 
tradition of metaphysical idealism. However, when we read Husserl's later 
work, such as the Cartesian Meditations, and his Phenomenology of Internal 
Time Consciousness, closely, we find just such speculative excesses and 
certain fundamental ambiguities which reveal themselves as necessary to 
phenomenological description. Although Husserl is not wont to emphasise 
these excesses, neither does he deny or suppress them. 
Thus, at this stage of the reading, we should perhaps be wary of 
passing over the narrative development in the Cartesian Meditations. In doing 
so we would run the risk of reducing certain speculative threads of this 
progression to a singular determination of the intended meaning of this 
book. ' 
44 Even if one wishes to remain true to these speculative tendencies it should be noted 
that Husserl thinks it necessary at the very beginning of the Cartesian Meditations, to 
return to Descartes' first premise and point of departure, that of the ego cogito ergo sum, 
as the first originary apodictic evidence. He thus determines philosophy and the subject, 
as the domains of critical inquiry and truth, without paying attention to the possibility of 
the inscription of a functioning critical discourse within areas other than a so-called pure 
philosophy, and without legitimating this strict division between philosophy and other 




It could well be that these ambiguities and excesses arise because of 
Husserl's unequivocal assertion for the need for a philosophical unity within 
which the reforming of the sciences can be rationally articulated. This is one 
of the contexts within which Husserl's text can be said to be marked by an 
ambiguity. For the determination of an absolute origin is forced on Husserl 
when he asserts: 
Only within the systematic unity of philosophy can they [the 
empirical sciences] develop into genuine sciences. As they have 
developed historically, on the other hand, they lack that 
44(... continued) 
effect of their own, and were always dependent upon philosophy for such an effect. Even 
if this is so, which is disputed here, Husserl makes little effort to justify and demonstrate 
this. 
In other words, at least in the Cartesian Meditations, his reading of Descartes is 
restricted to its logical content, and excludes any mention of its rhetorical and literary 
form. For, as Heidegger shows in his essay "The word of Nietzsche: God is dead, " to 
which we will turn our attention later on, the proposition ego cogito ergo sum is not so 
much a new phenomenon in philosophy -a new idea - as a rewriting, a translation, of the 
Ancients conceptual network in which the Greek usage of Hypokeimenon (that which is) 
was inscribed. Thus whilst the idea was not exactly new, the literary device used by 
Descartes to carry out this translation had probably never been used before in the scope 
of philosophical writing. After all, it is difficult, if not impossible, to envisage the 
persuasive force of the ego cogito without the rigorous and exclusive use of the 
autobiographical form to perform this argumentation, a device to which Husserl must also, 
necessarily, resort. 
And yet, as Derrida points out, within the locus of a restriction, such as the focus 
upon, and the prioritisation of a logical grammar, or the expressive sign, Husserl 
effectively denies the necessity of such devices both in the constitution of sense in general, 
and as internal necessities to his own argumentation. If elsewhere, in his Logical 
Investigations, Husserl, commenting on the word "I, " says: 
What its meaning is at the moment can be gleaned only from the living 
utterance and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it. If we 
read this word without knowing who wrote it, it is perhaps not 
meaningless but is at least estranged from its normal meaning. [From SP. 
p. 96] 
then is not the "I, " which is always called forth by Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations 
when it comes to the execution of the transcendental epoche, also estranged from the 
normal meaning he necessarily intended it to carry? 
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scientific genuineness which would consist in their complete 
and ultimate grounding on the basis of absolute insights, insights 
behind which one cannot go back any further. Hence the need 
for a radical rebuilding that satisfies the idea of philosophy as 
the all-inclusive unity of the sciences, within the unity of such 
an absolutely rational grounding. [CM p. 1-2] 
Thus the assertion of the origin of such a grounding is contained in the 
assertion of the possibility of such a grounding. This origin, and together with 
it the concept of origin in general, is always articulated as that singular 
determination of meaning behind which one cannot go any further. Husserl 
asserts that this origin is expressed as the innermost apodicticity of the 
subject. This is specifically Descartes' subject, the philosophising "I" which 
maintains its meaning in the very suspension of belief in all previously 
accumulated knowledge, the doubting subject. 
It is here that the ambiguity begins to have an effect, an effect to which 
Husserl is not entirely blind, and which he will later comment upon in the 
progression of his meditations. This comment or suspicion throws another 
light upon Husserl's phenomenology which Derrida at least partly misses. 
The ambiguity which is at work here is opened by the presupposition of the 
radically doubting subject. Logically we must begin here, with the 
apodicticity of the Cartesian subject. But Husserl will also throw logic into 
doubt within the scope of his transcendental epoche - is he not then 
necessarily committed to a false start? 
In other words, can one ever be certain that the doubting meditator 
who "Keeps only himself, qua pure ego of his cogitationes, as having an 
absolutely indubitable existence, as something that cannot be done away 
with, something that would exist even though this world were non-existent" 
[CM p. 3] is always identical with himself? Only a subject identical over time 
could offer an authentic ground from which Husserl's project can begin, but 
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is this not thrown into doubt as well? It is not that the ego which thinks 
"now" is not assured of existence at that precise point in time - this fact is 
beyond question. It is rather that the fact that the ego who thought "then" is 
more than merely formally the same as the ego who thinks "now" is not 
necessarily deducible from this fact. 
Secondly, if one cannot be certain that this "I" who meditates is always 
self-identical, how is one to be certain that he is truly alone in himself "qua 
pure ego" as Husserl says? Is it not rather that the thought of the thinking ego 
- the subject reflected in time - is always attended by the possibility of being 
otherwise, of being forgotten, or of carrying another meaning than was 
originally intended? Husserl will answer this question in two ways: 
1. He will stipulate that the I, the pure transcendent ego, is an ideal repetition 
-a formal repetition - of a possible ego and exists therefore only as an ideal 
possibility of the concrete ego - the psychological ego. The veracity of all 
existential internal experiences of the ego is therefore bracketed out by the 
transcendental epoche through which the transcendent ego is reached. Thus 
all apodictic evidences only refer to the possibility of the realisation of this 
formal point. This still begs the question how one can verify an ideal unity 
which would be inherent within this repetition without reference to a content 
(over time) of this form. This also stands in opposition to his earlier 
affirmation that the word "I, " estranged from its "normal" living origin, is 
deprived of its normal sense. In relation to the ideal possibility of its infinite 
repetition, the "normal" sense of the transcendent ego, the "I, " would 
necessarily veer towards non-sense, or more precisely, towards a sense which 
could never be remembered and thus verified. 
2. Later, Husserl will note, after stating that there must necessarily be a 
relation to something other within the transcendental subject in order that an 
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Objectively verifiable world can be conceived of as existing, that: 
The empathies [towards the other] he within the immanency that 
belongs to me as "ego" of the reduction. These non-originary 
presentations function together with all the others in the 
constitution of the "world. " Therefore what is set forth in 
Meditations I-III must have made implicit use also of empathy - 
only it was not mentioned. The difference between other 
persons and me as a person is itself a constituted differentiation 
between transcendental I (ego in the second sense) and 
transcendental others; and the transcendental intersubjective 
constitution of the world, as a world for all and a world that 
contains the transcendental subjects, mundanized as men. In the 
absolute and original ego of the reduction the world is 
constituted, as a world that is constituted as transcendentally 
intersubjective in every transcendental Ego. [CM p. 64 fn. I] 
This at least suggests that the "absolute and original ego of the reduction" 
was already false as soon as it was posed in its absolute form. It is, at least 
with reference to the Cartesian Meditations, at times difficult to subscribe to 
Derrida's reading of this problem as a tension within phenomenology. It is 
more than possible to interpret this tension as a speculative excess inherent 
in phenomenology which sustains the acuity of phenomenological analyses 
over and above Derrida's accusations of a repetition of the traditional motives 
of the metaphysics of presence. 
In Husserl, all the analyses which Derrida indicates as exemplifying a 
tension, those of time, of the alter-ego, of apperception, or representation, 
never simply bury the problems they raise. If this were the case this would 
suggest a simple tension in the work, such as one experiences in Kant's 
positing of noumena. These descriptive analyses go too far for this, which 
suggests, as has been argued, at least an other Husserl to that of Derrida, a 
statement that Derrida would perhaps not totally disagree with. It still 
remains, however, to pass through the transcendental reduction in order to 
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ascertain to what extent this other Husserl is able to speak. 
12. Transcendental Reduction and Objectivity 
We should therefore turn our attention to the opening of the transcendental 
reduction. It is within this reduction that Husserl begins his enterprise. This 
reduction is meant to take place at the origin of scientific discourse and 
knowledge - in the first principle of a first philosophy, ego cogito ergo sum. 
His aim, like Descartes before him, is to suspend belief in all knowledge 
which is not yet absolutely certain. With this in mind he states: 
And so we make a new beginning, each for himself and in 
himself, with the decision of philosophers who begin radically: 
that at first we shall put out of action all the convictions we 
have been accepting up to now, including all our sciences. Let 
the idea guiding our meditations be at first the Cartesian idea of 
a science that shall- be established as radically genuine, 
ultimately an all-embracing science. [CM p. 9] 
This leads Husserl to question the legitimacy of such a beginning: if the belief 
in the validity of the sciences in general is suspended, how can we follow 
their alleged ideal, and how can we know whether this ideal is legitimate. 
True to the radicality of Cartesian doubt, from which the transcendental 
reduction stems, Husserl thinks although we are not to be persuaded by the 
veracity of the ideal of the sciences, that does not mean that they simply 
disappear out of sight. He admits that we cannot simply suspend our 
presumptive attitude towards philosophical and scientific discourse if we have 
already decided to participate within the scope of its given structures, no 
matter how critical this participation might be. 45 
45 The move which Husserl here performs within the scope of the transcendental 
reduction is remarkably similar to Heidegger's conception of Destruktion and Abbau, 
which will be later refined and translated by Derrida under the heading Deconstruction. 
(continued... ) 
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We can, however, suspend our judgement regarding their truth and 
their logic, regarding them as possible discourses, in which knowledge could 
be grounded, and follow the course of their argumentation. This leads Husserl 
to an understanding of the objects of phenomenological description which 
grasps them in their ideal possibility rather than their actuality: 
Naturally we get the general idea of science from the sciences 
that are factually given. If they have become for us, in our 
radical critical attitude, merely alleged sciences, then, according 
to what has already been said, their final idea has become, in a 
like sense, a mere supposition. ... Nevertheless we 
do have it in 
this form, and in a state of indeterminate fluid generality; 
accordingly we have also the idea of philosophy: as an idea 
about which we do not know whether or how it can be 
actualised. [CM p. 8] 
We wish to show that within the interpretational matrix offered by 
phenomenology, this reference in the transcendental reduction to a possible 
real or factual world is only possible on the necessary presupposition of a real 
factual world. In other words, an empirical world, the sense of which arises 
before that constituted by the subject. Husserl's contention, however, is that 
this exteriority is itself ideal, contained within the subject, and its meaning 
thus constituted by the transcendental subject. ' 
45(... continued) 
He follows the trajectory of the use of certain concepts central to scientific thought 
without granting them absolute validity, in order to determine the possible scope and 
conditions of their function. Concepts which cannot sustain themselves by their own 
criteria are therefore suspended within the phenomenological reduction, from which 
perspective they can be criticised. 
46 It should be noted that the reduction is, at this stage of the Cartesian Meditations, only 
a provisional attitude, which must demonstrate its objective grounding during the course 
of the meditations. Even at the end of these meditations it is not absolutely clear whether 
this provisionality is ever overcome, especially when Husserl says that this is still a 'first 
stage of phenomenology -a stage which in its own manner is itself still infected with a 
certain naivete (the naivete of apodicticity)" [CM p. 151]. The validity of the 
(continued... ) 
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The Suspension of Jud a ment 
Husserl thus begins his meditations with an implicit reading of Descartes, 
and, provisionally starts from the same radical suspension of all truth claims, 
that is, the suspension of all things which are judged to be true. He thus 
begins with himself, as he who suspends his judgement from the things 
around him. This, however, in no way renders the world of the meditating 
philosopher non-existent. It is always there as a possible world for the 
philosopher. What is suspended is the question whether it is there in reality. 
Within this suspension of the division between reality and illusion, Husserl 
distinguishes between the suspension itself, and what this judicative act 
suspends: namely judgement itself. 
Judicative doing is therefore the activity which is ascribed to the 
philosophising subject within which he can accept a judgement as true, that 
is, believe it to be grounded, or suspend his belief in it. Within this context 
there is then a distinction between immediate and mediate judgements 
whereby 
mediate judgements have such a sense-relatedness to other 
judgements that judicatively believing them "presupposes" 
believing these others - in the manner characteristic of a 
believing of an account of something believed already. [CM 
P. 10] 
Immediate judgements thus have the form: x=y, and mediate judgements the 
form: if x=y then p. The proper object 'Of judicative activity is judgement 
itself, and includes the validation of a judgement, whereby, ideally, it is 
46(... continued) 
transcendental reduction is rooted in the nature of apodictic evidence, ' and if this itself is 
called into question; the provisionality of 'the reduction as the' origin of the 
phenomenological project is reinforced. ' 
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concretely and absolutely grounded. This grounding of a judgement consists, 
for Husserl, in the apodictic demonstration of a judgement's validity and 
forms the cornerstone of his phenomenological project, for without such a 
grounding one would not be able to talk in terms of the possession of cert ain 
knowledge. This grounding therefore takes on the characteristic of a 
necessary property of the knowing subject, where a property or acquisition 
is understood as 
a grounding already executed, or to the truth shown therein, [to 
which] one can "return" at will. By virtue of this freedom to 
reactualize such a truth, with awareness of it as one and the 
same, it is an abiding acquisition or possession and, as such, is 
called a cognition. [CM p. 10] 
This does not mean, however, that a cognition should be understood as 
simply a wayward thought ethereally emanating from somewhere in the 
subject's vicinity which the subject somehow reaches out and grasps, making 
it its own. A subject is not something which exists and then "has" thoughts 
or cognitions. The subject is rather fully grounded in cognition - it is what the 
subject itself means or intends. Cognition is conceived of as the ability of the 
subject to possess a meaning as its own and which therefore necessarily 
includes at all times the possibility of a demonstration of this possession. This 
gives rise to the idea of evidence, whereby 
In a genuine grounding, judgements show themselves as 
"correct, " as "agreeing; " that is to say, the grounding is an 
agreement of the judgement with the judged state of affairs 
[Urteilsverhalt] (the affair or affair-complex [Sachverhalt]) 
"itself. " More precisely stated: Judging is meaning - and, as a 
rule, merely supposing - that such and such exists and has such 
and such determinations; the judgement (what is judged) is then 
a merely supposed affair or complex of affairs, as what is 
meant. But, contrasted with that, there is sometimes a pre- 
eminent judicative meaning [Meinen],, a judicative having of 
such and such itself. This having is called evidence. In it the 
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affair, the complex (or state) of affairs, instead of being meant 
"from afar, " is present as the affair "itself, " the affair-complex 
or state-of-affairs "itself "; the judger accordingly possesses it 
itself. [CM p. 10] 
For Husserl, the intentional subject therefore consists of its meaning, or 
judgement, insofar as this meaning or judgement self-evidently belongs to the 
subject itself, i. e. it expresses the subject's own sense or meaning. 
The Apodictici of the Reduction 
At this stage, however, Husserl is not yet at the reduction proper to the 
transcendental subject. It is within this context that he will contend that he 
has overthrown the Cartesian subject because Descartes missed the 
transcendental nature of the subject. At this stage of his meditations he feels 
certain enough to state that:. 
We have gained a measure of clarity sufficient to let us fix, for 
our whole fu ther procedure, a first methodological principle. 
It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I 
am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must 
neither make nor go on accepting any judgement as scientific 
that I have not derived from evidence, from "experiences" in 
which the affairs and affair-complexes are present to me as 
"they themselves. " [CM p. 13] 
This then gives rise to the notion of apodictic evidence: 
An apodictic evidence, however, is not merely certainty of the 
affairs or the affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) evident in it; 
rather it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the 
signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute 
unimaginableness (inconceivability) of their non-being, and 
thus excluding in advance every doubt as "objectless, " empty. 
[CM p. 15-16] 
It is from this ideal of the sciences of securing knowledge from absolute, 
irrefutable evidence, that Husserl concludes that the premise of the Cartesian 
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subject, the ego cogito ergo sum is the first apodictic evidence which the 
philosopher can possess. However, the veracity of any relation to anything 
other than the ego posited in this statement is suspended, in what he terms the 
transcendental epoche. It is important to realise that for Husserl it is only this 
ego, in all its ideality, which is apodictic. This does not yet include the 
veracity of thoughts stemming from this ideal ego in reflection about itself. 
Within this epoche, at this stage of the meditation, nothing other than this 
statement is accepted as apodictically true. This suspension is executed only 
from within the scope of this statement. This expression of the subject is the 
performance of the transcendental epoche by the transcendental subject in 
which its existence is apodictically verified. 
As has been said, however, this abstention from belief in the world 
does not destroy its appearance to the subject, it only suspends the validation 
of its claim to an external existence, outside that of the subject. The claim of 
the "objective" world to a real being-in-itself is no longer accepted by the 
doubting subject as being true. Within this realm the minimal subject is still 
confronted with a world, but no longer one to which it takes a judgemental 
stance. This holding back from judgement - the performance of the epoche - 
nonetheless exists, and to it thus belongs the world as a phenomenon. The 
subject, holds Husserl, experiences this field of phenomena as its life - the 
awareness of this passing phenomenal field is the subject's awareness of its 
pure life in its subjectivity: 
This universal depriving of acceptance, this "inhibiting" or 
"putting out of play" of all positions taken toward the already- 
given Objective world and, in the first place, all existential 
positions (those concerning being, illusion, possible being, being 
likely, probable, etc. ), - or, as it is called, this 
"phenomenological epoche" and "parenthesizing"., of . 
the 
Objective world - therefore does not leave us confronting 
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nothing. On the contrary we gain possession of something by it; 
and what we (or, to speak more precisely, what I, the one who 
is meditating) acquire by it is my pure living, with all the pure 
subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in 
them, purely as meant in them: the universe of "phenomena" in 
the (particular and also the wider) phenomenological sense. 
[CM p. 20-21 ] 
And, shortly afterwards: 
The epoche can also be said to be the radical and universal 
method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, and with 
my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire 
Objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me. 
[CM p. 21] 
It is thus within the transcendental epoche that the subject comes to confront 
the sense of its intentional conscious life. It is only within this sphere that 
something can have sense for the transcendental subject, as a totality of 
meaning. 
These basic principles of phenomenology characterize the 
transcendental subject in the entirety of its possible meaning. The forms of its 
cognition, within which the meaning of every object intended by the subject 
has meaning for the subject, therefore form the apodictical ground of the 
possible knowledge which the subject can have. It is important to realize 
when reading Husserl, that he is only concerned with the possible meaning 
of an intentional object, what and how an object means something for the 
subject. Husserl holds that it is only this meaning that the subject can 
apodictically and evidentially possess, and thus know for certain. 
However, we have already seen that this leads to accusations of 
solipsism and of an infinite regress at the heart of phenomenology, a tension 
which is not easily escaped by Husserl. We have also suggested that these 
tensions are themselves produced by the radicality and rigour of Husserl's 
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phenomenological description set against the necessities of his analytical 
project. We can put it this way: on the one hand, whilst the analytical project 
requires the subject to immediately and transparently express its pure 
meaning to itself, the phenomenological description of this process commits 
this expression to refer to an exteriority in which this meaning is given its 
possible objectivity, and is not simply subjective. On the other hand, if the 
phenomenological description itself is to describe the processes of cognition 
"themselves, " and thus in accordance with the analytical project, then it too 
must refer to an exteriority from which the modes of appearance can be 
apodictically distinguished from appearance itself. 
In both cases we arrive at a necessary conjunction, which can be said 
to be both the opening and closure of the phenomenological subject. This is 
the necessary referral of its cognition to a transcendent world. It is also here 
that Derrida's critique takes on its pertinence. 
13. Transcendence in the Phenomenological Subject 
Does not Husserl also discover this tension in phenomenology during the 
course of his meditations? The answer to this must be both yes and no. As 
Derrida points out, the project of transcendental phenomenology essentially 
recognizes that a relation between the Cogito and a beyond, an outside, is 
necessary if we are to conceive of anything like a verifiable, objective 
meaning. This essential going out beyond itself of the Cogito is what is meant 
by Husserl's description of the Cogito as necessarily intending a horizon in 
the constitution of the meaning of its intended object: 
without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, 
consciousness of such and such, regardless of what the rightful 
actuality-status of this objective such-and-such may be, and 
regardless of the circumstances that I, as standing in the 
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transcendental attitude, abstain from acceptance of this object 
as well as from all my other natural acceptances. ... 
Each 
Cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, "means" 
something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar 
to the meant, its particular cogitatum. ... 
Conscious processes 
are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality 
signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property 
of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a Cogito 
to bear within itself its cogitatum. [CM p. 33] 
We can understand this from the perspective of the Cartesian ego, which 
must be formally indicated as the condition of cognition in general. These two 
conditions, however, mutually determine one another. The "I" of the 
transcendental subject always has a necessary existence in cognition, but. 
only in so far as cognition has a content which stretches beyond its formal 
condition. In other words the "I" can mean something only in so far that 
something is "there" of which it is conscious. This indeterminate "there" is 
the Cogito's general horizon of meaning, which is articulated in its relation 
to a transcendent world, with its web of constitutive horizons. 
Phenomenology thus represents the attempt to encompass the 
necessary intention of an exteriority within the scope of what can be 
meaningful for the subject. Husserl recognizes that without a certain reference 
to an "outside, " or an "other" within the scope of the subject's intentional 
meaning, this meaning could never lay claim to being objective. We could 
never understand meaning in terms of an objective realm which is necessarily 
exterior and transcendent to our subjective judgement. Without this reference 
to a general exteriority the subject could not discern the form of its thought 
from its content, it could not know whether its thought had an "objective" 
meaning, and could thus not distinguish what an object in general could 
mean. 
This can be understood in terms of what the subject is said Ito intend 
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or perceive. For example, Husserl says that the basic phenomenal condition 
of consciousness is the consciousness of its own temporal flux. This temporal 
flux of consciousness is the transcendental condition of the subject's 
differentiation and identification of the sense and meaning of its intentional 
objects. If, however, the subject perceives this temporal flux itself as an 
intentional object, and the meaning of this flux for the subject can only be 
constituted from the subject's cognitive processes in which this meaning is 
"mine, " then surely there can be no legitimate differentiation between the 
sense of the subject's ego and the sense of the object which it constitutes. 
Within the scope of the phenomenological epoche this, however, must surely 
be the case. The problem of how Husserl can explain the existence of our 
sense of a transcendent world of objects thus remains when he says: 
The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always 
has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can 
exist for me - this world, with all its Objects, I said, derives its 
whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from 
me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who 
comes to the fore only with the transcendental- 
phenomenological epoche. [CM p. 26] 
The problem is that the very idea of a transcendental ego presupposes a 
distinction between the ego's sense of itself and the sense of the ego's 
intended object. Husserl believes that meaning only obtains within the realm 
of the transcendental subject and that this realm - the subject and its 
cogitation - is its own only phenomenon of which one can be apodictically 
certain. This means that the difficulty remains of explaining how the subject 
can differentiate within itself in order, to express the meaning of its object, 
even if this object is itself, and what the sense of such an expression could 
possibly be. .11,1 
Without a reference to a transcendent horizon, 
, 
an externality, the 
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subject's expression of what it intends - the expression of its ideal meaning - 
would express nothing, could say nothing, could neither identify nor indicate 
anything. All that this expression could say, or indicate, would be a tautology. 
If this is the case then the intended object remains indeterminate, because it 
is in no way differentiated from the subject - if we could still talk of a subject 
as such. For, if the intended object - its ideal meaning - is in no way external 
to the subject "I, " then it would be nothing other than the subject, which 
would be to say nothing about the subject other than "I. " 
However, Husserl recognizes and emphasises the role of the 
transcendence of the objective world within the transcendental subject. Is 
there not some justification in his positing the transcendental subject as the 
condition of possibility of sense in general, including the sense of the 
transcendence of the world for the subject? Is it not logically impossible for 
the subject to envisage a sense which does not belong to it, that is external to 
it? 
Husserl restricts his analysis to the possibility of a logical sense. 
Within the locus of this restriction, it appears certain that Husserl must be 
right in designating a necessary relation between the interiority of the subject 
and the exteriority of the world in the intended meaning of an object. The 
sense of the world in the cognition of an object is always constituted as being 
transcendent to the subject. This transcendence does not mean for Husserl 
that it is not first constituted in the subject, insofar as it is a component of 
intentional meaning for the subject. What is important for him is that within 
the attitude of the phenomenological epoche one realizes that all posited 
meaning is ideal -a possible cognition by the subject. 
Phenomenological description is thus the apodictic presentation of the 
transcendental-logical conditions which are required by the subject's 
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cognition in order for a particular cognition to have a sense which can be 
meaningfully expressed. This means that the sense of the transcendence of the 
world does not indicate the real existence of a transcendent world, only the 
possibility of its existence. For the subject, the world can only be 
apodictically expressed in terms of this possibility of cognition. Its 
transcendence in relation to the subject is a condition of this possibility which 
is produced by the subject. We have no way of apodictically knowing 
whether the world in itself is real: 
Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, 
conversely, neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece 
of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life as a really inherent 
part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of 
acts. This "transcendence" is part of the intrinsic sense of 
anything worldly, despite the fact that anything worldly 
necessarily acquires all the sense determining it, along with its 
existential status, exclusively from my experiencing, my 
objectivating, thinking, valuing, or doing, at particular times ... 
. If this "transcendence, 
" which consists in being non-really 
included, is part of the intrinsic sense of the world, then, by way 
of contrast, the Ego himself, who bears within him the world as 
an accepted sense and who, in turn, is necessarily presupposed 
by this sense, is legitimately called transcendental, in the 
phenomenological sense. [CM p. 26] 
The subject therefore constitutes the transcendent sense of the world as 
immanent within it, and opposed to the interiority of the subject. The 
distinction between the exteriority of an object and the interiority of the 
subject who perceives that object is thus always interior to the subject's 
constitution of the sense of an object. For Husserl, this distinction therefore 
falls into the category of the irreal, although it is a necessary transcendental 
condition of the subject's cognition of a possible object, which may or may 
not be perceived as being real. This would suggest that Husserl is describing 
the conditions of the production of possible knowledge, within which the 
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unity of subject and object is a necessary condition, but not necessarily an 
obtainable condition, i. e. it is posited only ideally and never really. Such a 
reading of Husserl is supported when he describes the necessary being-in- 
consciousness of every intended object: 
This being-in-consciousness is a being-in of a completely 
unique kind: not a being-in-consciousness as a really intrinsic 
component part, but rather a being-in-it "ideally" as something 
intentional, something appearing - or, equivalently stated, a 
being-in-it as its immanent "objective sense. " The "object" of 
consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself' during 
the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process 
from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the 
subjective process itself - and thus as an "intentional effect" 
produced by the synthesis of consciousness. [CM p. 42] 
This must be true of every intentional cognition of an object, and forms the 
basic structure of the horizonal nature of intentionality. Every cognition must 
refer to a transcendent immanency of meaning within the object appearance 
itself. The Cogito thus always intends a meaning beyond, or exterior to, its 
own presented scope, in terms of an expectational horizon of meaning which 
conditions the meaning presented in the cognition of an object. For Husserl, 
the significance of this exteriority within the cognition is, however, 
constituted within the subject itself. The problem thus still remains how one 
is to apodictically, that is, absolutely, differentiate between the appearance 
of an object in its ideal constitution, and the appearance of this ideal 
constitution of the object in phenomenological reflection. 
The objection is not so much that one could not decide which is real 
and which is non-real - for Husserl both fall in the realm of a condition of 
possibility, a necessary potentiality of the subject if it is to cognise an object. 
The objection is rather how one delimits these appearances as actually non- 
real, fictive or imaginary. Given that all objects of consciousness are actually 
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i. e. apodictically, ideal, how can one apodictically differentiate between the 
categories of the real and of the imaginary? In order to describe all objects of 
consciousness as ideal, one must have already made the distinction between 
the real and the imaginary or irreal. There is a distinct difference between 
delimiting the subject as an ideal structure, which would be apodictically 
irreal, or as a "fictive" or "imaginary" structure, the apodicticity of which 
would be necessarily indeterminate. At the moment, however, we are 
concerned with the structure of the intentional horizon of the world, and what 
form the possibility of this fiction might take place in this case. 
It is here that Derrida's reading of Husserl is most enlightening. 
Derrida firstly asks whether it is possible to truly express the structures of 
consciousness, when their meaning is constituted from these very same 
structures. He answers this by showing that there must be an indication or 
reference within predicative expression to an indeterminacy, which resists 
predication. The pure expression of the subject is, as indicated above, a belief 
or fiction for Derrida. He then asks how such a belief is possible, and outlines 
a phenomenology of the voice of the subject which goes someway in 
explaining this possibility. Moreover, it is certainly useful in understanding 
why we find the concept of transcendental subjectivity and of the subject in 
a general state of collapse. 
14. The Co 'tom 's Expression 
We have argued that it is Husserl's commitment to a reference in cognition 
to a transcendent exteriority which interrupts his project of an apodictically 
grounded science. It is this fact that there must be an intended or meant object 
which transcends the scope of the subject's expression if intentionality is to 
make sense, which must be expressed and made evident in its expression. 
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Such an expression must directly present the evident validity of a 
judgement in accordance with a pre-predicative state of affairs. It must 
therefore itself be evident as a direct expression. Conceived thus, such an 
expression must evidently express the meaning which is meant in the 
subject's cognition of the said state of affairs. Thus Husserl is led to say: 
Yet there is one more thing that should be brought out, to 
supplement what we have said. We must distinguish the 
judgement in the broadest sense (something meant as being) and 
evidence in the broadest sense from the pre-predicative 
judgement and from pre-predicative evidence. That which is 
meant or, perchance, evidently viewed receives predicative 
expression; and science always intends to judge expressly and 
keep the judgement or the truth fixed, as an express judgement 
or as an express truth. But the expression as such has its own 
comparatively good or bad way of fitting what is meant or itself 
given; and therefore has its own evidence or non-evidence, 
which also goes into the predicating. Consequently evidence of 
the expression is also a determining part of the idea of scientific 
truth, as predicative complexes that are, or can be, grounded 
absolutely. [CM. p. 11 ] 
This means, however, that cognition, understood as the evidential possession 
of the meaning of something, is nothing other than the pure expression of the 
cognising subject itself. Pure expression is therefore nothing other than the 
demonstration or presentation of what the subject means immediately to 
itself. This then raises the problem of whether the distinction between a pure 
pre-predicative sphere and a pure predicative sphere can be legitimated, 
which, in this case, means nothing other than founding the possibility of 
apodictic expression in general. Here Derrida locates the problem of the voice 
of the subject. He holds that it is the ideality of vocal expression which would 
form the ideal mediation and verification of the subject to itself, an immediate 
mediation which must occur if knowledge is to obtain a logical foundation. 
Following the ideal structure of objective knowledge, Husserl deduces 
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that a de facto truth claim must be verified in judicative expression. This 
judgement only obtains insofar as its evident demonstration is always freely 
repeatable and the same, i. e., that it is always present in the possibility of a 
free return to its presentation. This presentation is understood as the apodictic 
expression of such a truth and, once acquired, takes on the status of a "true" 
cognition. This presupposes, however, a pre-predicative sphere which is 
necessarily "there" before this expression. The ego cogito ergo sum is 
necessarily the first predicative expression of the sense of this indeterminate 
pre-predicative sphere. The sense of a pre-predicative sphere therefore 
belongs to the subject itself. 
However, if this is so then one is thrown into the enigma of how the 
subject can mediate - express -a sphere which resists such a mediation, 
which must resist the determination of its meaning by judgement even though 
it is necessarily the ground of such a determination. In other words, for there 
to be a pure expression of what the subject means there must be a relation to 
an outside within which expression is grounded. However, as a pure 
expression of meaning which is immediately present to the subject, this 
expression poses itself as the obliteration of this outside in its very 
articulation. As Derrida says: 
By a strange paradox, meaning would isolate the concentrated 
purity of its expressiveness just at that moment when the 
relation to a certain outside is suspended. Only to a certain 
outside, because this reduction does not eliminate, but rather 
reveals, within pure expression, a relation to an object, namely, 
the intending of an objective ideality which stands face to face 
with the meaning-intention, the Bedeutungsintention. What we 
just called a paradox is in fact only the phenomenological 
project in its essence. [SP p. 22] 
It is precisely here that this necessary reference to an indeterminacy, which 
is what such a pre-predicative exteriority represents, threatens the whole of 
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the phenomenological project, for it renders its telos paradoxical, unsinnig. 
Derrida thinks that Husserl must therefore repress this reference in the 
expression of the subject's meaning, and does so by idealising the meaning 
of expression itself: 
Ex-pression is exteriorization ... The meaning (bedeuten) intends an outside which is that of an ideal object [Gegen- 
stand]. This outside is then ex-pressed and goes forth beyond 
itself into another outside, which is always "in" consciousness. 
For, as we shall see, the expressive discourse, as such and in 
essence, has no need of being effectively uttered in the world. 
[SP p. 32] 
Derrida gives us an account of how it is possible to maintain such a 
repression through the tools provided by phenomenology. He holds that in 
order to do so, philosophy in general, and in this case Husserl, must perform 
a division of language into expression and indication. In our reading of 
Heidegger we have already seen the necessity and the collapse of this 
distinction in consciousness, articulated in terms of the ready-to-hand, and 
present-at-hand. Derrida goes further and describes how this distinction is 
maintained through the phenomenon of the voice, which Husserl interprets in 
terms of its ideality: 
It is not in the sonorous substance or in the physical voice, in 
the body of speech in the world, that he will recognize an 
original affinity with the logos in general, but in the voice 
phenomenologically taken, speech in its transcendental flesh, in 
the breath, the intentional animation that transforms the body of 
the word into flesh, makes of the Körper a Leib, a geistige 
Leiblichkeit. The phenomenological voice would be this 
spiritual flesh that continues to speak and to be present to itself - 
to hear itself - in the absence of the world. [SP p. 16] 
This symptomatic treatment of language where the expression of meaning is 
taken as purely vocal is, for Derrida, akin to a wide prevailing dogma. It 
forms an index for a wider philosophical containment and interpretation of 
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desire in general. This is the reduction of the meaning of meaning in general 
to presence - to what is present, both temporally in terms of what "is, " and 
spatially in terms of what is most near. Thus he says of Husserl: 
The factor of presence, the ultimate court of appeal for the 
whole of this discourse, is itself modified, without being lost, 
each time there is a question of the presence (in the two related 
senses, of the proximity of what is set forth as an object of 
intuition, and the proximity of the temporal present which gives 
the clear and present intuition of the object its form) of any 
object whatever to consciousness, in the clear evidence of a 
fulfilled intuition. 
... Every time this element of presence becomes threatened, Husserl will awaken it, recall it, and bring 
it back to itself in the form of a telos - that is, an Idea in the 
Kantian sense. ... This ideality is the very form in which the 
presence of an object in general may be indefinitely repeated as 
the same. [SP p. 9] 
We have already seen that the meaning of the subject is always and only what 
it expresses in predicative judgement. Whilst the predicative expression of the 
ego cogito presupposes the reference to a pre-predicative, i. e. indeterminate, 
sphere of which it is the expression, it simultaneously presupposes an 
absolute distinction between these two spheres. Without this distinction its 
expression would be threatened by its referentiality towards indeterminacy. 
This would mean that the expression of the ego cogito would be open to a 
differentiation within its meaning. But if this distinction is absolute (which it 
must be if the expression of the ego cogito is to remain the identical to itself), 
then there can be no relation or interplay between these two spheres. This 
would mean that there could be no expressive determination of meaning 
within the subject. Effectively the subject would be dead. On the other hand, 
the referentiality of the subject's expression would also insinuate an 
indeterminacy into the heart of the subject's meaning because it always refers 
beyond the "ideality" of the subject's expression toward its other. In the case 
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of the ideality of the subject's expression this other is indicated by all 
concepts which are in some way mediate to consciousness, such as the 
empirical, the real, the visible and the spatial. The referentiality of the sign is 
thus also a death warrant for the phenomenological subject. As Derrida says: 
Visibility and spatiality as such could only destroy the self- 
presence of will and spiritual animation which opens up 
discourse. They are literally the death of that self-presence. [SP 
p. 35] 
Upon what grounds is it then possible to interpret the subject as the condition 
of the expression of meaning? Why does Husserl think that the subject can 
possess an apodictic expression of meaning, when his descriptions suggest 
that meaning can never be absolutely present to the subject, that it is 
"constituted" from beyond the "interiority" of the subject? 
The Voice of the Subject 
Derrida's analysis suggests that it is the phenomenological understanding of 
vocal expression which explains this repression of everything which does not 
belong to the ideality of the subject's expression i. e. the visible, the spatial, 
the empirical. If Husserl's analysis of meaning is to function, then the subject 
must possess a way of immediately expressing itself to itself. This medium 
of expression must, in effect, be absolutely transparent to the subject, 
avoiding ä11 reference to anything beyond. The apodictic expression of the 
subject's meaning is, as we have seen, ideal - it refers only to what the 
subject intends, and not to any mediation of this intention. The subject, for 
example, does not need to communicate its intention to itself - it is already 
apparent in the very fact, of the intention. Derrida maintains that it is the 
experience of the voice which allows us to believe in the existence 'of such a 
medium. 
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The voice, even when taken empirically, has certain characteristics 
which could well give the impression of such a medium. As Derrida says, 
when one talks, one hears one's self speak, and has the impression that this 
hearing-one's-self-speak is without mediation. This is because, when we 
focus upon the vocal medium itself, sound, then what we hear fades as soon 
as it is heard. In doing so one has the impression that the voice itself is 
immaterial and immediate - it belongs to the realm of ideality rather that of 
empirical spatiality: 
This immediate presence [of the voice to consciousness] results 
from the fact that the phenomenological "body" of the signifier 
seems to fade away at the very moment it is produced; it seems 
already to belong to the element of ideality. [SP p. 77] 
This impression forms a model for thinking in which thought is reduced to an 
immediate interior dialogue of the subject with itself. Derrida thinks that this 
experience forms the basis of the idea of a pure interiority of the subject, in 
which the expressed meaning of the subject is absolutely present to 
consciousness. This experience constitutes the subject's certainty of its 
autonomous existence over and above that of the world. Derrida thus holds 
that when I hear myself speak I understand myself in terms of a pure auto- 
affection in which the meaning of my cognition is immediately present. 
Because this auto- affection is always immediate and pure the meaning of my 
expression is always transparent, and always mine. The object of the 
subject's expression is thus always ideal because it is expressed in this 
transcendent medium of the voice. The expression of meaning by the subject 
therefore makes no reference to the exterior of the subject: 
As pure auto-affection, the operation of hearing oneself speak 
seems to reduce even the inward surface of one's own body; in 
its phenomenal being it seems capable of dispensing with this 
exteriority within interiority, this interior space in which our 
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experience or image of our own body is spread forth. This is 
why hearing oneself speak is experienced as an absolute pure 
auto-affection, occurring in a self-proximity that would in fact 
be the absolute reduction of space in general. It is this purity 
that makes it fit for universality. Requiring the intervention of no 
determinate surface in the world, being produced in the world 
as pure auto-affection, it is a signifying substance absolutely at 
our disposition. For the voice meets no obstacle to its emission 
in the world precisely because it is produced as pure auto- 
affection. [SP p. 79] 
Derrida holds, however, that in so understanding the voice, one misses the 
inherent empiricity of its medium: sound. The phenomenon of sound 
necessarily refers to the concept of an empirical, material mediation, within 
which the reality of a material, spatial world is already included. Derrida 
believes that Husserl's understanding of the intentional consciousness ignores 
the fact that these categories of empirical reality are necessary when 
conceiving the phenomenon of sound, and concentrates only upon the 
phenomenon of the voice. It is only so, through the initial presupposition and 
consequent reduction of the world's empirical reality - its material spatiality - 
that Husserl can conceive a pure interiority to the subject. This interiority of 
the subject, the ideality of its identity, is always transcendent to the facticity 
of the world i. e. the presupposition of the empirical reality of its existence. 
Derrida argues that 
the unity of sound and voice, which allows the voice to be 
produced in the world as pure auto-affection, is the sole case to 
escape the distinction between what is worldly and what is 
transcendental; by the, same token, it makes that distinction 
possible. ... [Thus] no, consciousness is possible without the 
voice. The voice is the being which is present to itself in the 
form of universality, as con-sciousness; the voice is 
consciousness. [SP p. 79-80] 
If there is no unity between sound and voice, if one admits the necessary 
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empiricity of sound, then this pure auto-affection, the proposed ideality of the 
"I exist... " of the subject, is interrupted. It would be interrupted because the 
category of the empirical would, when opposed to the pure autonomy of the 
subject, represents absolute difference. One would then be committed to 
saying that the subject is constituted differentially, rather than in terms of its 
identity, its autonomous transcendent meaning. 
Surely, however, this argument cannot explain away the rigorousness 
of Husserl's phenomenological descriptions, which suspend such empiricity 
in the transcendental reduction, as their very condition of possibility? 
This, however, is Derrida's point. Husserl's understanding of language 
as being divided into expression and indication, takes vocal expression as if 
it were totally ideal, stripped of all empiricity or materiality. But to do so one 
must already know what such empiricity or materiality means in itself. 
However, for Husserl the only thing that the subject can be apodictically 
certain of is its own cognition. This is all that really exists for the subject. 
This means that sound and voice must, from the phenomenological 
perspective, be presented as an ideal unity, for they are never really 
represented at all. In, for example, the cognition of a word, it is not important 
whether the word itself has a worldly existence or not. What is important is 
that it can be imagined, and it is this imagination - the pure subjective activity 
of the subject's cognition - which exists for the subject. Derrida thus says: 
In imagination the existence of the word is not implied, even by 
virtue of intentional sense. There exists only the imagination of 
the word, which is absolutely= certain and self-present insofar as 
it is lived. This, then, is already a phenomenological reduction 
which isolates the subjective experience as the sphere of 
absolute certainty and absolute existence. [SP p. 44] 
And, later: 
The ideal object is the most objective of objects; independent of 
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the here-and-now acts and events of the empirical subjectivity 
which intends it, it can be repeated infinitely while remaining 
the same. Since its presence to intuition, its being-before the 
gaze, has no essential dependence on any worldly or empirical 
synthesis, the re-establishment of its sense in the form of 
presence becomes a universal and unlimited possibility. But, 
being nothing outside the world, this ideal being must be 
constituted, repeated, and expressed in a medium that does not 
impair the presence and self-presence of the acts that aim at it, 
a medium which both preserves the presence of the object 
before intuition and self-presence, the absolute proximity of the 
acts to themselves. The ideality of the object, which is only its 
being-for a nonempirical consciousness, can only be expressed 
in an element whose phenomenality does not have worldly form. 
The name of this element is the voice. The voice is heard. [SP 
p. 76] 
The point is that the empiricity of the world is simultaneously presupposed 
and suspended as soon as one proposes a hierarchical distinction between 
expression and indication, and this occurs before Husserl even proposes the 
transcendental reduction. It is only upon the basis of this initial reduction that 
the transcendental reduction can be formulated. This reduction is itself based 
on the reduction of the voice to a pure ideality, even though this ideality has 
never been subjected to a phenomenological critique. The voice never is , and 
never can be, the object of Husserl's phenomenological critique, for such a 
critique would threaten the phenomenological project. 
As soon as we recognise that a reduction takes place before the 
transcendental epoche, the auto-affection constitutive of the subject can no 
longer be said to be itself constituted by the subject. There is already a 
division between the world and the intentionality of the subject - pure and 
absolute subjectivity - which is already crossed out in the expression of this 
absolute subjectivity in terms of the ideality of the voice. On the one hand, 
the voice - the pure expression of the subject's cognition - must transcend the 
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division between the interiority of the subject and the empirical exteriority of 
the world. It must express this distinction in terms of its apodictic ideality, in 
terms of its truth. On the other hand, we cannot conceive of the voice without 
reference to the concept of sound which is always an empirical concept, 
dependent upon the reference to an existent non-ideal world. Such a 
conception, however, disrupts the pure interiority of the subject, the presence 
of the subject's intentional consciousness to itself, because it makes reference 
to something other than the subject, necessarily outside of and non-identical 
to the intentional sphere of the subject. In terms of the conceptual framework 
in which the subject is conceived, this difference must be absolute. Such a 
difference is inconceivable from within the concept of intentional subjectivity, 
and therefore its meaning cannot be constituted on the basis of this concept. 
Husserl's transcendental reduction is therefore rendered impure, always 
contaminated by an outside, something other than what the subject can intend 
or constitute: 
Taking auto-affection as the exercise of the voice, auto-affection 
supposed that a pure difference comes to divide self-presence. 
In this pure self difference is rooted the possibility of everything 
we think we can exclude from auto affection: space, the outside, 
the world, the body, etc. As soon as it is admitted that auto- 
affection is the condition for self-presence, no pure 
transcendental reduction is possible. [SP p. 82] 
It still remains to be explained how this idealisation of the voice in the 
phenomenological representation of the subject introduces an empirical 
spatiality into cognition, i. e. into what the subject means. Through what 
conceptual structure can the phenomenon of the voice introduce a necessary 
reference to an exteriority into the subject, when the subject itself is only ever 
posited in terms of its ideal unity? The answer which Derrida provides is the 
relation between the temporality and spatiality of the subject which is 
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constituted in the idea of the subject's pure auto-affection. 
If the concept of the transcendental subject is, as Husserl seems to 
believe, rooted in the idea of a self-constitutive pure auto-affection in which 
what the subject intends, what it means, is immediately present to the subject, 
then the phenomenological description of the intentional structures of 
consciousness will also be determined by this idea. In the cognition of an 
object the foremost of these structures is the consciousness of time and space. 
We can explain this as follows: ideally, pure auto-affection is the self- 
constituted immediate representation of the existence of the subject's 
intention to itself. This is the essence of consciousness expressed in the "I 
am... " or "I think... " formally necessary to the conception of the subject's 
cognition in general. This, for Husserl, is the living immediacy of subjective 
thought itself - the living presence of subjective life, in which the subject is 
immediately conscious of itself. For Husserl, the transcendental condition for 
consciousness in general is therefore the necessary awareness of its own 
temporality, for it is only within a general matrix of time that the subject can 
present itself to itself in consciousness. 
Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the consciousness of 
temporality are no doubt revolutionary in that they bring us closer to 
understanding that non-present modalities of time are necessary to our 
conception of what we mean by the present, or what is "now. " Without these 
analyses it is doubtful whether Heidegger could have written Being and Time, 
which draws heavily upon Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time 
Consciousness. Derrida's own understanding of, temporality also relies 
heavily upon these analyses, and, one could feasibly argue that he does not do 
justice to them in "Speech and Phenomena, " as indeed David Wood has 
done. 
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The thrust of Derrida's critique, and also our interest here, does not, 
however, lie in this direction. Derrida is in general interested in the status of 
writing in philosophy, symptomatic of the operation of a general repression 
of alterity, executed in the name of a logos in which meaning and truth are 
generally understood in terms of presence and presentation. Whilst the rigour 
of phenomenological description leads Husserl to a confrontation with such 
alterity in which it must be described, Derrida is interested in the 
consequences of this confrontation for the status of this phenomenological 
description. 
Derrida is thus not so much interested in whether Husserl's 
phenomenological descriptions are true or false, but whether the category of 
truth, as understood in phenomenology, can be legitimately applied to them. 
Through this we can begin to see how and when the representation of the 
subject, its description, exceeds its stated intention and must necessarily refer 
to other ways of thinking which lie "outside" the intended scope of the 
concept of the subject and subjectivity. 
Derrida's use of auto-affection to describe the "movement" of 
intentional cognition - the subject's temporalisation - in the phenomenological 
description of the structures of consciousness is therefore designed to 
demonstrate how the necessary reference to alterity throws the possibility of 
an apodictic certainty i. e. the truth, of these descriptions into question. 
Consciousness is, in the operation of auto-affection, determined as the living 
present, and, strictly speaking, it can only be apodictically certain of this 
living present. The truth of phenomenological description must therefore, in 
general, be founded upon the basis of this living presence. Auto-affection, 
however, as 
, 
Derrida demonstrates, and as. we, have seen above, must 
introduce an alterity into this living presence of the subject. In other words, 
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an alterity, irreducible to the transcendental structures of consciousness, 
constitutes the very temporalisation of consciousness in which the subject is 
determined in terms of what is "now, " or of what is present. This presence 
will thus always appear at some stage to be constituted from outside of itself, 
making a necessary reference to an "outside of subjective time" in general, 
in other words to the concept of an irreducible "empirical" world, or "space. " 
Derrida thus argues that: 
The process by which the living now, produced by spontaneous 
generation, must, in order to be a now and to be retained on 
another now, affect itself without recourse to anything empirical 
but with a new primordial actuality in which it would become 
a non-now, a past now - this process is indeed a pure auto- 
affection in which the same is the same only in being affected 
by the other, only by becoming the other of the same. This auto- 
affection must be pure since the primordial impression is here 
affected by nothing other than itself... . [SP p. 85] 
This means, however, that when we attempt to describe this movement, in 
itself and in truth, i. e. as referring only to the living presence of 
consciousness, as soon as we attempt to bring a determinate object into this 
description, we can only speak metaphorically. Auto-affection, the 
representation of the "I am... " necessary to the subject's cognition in the 
medium of the voice, can never itself truly transcend the world, -it never 
escapes the reference to an outside, even if this outside tends toward the 
unnamable. The Cogito itself might transcend the world, but this 
transcendence does not belong to the voice, it remains unsayable. Within 
phenomenology, however, this transcendence is determined, that is, 
described, as the temporality proper to consciousness - the present. Derrida 
is basically arguing that this understanding of the subject in terms of the 
present is a metaphorical structure rather than the intended ontological 
structure. He thus says: 
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We speak metaphorically as soon as we introduce a determinate 
being into the description of this "movement"; we talk about 
"movement" in the very terms that movement makes possible. 
But we have been always already adrift in ontic metaphor; 
temporalization here is the root of a metaphor that can only be 
primordial. The word "time" itself, as it has always been 
understood in the history of metaphysics, is a metaphor which 
at the same time both indicates and dissimulates the 
"movement" of this auto-affection. [SP p. 85] 
If we understand the description of the subject in terms of the living presence 
of consciousness as a metaphorical description rather than an ontological one, 
then we can only understand it in terms of a reference to other metaphors. In 
other words, Derrida disputes whether such descriptions can ever be 
essential. If we now try to describe this "movement" of metaphorisation we 
must also revert to a metaphoric use of language, and so on. It should be 
pointed out that this metaphoric movement toward the unnamable is also 
indicated by Husserl in terms of the infinite regress experienced in the eidetic 
description of temporality. Husserl, however, always tends to reassign the 
meaning of such phenomena to the constitutive operation of the 
transcendental subject. Derrida, on the other hand, tends to remain true to the 
consequences of such a "metaphorisation. " Thus he holds that the living 
present of consciousness must always retain within it a trace of that which 
remains non-identical and non-appropriable to it, and thus renders this simple 
presence non-simple and non-primordial: 
The living present springs forth out of its nonidentity with itself 
and from the possibility of retentional trace. It is always already 
a trace. This trace cannot be thought out on the basis of a simple 
present whose life would be within itself; the self of the living 
present is primordially a trace. The trace is not an attribute; we 
cannot say that the self of the living present "primordially is" it. 
[SP p. 85] 
This explains why he describes the temporalisation of the subject in terms of 
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"spacing" or "spatiality. " Within the context of the language used to describe 
the subject this opening up of the living presence of consciousness onto an 
outside, must always refer to spatial metaphors. They are metaphors because 
the "interiority" and "exteriority" of the subject are spatial figures which are 
not meant to indicate spatial regions, but transcendental conditions of 
possibility. They are necessary because the originary condition of meaning 
in general is temporality, and, within the set of distinctions in which it is 
traditionally used time can only function and begin to make sense when it is 
described in terms of spatial metaphor. Its meaning must thus always retain 
a trace of a spatial sense. This spatial sense makes time "possible, " but at the 
same time it dissimulates its meaning because it remains "other" to 
temporality. Derrida argues that: 
Since the trace is the intimate relation of the living present with 
its outside, the openness upon exteriority in general, upon the 
sphere of what is not "one's own, " etc., the temporalization of 
sense is, from the outset, a "spacing. " As soon as we admit 
spacing both as "interval" or difference and as openness upon 
the outside, there can no longer be any absolute inside, for the 
"outside" has insinuated itself into the movement by which the 
inside of the nonspatial, which is called "time, " appears, is 
constituted, is "presented. " Space is "in" time; it is time's pure 
leaving itself; it is the "outside-itself' as the self-relation of 
time. The externality of space, externality as space, does not 
overtake time; rather, it opens as pure "outside" "within" the 
movement of temporalization. [SP p. 86] 
This argument may well, as David Wood argues, appear very Hegelian. We 
should remember, however, that Derrida shows that "space" and "time" are 
metaphors because they can only be designated and described through their 
reference to each other, and to other terms, all of which remain necessarily 
"outside" the scope of their meaning. If we try to describe space then we will 
eventually end up describing it in terms' of presence and non-presence, which, 
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strictly speaking are no longer spatial terms but temporal ones, and are 
therefore temporal metaphors for space. Similarly if we attempt to describe 
time we will eventually end up referring to spatial terms, which are then 
likewise metaphors for time. In general terms one could say that the 
phenomenological reduction actually reduces the very metaphoricity of 
language, which it itself calls forth, to the idea of the pure expression of the 
thing in itself, which can never be metaphorical. Therefore Derrida cannot be 
accused of really believing that there is an actual time which is opened up by 
an actual space. He is rather describing the understanding of space and time 
which Husserl's formulation of the phenomenological subject commits us to, 
and the fact that this understanding cannot be contained within this 
formulation. 
What does such an analysis mean for the phenomenological subject? 
Is it possible to reach the pure interiority of the subject, necessary for the 
expression of apodictic truth, through the means of the transcendental 
reduction? The answer is obviously no, but this still leaves the question as to 
what the phenomenological reduction actually is, or better, how we are to 
describe it. 
Derrida is absolutely clear on this matter. Because the reduction can 
never be pure, because the interiority of the subject is always infected by the 
reference to an outside in its very expression, this expression always takes on 
an as if structure. The claim of ideal objectivity inherent in the 
phenomenological subject's intention of an ideal object is thus a posture, an 
act - the thing itself, ideal or not, can never be truly present to the subject, 
even if it acts as if it were. The stage for such an act is the phenomenological 
reduction itself: 
As a relation between an inside and an outside in general, an 
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existent and a nonexistent in general, a constituting and 
constituted in general, temporalization is at once the very power 
and limit of phenomenological reduction. Hearing oneself speak 
is not the inwardness of an inside that is closed in upon itself; it 
is the irreducible openness in the inside; it is the eye and world 
within speech. Phenomenological reduction is a scene, a 
theatre stage. [SP p. 86] 
It is upon this stage that what we have called the transcendent infinite is 
determined as the object of cognition. What Derrida is suggesting is that such 
a determination is "only" a characterisation, it can never be known to be true. 
In other words, the determinate object of the subject's cognition, whether it 
be itself, or an ideal object, is never really present. According to the 
traditional conception of truth and illusion or fiction, its presentation must be 
of the order of a belief or fiction. 
This fiction, however, is not without its consequences. Insofar as it 
poses itself as the expression of the true meaning of the subject, in its 
attempted determination of the undecidable relation between thought and the 
transcendent infinite, it represents a repressional structure. Derrida highlights 
this repressional structure by focussing in general upon the symptomatic 
repression of writing within Western philosophy in favour of the voice of the 
subject. 
At base, Derrida is attempting to dislodge a traditional wish to restrict 
and contain a certain desire which can be said to be the desire of the other, 
of what is other to the unity of the self. Derrida reads this movement of desire 
symptomatically through philosophy's historical tendency to prioritise the 
spoken word over the written. Writing is seen to threaten the singularity of 
the spoken meaning through its capacity to duplicate meaning without 
recourse to an original source. This is interpreted in opposition to the spoken 
word. This spoken word itself, its structure and meaning, is taken as 
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stemming from, and manifesting, the meaning of its source, the speaking 
subject. 
The structure of consciousness is therefore implied and constituted 
within this repressional matrix, but is thus produced as an ideal structure 
which maintains its dominance through positing itself as the ideal structure 
within which and upon which all other ideal structures are inscribed and 
grounded. 
This repressional matrix, by its very nature, will always be more or less 
inadequate to its task, and necessarily so. The full repression of what remains 
unthought, but necessary to conscious life - the essence of modem 
philosophical knowledge - which is articulated in the desire for the full 
presentation or expression of an absolute term, would mean, as was shown 
above, the death of the subject. Which means that this repression is resisted, 
and this resistance has its effects - in this case the multiplication and 
differentiation of the meanings of the ego cogito. One then experiences a 
suppression of these unwanted effects through a policing and enforcement of 
the boundaries which would ideally delimit conscious life. It is in this context 
that one can understand Derrida's accusation that Husserl modifies every 
speculative thread which might disrupt the unity of the transcendental subject, 
in an attempt to tie them back up and secure them in the knot of presence. 
15. Summary of Section II 
In the preceding chapters we have seen how the necessity for the reference 
of the subject's cognition to a transcendent exteriority can threaten the 
Husserlian concept of the phenomenological subject, together with the 
accompanying descriptions of its constitutive intentional structures with 
collapse. 
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Our reading of Heidegger has attempted to describe how binary 
conceptuality necessarily falls into incoherency. Generally this is because 
whilst meaning is conceived of as a simple presence, the meaning of each 
term must refer to its opposite. However, this referentiality of meaning cannot 
be thought of in terms of a simple presence because the meaning of each term 
should be simple, discrete and present in-itself, whilst such a reference would 
mean that the simple presence of meaning could no longer be possible, the 
reference being always to a non-present term. 
Thus, for example, the meaning of Dasein's world as ready-to-hand 
can only be articulated through Dasein's interpretation of its world as 
present-at-hand. On the other hand, this interpretation of the world must, in 
terms of the oppositional structure which Heidegger sets up and then 
destructures, be based in the pre-conceptual understanding of the world as 
ready-to-hand. Heidegger's destructuring of this opposition shows that 
Dasein's world cannot be understood in terms of a totality. Its meaning can 
never be wholly present within the binary opposition of the ready-to-hand and 
present-at-hand. The meaning of each concept necessarily refers beyond the 
scope of its terms, to a meaning which cannot be presented in, or fully 
translated into, these terms. 
We have tried to explain this general example in terms of the relation 
between Dasein's general temporal horizon of understanding, within which 
meaning can be conceived of as being present, and Dasein's spatial horizon 
of meaning, within which Dasein can understand itself as Being-in-the-world. 
We have tried to show how. Dasein's spatial horizon interrupts or dislocates 
its temporal horizon, in which meaning, understood as, presence, is itself 
located, and vice versa. We have argued that this movement of interruption 
is what Heidegger means by the temporalisation of temporality. 
165 
Within this context, we can understand the general reduction of 
meaning to a simple presence as a repression of a necessary referentiality 
without which no sign could have meaning. We have indicated through our 
reading of Heidegger that such a repression stretches back in history to the 
conceptual system belonging to early Greek thought, and that this repression 
is not merely a result of the modem concept of the subject. 
This reading then forms the background for Derrida's critique of the 
phenomenological subject. Here we have read this general conceptual 
collapse, opened up by a necessary referentiality of meaning, in terms of the 
necessary relation between the concept of the phenomenological subject and 
that of an empirical, spatial world, with its inherent transcendency. 
We have not onlytried to show how the concept of a transcendent 
world -a real, empirical, non; ideal space - is necessary to the constitution of 
meaning in the subject, we have also tried to show the "mechanisms" through 
which it is possible for the concept of the phenomenological transcendental 
subject to repress such a necessity. We have used Derrida to illuminate how 
the interpretation of language in terms of expression and indication, and the 
subsequent idealisation of the voice in the subject, leads to the repression of 
a necessary reference to what in general is "other" to the subject. We have 
done this by outlining the necessity for a reference to a spatial metaphor in 
the conception of the pure "temporal" interiority of the subject in which 
meaning is constituted, even though such a reference can never be admitted 
if one holds that meaning is constituted `within" the subject. In conclusion we 
have argued that, according to the traditional opposition between truth and 
fiction, the interiority necessary to the phenomenological subject must be 
determined as a belief or fiction, and it is by means of this "fiction" of a pure 
interiority and a pure exteriority, an "inside" and an "outside" of sense and 
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meaning that this general repressional structure can operate. 
What these analyses suggest is that the very concept of reality, of 
either an "actual"or an "underlying" reality, which includes the concept of an 
empirical, spatial world, is also part of this fiction of the subject, and thus of 
this general repression. We have seen that there is a necessary reference to 
such a transcendent term within the concept of the subject, but it would be 
wrong to determine such a term as existent. The objection could here be 
raised that when we start calling reality in general into question, we are 
risking the incoherency of madness. We have already shown, however, that 
the conceptual network within which meaning and sense is situated is itself, 
at certain points, incoherent. When the distinction between a general inside 
and outside, between temporality and spatiality, begins to collapse, then the 
distinction between reason and unreason, between sense and madness, begins 
to collapse with it. 
In the following chapters we therefore wish to show that the concept 
of the subject cannot be reduced to an underlying or transcendent reality 
which has historically determined its conception. We wish to explore how the 
concept of the subject can itself resist this general repression, paradoxically 
transcending the attempt to reduce it to an objectified historical 
determination. In order to do so we shall examine the general distinction 
between the madness and rationale of the subject, arguing with Derrida 
against Foucault's thesis that the distinction between the two is explicable 
from a social-historical perspective. In doing so we hope to show that the 
determination of what we have termed the transcendent infinite as a 
transcendent historical reality belongs as much to the general repressional 
structure Derrida calls presence as does the ideal objectivity of the 
phenomenological subject. 
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Section III: The Transcendence of the Subject's Interiority 
Part I: Heidegg r' reading of he Subject in Nietzsche 
The madman, on the contrary, is 
clearly... the one who seeks God, 
since he cries out after God. Has 
a thinking man perhaps here 
really cried out de profundis? 
And the ear of our thinking, does 
it still not hear the cry? It will 
refuse to hear it so long as it does 
not begin to think. Thinking 
begins only when we have come 
to know that reason, glorified for 
centuries, is the most stiff necked 
adversary of thought. [TWN p. 
112] 
Narr in Verzweiflung 
Ach! Was ich schrieb auf Tisch 
und Wand 
Mit Narrenherz und Narrenhand, 
Das sollte Tisch und Wand 
mir zieren?... 
Doch ihr sagt: "Narrenhände 
schmieren; 
Und Tisch und Wand soll man 
purgieren, 
Bis auch die letzte Spur 
verschwand! " 
Erlaubt! Ich lege hand mit an-, 
Ich lernte Schwamm und Besen 
führen, 
Als Kritiker, als Wassermann. 
Doch, wenn die Arbeit abgetan, 
Säh' gern ich euch, ihr 
Überweisen, 
Mit Weisheit Tisch und Wand 
besch...... 
(47) 
In order to better understand the question of madness and rationality in the 
subject it is worth examining Heidegger's account of the subject and 
subjectivity. Heidegger exerts no less an influence in Foucault's work than 
in Derrida's, and his interpretation of the subject through his understanding 
of Nietzsche's doctrine of the Will to Power and the Overman provides great 
insight into the conceptual network in which we traditionally understand the 
subject and subjectivity. In the previous sections we have seen that the 
concept of the subject must always refer to an indeterminate transcendent 
47 Nietzsche, F., The Gay Science, pp. 362-3. 
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infinity. It was argued that the subject's judgement, what it means, represents 
a repression of this necessary referentiality. In the following section on 
Heidegger it will be argued that the referentiality of the subject includes a 
necessary reference to an irreducible "concept" of justice, which exceeds the 
subject's reflective judgement or perception. That is why we can interpret the 
subject's reflective judgement as an illegitimate repressional act of force. 
Thus, through a close reading of Heidegger's analysis of Nietzsche we should 
be able to see what is at stake in the confrontation between Derrida and 
Foucault. 
16. The Will to Power 
In "The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead" Heidegger analyses Nietzsche's 
understanding of the problem of subjectivity as the final articulation of 
metaphysics. His interpretation is initially focused upon Nietzsche's 
pronouncement, issued from the mouth of the madman come too soon, that 
God is dead. He proceeds to show the conceptual network in which this 
pronouncement can be understood beyond a merely theological framework. 
Heidegger quotes this passage from Nietzsche: 
Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the 
bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried 
incessantly, "I seek God! I seek God! " As many of those who 
do not believe in God were standing around just then, he 
provoked much laughter. Why, did he get lost? said one. Did he 
lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he 
afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they 
yelled and laughed. The madman jumped into their midst and 
pierced them with his glances. 
"Whither is God" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have 
killed him - you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how 
have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who 
gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did 
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we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it 
moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all 
suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, 
forward, in all directions? Is there any way up or down left? Are 
we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel 
the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not 
night and more night coming on all the while? Must not lanterns 
be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise 
of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell 
anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. 
God is dead. God remains dead. 
"And we have killed him. How shall we, the murderers 
of all murderers, comfort ourselves? What was holiest and most 
powerful of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death 
under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? What water 
is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, 
what sacred games will we have to invent? Is not the greatness 
of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become 
gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a 
greater deed; and whoever will be born after us - for the sake of 
this deed he will be part of a higher history than all history 
hitherto. " 
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his 
listeners; and they too were silent and stared at him in 
astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it 
broke and went out. "I came too early, " he said then; my time 
has not come yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still 
wandering - it has not yet reached the ears of man. Lightning 
and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, 
deeds require time even after they are done, before they can be 
seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than 
the most distant stars - and yet they have done it themselves. " 
It has been related further that on the same day the 
madman entered divers churches and there sang his requiem 
aeternam deo. Led out and called to account, he is said to have 
replied each time, "What are these churches now if they are not 
the tombs and sepulchres of God? " [TWN p. 59-60] 
This passage, Heidegger argues, can only be understood in terms of 
Nietzsche's metaphysical doctrine of the Will to Power, and the idea of the 
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Overman. The concept of the Will to Power is inherently connected with 
Nietzsche's idea of nihilism, understood as the re-evaluation of accepted 
norms and truths, of accepted values. Heidegger sets this within the context 
of the breakdown of the metaphysical distinction between the worldly or 
sensuous, and the non-worldly suprasensuous, which has determined the 
concept of the subject since Plato. The phrase "God is dead... " can only be 
essentially understood within this context, because it is this distinction which 
historically determines our understanding of Being. Such a phrase, argues 
Heidegger, represents the consciousness of the breakdown of this distinction, 
in which the subject's perception - in other words, consciousness - is 
determined as valuation. 
In order to grasp this we must first understand the nature of value. 
Heidegger argues that in order to conceive of value and valuation one needs 
a perspective, a place from which to see: 
The essence of value lies in its being a point-of-view. Value 
means that upon which the eye is fixed. Value means that which 
is in view for a seeing that aims at something or that, as we say, 
reckons upon something and therewith must reckon with 
something else. Value stands in intimate relation to a so-much, 
to quantity and number. Hence values are related to a 
"numerical and mensural scale" (Will to Power, Aph. 710, 
1888). The question still remains: Upon what is the scale of 
increase and decrease, in its turn, grounded? [TWN p. 71] 
Heidegger understands the Will to Power as grounded in the modem 
experience of conceptuality. Being is thus always understood in terms of what 
is intended, what the subject sees, as perceptio. It is only from a grasp of 
subjectivity as intentionality that the Will to Power can be understood. 
A value can only exist insofar as it is posited in cognition. An object 
has significance only to the extent that it is seen to be worth something and 
is thus fully constituted through intentional perception. A value cannot be an 
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object in itself, which perception comes across and judges to be worth so and 
so much. Rather, value lies within this very act of intentional judgement 
which constitutes its object in view through its evaluation. Value is thus the 
relation within which an object of perception can be constituted, identified, 
and differentiated from other objects. 
It is in this sense that "According to Nietzsche, with values as points- 
of-view, `preservation-enhancement conditions' are posited. " [TWN p. 72] 
In other words, objects of perception can be expressed, perceived and 
understood as differentiated elements, in which the factor of differentiation 
is a relation of value. In order for an object to have value within perception 
it must be perceived as having a period of duration - it must be preserved 
within and by perception. 
But the second point concerning enhancement - growing stronger - is 
harder to grasp, since it appears to contradict our everyday experience of life 
in general. We tend to think within a traditional entropic framework whereby 
objects decay into disorder. However, this is essentially a misunderstanding 
of the term value as an object rather than as perceptual relation. 
The point is that if the modem world is perceived in terms of decay, 
then the value of the world as decaying must be getting stronger. This value 
must be continually enhanced if this perception is to be maintained. 
Perception understood as such cannot stem from the lack of an object which 
it desires. Desire itself - the will of the subject - is understood as the 
constitutive relation of perception, (in Nietzsche's terms, the Will to Power) 
whereby desire constitutes, or wills, its own conditions of possibility. As such 
it is neither passive nor active-in relation to its object, since it constitutes its 
object as the condition of its own preservation and enhancement. 
Heidegger analyses the terms "will" and "power" in relation to this 
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context of the subject's perception understood as valuation - as preservation- 
enhancement. On this basis the will is not to be understood as the 
psychological activity of the willing subject. Will is understood as the ground 
of intentionality itself, as the ground of value-positing: 
The will is not a desiring, and not a mere striving after 
something, but rather willing is in itself a commanding (cf. Ihus 
Spoke Zarathustra, parts I and II; see also Will to Power, Aph. 
668,1888). Commanding has its essence in the fact that the 
master who commands has conscious disposal over the 
possibilities for effective action. What is commanded in the 
command is the accomplishing of that disposal. In the 
command, the one who commands (not only the one who 
executes) is obedient to that disposing and to that being able to 
dispose, and in that way obeys himself. Accordingly, the one 
who commands proves superior to himself in that he ventures 
even his own self. Commanding ... 
is self conquest and is more 
difficult than obeying. Will is gathering oneself together for the 
given task. ... What the will wills 
it has already. For the will 
wills its will. Its will is what it has willed. The will wills itself. 
It mounts beyond itself. Accordingly, the will as will wills out 
beyond itself and must at the same time in that way bring itself 
behind itself and beneath itself. ' [TWN p. 77] 
Will, as commanding, has as its attribute consciousness. This is always the 
consciousness of what "is, " of a world in which there are significant values. 
These values are always posited in terms of a disposability for consciousness. 
They are articulated by an intentional realm in which objects always have 
meaning for consciousness, and are constituted by their relational value to 
consciousness. 
Object formation thus simultaneously implies subject formation, in that 
the consciousness of valuation, of effective action, is itself constituted in 
terms of this valuation. Thus the will, as command, always exceeds a 
constituted, determinate self in the very perception of the self. The self, 
however, as self-consciousness, is a necessary condition of the will and so 
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Heidegger argues that "the will wills itself. " It creates its own conditions of 
possibility through perception. The subject's intentional perception therefore 
always overreaches its self-constituted ground - it stabilises and destabilises 
itself in the movement of value positing, its value positing being the condition 
of its preservation and enhancement. 
This explains why the will to will is grounded in the Will to Power in 
terms of its normative explanation, that is, in relation to truth. Power serves 
as a grounding concept for the will to will because, being a question of value, 
the relation between stable conceptual formations and the possibility of their 
destabilisation is always quantitative. As such these can only be thought in 
terms of a stronger or more powerful conceptual formation: 
Therefore Nietzsche can say: "To will at all is the same thing as 
to will to become stronger, to will to grow... " (Will to Power, 
Aph. 675,1887-88). "Stronger" means here "more power" and 
that means: only power. For the essence of power lies in being 
master over the level of power attained at any time. Power is 
power only when and only so long as it remains power- 
enhancement and commands for itself "more power. " Even a 
mere pause in power-enhancement, even a mere remaining at a 
standstill at a level of power, is already the beginning of the 
decline of power. To the essence of power belongs the 
overpowering of itself. Such overpowering belongs to and 
springs from power itself, in that power is command and as 
command empowers itself for the overpowering of its particular 
level of power at any given time ... 
it empowers itself for this 
reason alone: to attain power over itself in the unconditionality 
belonging to its essence. [TWN p. 78] 
In order to accomplish this the Will to Power must first create its own 
conditions of possibility, that is, the means through which power can be both 
preserved and enhanced at the same time. We have already seen that values 
in general are the conditions of this preservation and enhancement of power. 
Therefore, the Will to Power must posit values in general, and, as a condition 
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of this positing, a particular network of values in which its own conceptual 
configuration is rendered possible. It achieves this by perceiving the dominant 
social and conceptual formations as values, as perceptual relations rather than 
absolute principles of social order. These formerly absolute principles are 
thus devalued precisely as values, but only according to a "new" valuation. 
Thus Heidegger argues that if the Will to Power is to enhance its own 
standing, then it must be formulated or thought in terms of its essentiality, in 
its formation of what, existentially, is. Power formations can only exist on the 
condition of their rightful claim to unconditional being, that is, on condition 
of their truth as existential formations. The Will to Power must thus posit its 
truth, the truth of its relative formation, as a certainty. Truth is thus a 
necessary condition, expressed in terms of this making secure, of the Will to 
Power, posited by the Will to Power as a value necessary to its enhancement 
in the establishment of what existentially is. 
Heidegger holds this movement to be in accord with the traditional 
thought of metaphysics since Descartes onwards, manifested in the modem 
understanding of the subject. The concept of the Will to Power is the final 
manifestation of this formation of metaphysics, and metaphysics in general. 
He says: 
Nietzsche remains in the unbroken line of the metaphysical 
tradition when he calls that which is established and made fast 
in the Will to Power for its own preservation purely and simply 
Being, or what is in being, or truth. Accordingly, truth is a 
condition posited in the essence of the Will to Power, namely, 
the condition of the preservation of power. Truth is, as this 
condition, a value. ... Truth is now, and indeed through an 
essentially historical origin out of the modes of its essence just 
mentioned, that which - making stably constant - makes secure 
the constant reserve, belonging to the sphere from out of which 
the Will to Power wills itself. [TWN p. 84-85] 
175 
Thus truth is rendered a value in that it is a necessary condition posited by the 
Will to Power. This means, however, that truth can no longer be the highest 
value or principle of being, of what is. It is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of the Will to Power. This can be explained by the fact that truth, 
as a making secure of power formations, cannot act as a spur to reformulate 
power formations. It would resist any movement of reformulation, of 
transgression. Truth, understood as certainty, is deathly, and represents a 
stagnation of power if it is conceived of as a sufficient condition. This 
sufficient condition must necessarily lie beyond any perception of the subject, 
and, as such, resists this movement of valuation. Heidegger locates this 
condition in the notion of justice, in which he holds the modem concept of 
subjectivity to be bound. 
17. Justice 
Heidegger thus returns to the opening of modern metaphysics, to Descartes' 
Latin translation of the Greek experience of "that which is, the 
hypokeimenon" [TWN p. 88], into the subiectum, A the modern experience 
of the ego cogito. We have already seen above that the locus and condition 
of truth appearing is the will itself. For it is the will which posits the 
conditions of power, and truth, as we have seen, is a necessary condition of 
power. The will, understood as the subject's intentional perception, wills its 
own conditions of possibility. In other words, if the intentional perception of 
the subject is to maintain itself as a conceptual formation it must intend or 
perceive itself as its own object. The essential condition of the subject's 
perception is thus the subject knowing itself: 
That which is (subiectum) presents itself [präsentiert sich], and 
indeed presents itself to itself, in the mode of the ego cogito. 
This self-presenting, this re-presentation [Repräsentation] 
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(setting-before [Vor-stellung]), is the Being of that which is in 
being qua subiectum. Self-knowing-itself is transformed into 
subject purely and simply. In self-knowing-itself, all knowing 
and what is knowable for it gathers itself together. It is a 
gathering of knowing, as a mountain range is a gathering 
together of mountains. The subjectivity of the subject is, as such 
a gathering together, co-agitatio (cogitatio), conscientia, a 
gathering of knowing [Ge-wissen], consciousness (conscience). 
But the co-agitatio is already, in itself, velle, willing. In the 
subjectness of the subject, will comes to appearance as the 
essence of subjectness. Modem metaphysics, as the 
metaphysics of subjectness, thinks the Being of that which is in 
the sense of will. [TWN p. 88] 
That is, Being is determined in modem metaphysics as subiectum. The Being 
of anything must be expressed in relation to a subject, and this relation is 
always expressed as the ego cogito. The subject, as the mode or form of that 
which is, must therefore present itself. Since the subiectum is the realm in 
which being signifies, the subject must present itself to itself, and at the same 
time register this presentation. The register for the presentation of self to self, 
that is, self knowing itself, will therefore always be the subjectivity of the 
subject. For example, in Kant's "I think" this representation must always 
accompany every sensible intuition, in order for the intuition to register as 
sensible. 
Thus the condition of the self knowing itself in terms of the subject, is 
that it perceive itself in the act of knowing. Heidegger terms this act the 
gathering of knowing, the co-agitatio. This is the modem experience of 
intentional consciousness which constitutes itself in the very act of positing 
significant objects for itself. This knowledge of objects is gathered together 
and ordered according to the transcendental structures of consciousness. This 
positing, as we have seen above, is the will. The will is therefore the essence 
of the subjectivity of the subject, in terms of which all Being registers. 
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This structure corresponds to the structure of the Will to Power in that 
truth is now self-certainty. The truth of the subject is the making secure of the 
self by the representing subject in the act of representation. The truth of the 
subject's representation is presented in terms of a justification validated by 
its claim to making secure: 
The representing is now correct when it is right in relation to 
this claim to secureness. Proved correct [richtig] in this way, it 
is, as "rightly dealt with" [recht gefertigt] and as at our 
disposal, made right, justified [gerecht fertigt]. The truth of 
anything that is in being, in the sense of the self-certainty of 
subjectness, is, as secureness (certitudo), fundamentally the 
making-right, the justifying, of representing and of what it 
represents before representing one's own clarity. Justification 
(iustificatio) is the accomplishing of iustitia [justice or 
rightness] and is thus justice [Gerechtigkeit] itself. [TWN p. 89] 
Thus the essential condition of modem experience, of subjectivity, is justice. 
In intentional consciousness truth is nothing other than the justification of the 
subject's representation in terms of it being indubitably certain. Without a 
prior concept of "making-right, "of bringing what is right to the fore, we could 
not conceive of truth. In order to have such a conception we must always 
already refer to a "concept" of right or justice. 
However, justice, as conceived in Nietzsche's metaphysics, necessarily 
stands outside and opposed to the Will to Power. Within the Will to Power 
justice remains unthinkable. This is because it claims a right which is always 
absolute, beyond any value posited within consciousness. It transcends the 
value of truth in which the subject's judgement or perception is made secure. 
In other words, the subject's intention necessarily refers to a "concept" of 
justice which transcends conceptuality in general. If the Will to Power is the 
mode in which being presences, in which everything is the product of value- 
positing, then its essence, metaphysically named here as justice, cannot be 
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approached, cannot be thought. How could one justify the determinate or 
metaphysical representation, whatever it may be, of justice as being right? 
We obviously cannot since we enter into an infinite regress in which justice 
is always presupposed before its representation. Heidegger thinks that this 
simultaneous necessity and inability to finally and fully justify every 
representation of what is, is the reason why we cannot think the essence of 
nihilism - the metaphysical expression of what is: 
Justice is, however, the truth of whatever is, the truth 
determined by Being itself. As this truth it is metaphysics itself 
in its modem completion. In metaphysics as such is concealed 
the reason why Nietzsche can indeed experience nihilism 
metaphysically as the history of value-positing, yet nevertheless 
cannot think the essence of nihilism. [TWN p. 93] 
This necessary reference of the concept of subjectivity to a concept of justice 
which remains beyond the perception of the subject effectively means that no 
determination, or determinate representation of the essence of cognition can 
be justified. The determinate representation of cognition, the attempt to 
represent or say what the subject's Cogito means, to reflect upon it in 
judgement, must be represented as moment of injustice in relation to the 
Cogito. 
18. The Madman 
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche can itself be said to be captured by 
this metaphysical appropriation of thought. For even though at every stage in 
Heidegger's argument the dissimulating force of Nietzsche's word is always 
marked, it is always reappropriated within the proper structure of the history 
of Being. 
At every stage of the argument where one might read a dissimulation 
of meaning, whereby the essence and meaning of Nietzsche's word would be 
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forever dissimulated, two forms of truth operate and support each other. The 
first is adequation. In each case, where essential meaning is pursued, the 
representation of this truth must be made adequate to its grounding structure. 
This ground, however, will always be essence itself - that is, Being. This is 
according to a pathway already prescribed by Being, as the history of 
Western thought, in the epoch of metaphysics. This ensures the return of the 
detached, dissimulated meaning of Nietzsche's word to the realm of Being, 
according to its proper course - its rightful representation. We have already 
seen, however, that such a representation can never be fully justified. 
The second value of truth is veiling/unveiling, in which, in every stage, 
Being or essence is lacking, this lack being the proper home of truth. On this 
basis, the history of Being is issued forth, as the determination of what is, so 
that the meaning of being can begin its circular course, its proper course, to 
return to its proper place. Underlying this is the presupposition that the 
meaning of Nietzsche's word is never, finally, lost, that it has, in the end, a 
determinate meaning, that Being, in the end, has a name: 
Thought from out of the destining of Being, the nihil in 
"nihilism" means that Nothing is befalling Being. Being is not 
coming into the light of its own essence. In the appearing of 
whatever is as such, Being itself remains wanting. The truth of 
Being falls from memory. It remains forgotten. 
Thus nihilism. would be in its essence a history that runs 
its course along with Being itself. It would lie in Being's own 
essence, then, that 
'Being 
remain unthought because it 
withdraws. Being itself withdraws into its truth. It harbours 
itself safely within its truth and conceals itself in such 
harbouring.... 
Assuming that every "is" lies in Being, the essence of 
nihilism consists in the fact that Nothing ° is befalling Being 
itself. Being itself is Being in its, truth, which truth belongs to 
Being. [TWN p. 110-11] 
Is this not, implicitly, the attempt to reinstate the meaning of Being, against 
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the word of Nietzsche, which perhaps more than anything shows itself as not 
simply a singular word, which at every locus of interpretation resists its 
reduction to a determinate meaning? 
However, our topic remains the subject, which was opened by the 
words of the madman. If our hypothesis is true, we should be able to decipher 
it in Heidegger's understanding of the madman. 
It is first of all the madman who says Nietzsche's word, not Nietzsche 
himself. In order to understand the meaning of the word issued forth, that 
"God is dead" we would first of all have to understand why Nietzsche speaks 
through the mouth of a madman, what the madman signifies, before the 
question of what his speech, what his words signify. Heidegger says of the 
madman that: 
He is "de-ranged" [ver-rückt]. For he is dis-lodged [aus- 
gerückt] from the level of man hitherto, where the ideals of the 
suprasensory world, which have become unreal, are passed off 
for the real while yet their opposite is realizing itself. This de- 
ranged man is carried out [hinausgerückt] beyond man hitherto. 
Nevertheless, in this way he has only been drawn into 
[eingerückt] being the predetermined essence of man hitherto, 
the animal rationale. [TWN p. 111-12] 
As such, asserts Heidegger, he has nothing in common with the men of reason 
who are simply unbelievers, he speaks from outside of reason, from out of the 
realm of thinking harboured in Being. Opposed to this the truth of his word 
is obscured by that "stiff necked adversary of thought" - reason. It is only 
thought oriented from Being, as opposed to reason, which is capable of 
hearing his cry. 
And yet, having nothing in common with his listeners, he binds himself 
to them, - "Whither is God" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him - 
you and I. " Here, he can be understood, he is no longer alone, he stands 
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together with man, the rational man, within the locus of the same described 
by "we - you and I. " But his words are not understood, he withdraws his 
light, and once more stands alone: 
"I came too soon ... my time has not come yet. This tremendous 
event is still on its way, still wandering - it has not yet reached 
the ears of man. ... This deed is still more distant from them than 
the most distant stars - and yet they have done it themselves. " 
[Ibid. ] 
He speaks then, for the first time as a rational man, within the locus of the 
"we, " but his words fall upon deaf ears, their meaning is not grasped. The 
locus in which they would have meaning does not yet exist. Reason itself 
cannot hear the truth of her own words, and declares that they are the words 
of a madman. And in the second instant he testifies to this in his very 
withdrawal from this locus. He withdraws to the locus of the I, of the singular 
subject beyond the rational community of the we, and from this vantage he 
denounces man as God's murderer whilst no longer being included within this 
concept. He is no longer associated with God's murderers - it is they that 
have committed the deed, not the madman. But placed outside of the rational 
community his words will still not obtain significance. He addresses no one 
in particular, there is no one to listen. 
Is reason therefore absolutely opposed to the words of the madman? 
Strictly speaking, no., The madman identifies himself with the rational man 
and speaks rationally to the rational man, but he cannot be understood, either 
from within or from outside the rational community. The madman, as uttering 
the truth of man, that "God is dead" speaks from a space, which, 
transgressing the inside and outside of rationality, speaking within and 
without rationality, dissimulates the meaning of his word as a rational 
enunciation. It is reason - man as the speaking subject - which is necessary 
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to hear this enunciation, for it is only within the rational community of man 
as "We - you and r, that this enunciation can be heard. And it is reason - the 
madman as the essence of the speaking subject, as the animal rationale - 
which cannot hear itself speak. Here the madman is the possibility of reason's 
own dissimulation, but not its opposition. Madness as the promise of reason 
in its very threat. Reason, in the vanity of its own madness, has always 
attempted to repress this threat, by enclosing it within a history which would 
always unjustifiably determine the sense or non-sense of thought in general. 
In the next section we shall see how the Cogito resists this reduction, 
and dissimulates its own determinate meaning. 
Part II: The Historical Meaning of the Cogito 
In "Cogito and the History of Madness" Denida intervenes in Foucault's 
work at a very precise point. His reading centres on the opening of the 
subject, on the intersection of a philosophical and a socio-historical 
perspective upon the subject. If there is a real confrontation between Derrida 
and Foucault then it is located at this point in their opposing readings of 
Descartes. 
Foucault's Madness and Civilisation can be said to be the attempt to 
narrate the production of the division between sense and non-sense, or reason 
and unreason, through reason's conception and confinement of madness. He 
holds that this confinement can be located in the historical formation of 
reason, in the form of the Cartesian subject. Foucault thus holds that 
Descartes' philosophical delineation of the subject is bound within a wider 
historical horizon as both a symptom and cause of this confinement 'of 
madness. 
What Derrida` questions is whether such a narration is possible within 
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the horizons it must set itself, without it falling into the same structures of 
confinement which it seeks to denounce. Upon what grounds can historical 
cognition and demonstration be more truthful than its subject matter, when 
this is cognition in general, in this particular case, the Cartesian Cogito? In 
other words, does Foucault himself subject his historical subject, cognition 
and madness, to the same structures of reason which he holds to have 
confined madness, within his archaeology of its silence? Does not his 
archaeology, in the very axioms of its narrative, itself partake of the structures 
of rational discourse which he seeks to undermine and criticize? If not, then 
how is his historical account to make sense? 
Derrida's critique is thus aimed at the a priori possibility of conducting 
such an archaeology without repeating the violence which Foucault finds in 
rationality's confinement of madness. His reading is therefore far less 
concerned with the narration of this archaeology, than with the axioms upon 
which this narrative is grounded. The weight of his critique therefore bears 
down upon the philosophical and methodological demands of Foucault's 
enterprise. 
19. The Historical Location of the Cogito 
Derrida detects two opposing projects within Madness and Civilisation. The 
first appears to be the dominant one. This is to write the history of madness 
as it is interned and confined through what might be termed a process of 
productive definition, by the rationalism of the Classical period, from the 
middle of the seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth century. 
Foucault, however, wanted to write a history of madness from outside the 
confines of a reason which had already damned madness, that is, from the 
side of madness itself. He wanted to articulate the very silence which he saw 
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as a product of reason; to allow madness to speak for itself. At its extreme 
this would mean allowing madness back into the realm from which it had 
been expelled, allowing its subjectivity truth, allowing it back into the truth 
of subjectivity. Thus, in the preface to Madness and Civilisation he says: 
In the serene world of mental illness, modem man no longer 
communicates with the madman: on one hand, the man of 
reason delegates the physician to madness, thereby authorizing 
a relation only through the abstract universality of disease; on 
the other, the man of madness communicates with society only 
by the intermediary of an equally abstract reason which is order, 
physical and moral constraint, the anonymous pressure of the 
group, the requirements of conformity. As for a common 
dialogue, there is no such thing; or rather, there is no such thing 
any longer; the constitution of madness as a mental illness, at 
the end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence of a 
broken dialogue, posits the separation as already effected, and 
thrusts into oblivion, all those stammered, imperfect words 
without fixed syntax in which the exchange between madness 
and reason was made. The language of psychiatry, which is a 
monologue of reason on madness, has been established only on 
the basis of such a silence. 
I have not tried to write the history of that language, but 
rather the archaeology of that silence. [MC p. xii-xiii] 
Foucault's book is the attempt to narrate the relation between reason and 
what he terms unreason, the domain from out of which madness is drawn and 
defined by reason, in the very attempt to confine and limit this domain. In 
other words, he attempts to historically articulate and locate the relation 
between classical rational cognition, exemplified in the idea of the Cartesian 
subject, and madness: 
For classical man, madness was not the natural condition, the 
human and psychological root of unreason; it was -only 
unreason's empirical form; and the madman, tracing the course 
of human degradation .. to the frenzied nadir of animality, 
disclosed that underlying realm of unreason which threatens 
man and envelops - at a tremendous distance - all the forms of 
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his natural existence. [MC p. 83] 
Derrida argues that this narrative, however, takes the form of a historical 
account and explanation. If this is to make sense, if we are to understand it 
as making sense, then it must be grounded in the prioritisation of a certain 
factual period of time, within which Foucault holds madness, the experience 
of madness, to be rooted and organised. Moreover, Foucault is committed to 
thinking that madness itself is open to empirical inquiry and explanation in 
terms of the historical relation between reason and unreason. He must 
therefore at some stage assume that he already knows what madness is. 
Derrida holds that these conditions and assumptions of Foucault's discourse 
conform to and repeat the structures of rationality which have served to intern 
madness through its definition. He believes that Foucault executes an act of 
force upon thought itself by means of the very structures whose violence 
Foucault sought to condemn. 
The matrix of the question which Derrida thus poses to Foucault is the 
relation of historical discourse to thought in general, and the Cartesian Cogito 
in particular. This is articulated specifically in relation to sense and non- 
sense, or reason and unreason. Foucault, in his interpretation of Descartes, 
makes a very strong claim, saying that the thought of the Cartesian subject 
can never be mad, and that this fact can be seen in the historical development 
of reason. This implicitly means that the philosophical moment, which is 
always, essentially, a statement of what sense is, can be historically 
accounted for. Foucault thus holds that the thought of philosophy can be 
reduced and explained by a history of philosophy, traced through 
philosophy's determination of non-sense., Derrida argues that such a thesis 
simply repeats the repressional violence of rationality, because it remains 
within, and conforms to, ý the confines and telos of reason. 
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However, Derrida's reading is not simply a critique of and 
confrontation with Foucault's book, but also what Derrida would regard as 
a necessary repetition of the problematic it is involved in: 
in the light of the rereading of the Cartesian Cogito that we shall 
be led to propose ... will it not be possible to interrogate certain 
philosophical and methodological presuppositions of this history 
of madness? ... And if it is true, as Foucault says, as he admits by citing Pascal, that one cannot speak of madness except in 
relation to that "other form of madness" that allows men " not 
to be mad, " that is, except in relation to reason, it will perhaps 
be possible not to add anything whatsoever to what Foucault 
has said, but perhaps only to repeat once more, on the site of 
this division of which Foucault speaks so well, the meaning, a 
meaning of the Cogito or (plural) Cogitos [CHM p. 33] 
In order to throw this question and this assumption into relief, Derrida mimics 
Foucault's gesture as regards the philosophical text of the Meditations, and 
the philosophical text of Madness and Civilization. Derrida's question is 
therefore, what history must the subject have in order to be mad? His answer 
does not strictly oppose Foucault's. However, it creates a differentiation 
within Foucault's historical account, which calls the relation between the 
concept of history and the understanding of the rational subject into question. 
The Internment of the Co ; to 
In proposing this set of questions, Derrida creates a slippage of meaning in 
his reading of Foucault. Derrida's text repeats the possible justification for 
Foucault's interpretation and historical localisation of the Cartesian Cogito. 
However, it repeats it by acting out the possibilities of this justification latent 
in Foucault's discourse. In so doing Derrida creates in his own text a parody 
of Foucault's. For example, in Madness and Civilization, the question of the 
status of philosophical discourse, both in particular and in general, is left 
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obscure. Foucault plucks out the Meditations from the Classical period, to 
mark its beginning, and as a prologue to the book he wishes to write, but 
without ever explaining it as a philosophical discourse. As Derrida later says: 
We are not told whether or not this passage of the first 
Meditation, interpreted by Foucault as a philosophical 
internment of madness, is destined, as a prelude to the historical 
and sociopolitical drama, to set the tone for the entire drama to 
be played. Is this "act of force, " described in the dimension of 
theoretical knowledge and metaphysics, a symptom, a cause, a 
language? ... And 
if this act of force has a structural affinity with 
the totality of the drama, what is the status of this affinity? 
Finally, whatever the place reserved for philosophy in this total 
historical structure may be, why the sole choice of the Cartesian 
example? [CHM p. 44] 
Derrida, however, himself copies this gesture. He selects and concentrates on 
three pages of Madness and Civilisation, which form the opening to the book. 
The manner of this selection mirrors Foucault's selection of Descartes' text, 
which he holds to mark the turn of thought which opens the Classical epoch. 
Derrida could be accused of reducing an extremely complex historical 
narrative to a brief statement of its philosophical intentions. This, however, 
is Derrida's point. "His" text is no more legitimate in its formal criticism of 
Foucault's text, than Foucault himself. But if its formal structure raises 
questions of legitimacy this is because it repeats the structure of Foucault's 
text, demonstrating in its movement the violence of reductive objectification. 
The question which Derrida sets is not simply one of justification, but 
also one of destination, both of the philosophical word within Foucault's 
narrative; and of the word itself, spoken by the thinking subject within the 
history of reason. 
If Foucault, as he claims, wishes to write the archaeology of this 
silence of madness, after it has been interned, that is, after all its legible signs 
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have been made the property of reason (as Foucault claims they are), then 
how can this archaeology be meaningful unless it participates in this 
internment? 
But, first of all, is there a history of silence? Further, is not an 
archaeology, even of silence, a logic, that is, an organized 
language, a project, an order, a sentence, a work? Would not 
the archaeology of silence be the most efficacious and subtle 
restoration, the repetition, in the most irreducibly ambiguous 
meaning of the word, of the act perpetrated against madness - 
and be so at the very moment when this act is denounced? 
[CHM p. 35] 
This is a general criticism of Foucault's project, insofar as Foucault conceives 
it as an account in which a history is told and meant to be understood, that is, 
insofar as he holds it to be an objective, rational account. In other words, if 
the structure of truth belongs strictly to rationality, as Foucault implicitly 
holds in Madness and Civilization, if the philosophical moment of language 
is enclosed within, and transcended by, the archaeological account of its 
possibility, if the order of this archaeology is to be understood, then surely the 
order and language of its truth must fall within the conceptual range of the 
rationality which Foucault seeks, on behalf of madness, to put on trial? 
20. The Silence of Madness 
This general criticism has a further application in teens of the relation 
between madness and reason. If reason itself enables and enforces the 
division between itself and unreason, in which madness forms the empirical 
index of the limit of reason, 'then the rational formulation of the question of 
madness in Foucault's language must reiterate this division. If Foucault's 
archaeology is to truly demonstrate the historical fact of this division then it 
itself cannot be mad - it must itself expel the possibility of its own madness. 
189 
In other words, it must repeat reason's own strange act of force, initiated, so 
Foucault claims, by Descartes' articulation of the Cogito. Derrida therefore 
asks: 
What is the historical responsibility of this logic of archaeology? 
Where should it be situated? Does it suffice to stack the tools of 
psychiatry neatly, inside a tightly shut workshop, in order to 
return to innocence and to end all complicity with the rational 
or political order which keeps madness captive? ... Nothing 
within this language, and no one among those who speak it, can 
escape the historical guilt - if there is one, and if it is historical 
in a classical sense - which Foucault apparently wishes to put on 
trial. But such a trial may be impossible, for by the simple fact 
of their articulation the proceedings and verdict unceasingly 
reiterate the crime. If the Order of which we are speaking is so 
powerful, if its power is unique of its kind, this is so precisely 
by virtue of the universal, structural, and infinite complicity in 
which it compromises all those who understand it in its own 
language, even when this language provides them with the form 
of their own denunciation. Order is then denounced within 
order. [CHM p. 35] 
The trial of both reason and madness has always taken place within the 
juridical setting of rationality. If Foucault's analysis could be correct, then the 
judgement arrived at in such a setting must always be rational, which means, 
once again, the exclusion of the possibility of its madness. Madness is once 
more damned, this time by the language which seeks to offer it retribution and 
to judge the truly guilty. 4ß Thus if Foucault's historical account is to have 
48 It is this fact which forms the locus of Derrida's strongest objection to Foucault, and 
which Foucault, in his reply "My Body, This Paper, This Fire" (referred to as BPF) to 
Derrida's essay, acknowledges as an attack upon his position, a position which Derrida 
never actually claims that Foucault absolutely takes. That is, Derrida holds that there is 
no order outside of rationality, which is the language of order. And this is precisely what 
Foucault holds, at least in these earlier, writings, to be possible. He thus holds that 
Derrida's practice of textual reading is itself a repetition of classical rationality, a fact that 
Derrida would not deny, although he would hold that his writing exceeds this 
metaphysical closure. But, against this, Foucault asserts: 
(continued... ) 
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sense, then it must already belong to the order of reason, and especially in the 
case of madness or non-sense. This is because, if something is to obtain 
sense, then it must, in the first instance, partake of the order of sense; and 
madness, whatever else it may be, and especially as it is designated in 
Foucault's book, is not of this order. If there is a sense to reason's disruption 
by non-sense, then the articulation of this disruption can only take place 
within this order, for "outside" of this order, there is no articulation which can 
obtain rational sense. Which does not mean that there is no mark outside 
reason, but rather that there is no sensible mark outside of reason. There is 
no "outside" of reason which is sayable, precisely because reason has already 
articulated the division between its "outside" and "inside, " as a condition of 
universality in general: 
The revolution-against reason ... can be made only within 
it.... 
Since the revolution against reason, from the moment it is 
articulated, can operate only within reason, it always has the 
limited scope of what is called, precisely in the language of a 
(... continued) 
I will not say that it is a metaphysics, metaphysics itself or its closure 
which is hiding in this "textualisation" of discursive practices. I'll go much 
further than that: I shall say that what can be seen here so visibly is a 
historically well-determined little pedagogy. A pedagogy which teaches 
the pupil that there is nothing outside of the text, but that in it, in its blanks 
and its silences, there reigns the reserve of the origin; that it is therefore 
unnecessary to search elsewhere, but that here, not in the words, certainly, 
but in the words under erasure, in their grid, the "sense of being" is said. 
A pedagogy which gives conversely to the master's voice the limitless 
sovereignty which allows it to restate the text indefinitely. [BPF p. 27]. 
But this misses the point, whilst at the same time reiterating it. Derrida's manoeuvre in his 
essay was always aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the voice of the master, as we 
can see from his preface. And precisely because, the sovereignty of the master's voice 
marks both the necessity and the impossibility of its determination, historical or otherwise. 
It cannot be historically determined, because then it would not occupy a position of 
absolute sovereignty - this would be taken over by the voice of the historian, and it must 
be historically determined because, outside of its historical determination, that is the 
determination of an origin, a memory, a tradition, it would have no sense. 
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department of internal affairs, a disturbance. A history, that is, 
an archaeology against reason doubtless cannot be written, for, 
despite all appearances to the contrary, the concept of history 
has always been a rational one. It is the meaning of "history" or 
archia that should have been questioned first, perhaps. A 
writing that exceeds, by questioning them, the values "origin, " 
"reason, " and "history" could not be contained within the 
metaphysical closure of an archaeology. [CHM p. 36] 
The Historical Sign of the Subject 
Derrida thus asks whether Foucault's interpretation of Descartes is justifiable 
on two levels. Firstly, in terms of the interpretation itself, whether Foucault 
has read Descartes correctly. Included in this question is whether there is 
such a thing as a correct interpretation. Secondly, in terms of the position, 
that is, the determinable meaning of this interpretation in relation to its 
philosophical presuppositions. Here Derrida is basically asking whether one 
can legitimately give an historical account of a philosophical content and 
meaning: 
In asking if the interpretation is justifiable, I am therefore asking 
about two things, putting two preliminary questions into one: (a) 
Have we fully understood the sign itself, in itself? In other 
words, has what Descartes said and meant been clearly 
perceived? This comprehension of the sign in and of itself, in its 
immediate materiality as a sign, if I may so call it, is only the 
first moment but also the indispensable condition of all 
hermeneutics and of any claim to transition from the sign to the 
signified ... . (b) second implication of the first question: once 
understood as a sign, does Descartes' stated intention have with 
the total historical structure to which it is to be related the 
relationship assigned to it? ... That is, again, two questions in 
one: Does it have the historical meaning assigned to it? does it 
have this meaning, a given meaning Foucault assigns to it? Or, 
second, does it have the historical meaning assigned to it? Is 
this meaning exhausted by its historicity? [CHM p. 32-33] 
That is, in order to conduct an historical analysis of Descartes' text, which 
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purports to uncover the historical meaning of the text, one must first 
understand interpretation in general. In other words, Foucault assumes a 
certain structure of, and relation to, the sign in general, and, because he does 
not clarify this relation, it is not at all clear whether this assumption is 
justified. 
Derrida argues that Foucault simply accepts the traditional conception 
of signification without subjecting it to a critique. Such a critique is especially 
called for when one is attempting to articulate the division between sense and 
non-sense in general, for such an analysis operates at the very limits of 
meaning. Den-ida thus points out that in order to understand Descartes' text 
fully, that is, in terms of its obvious (in this instance philosophical) and 
hidden (in this instance, historical) meanings, Foucault must understand 
Descartes' language - its structure and its meaning. If this were possible, 
however, it would then be impossible for Foucault even to begin to detect a 
latent meaning, that is, a meaning hidden from Descartes himself, it would be 
impossible for him even to begin an interpretation of the text. This is because 
the differentiation between a latent and an obvious meaning, which Foucault 
assumes, could not be upheld. 
For, if this identification of the real and true meaning of Descartes' text 
were possible, if one could fully present the meaning of a text, let us say, in 
an historical account, then the presence of a latent meaning, - of a 
differentiation between a latent and manifest meaning, would be absolutely 
impossible. Foucault, above all, in his archaeology of the silence of madness 
in relation to the rational Cogito of Descartes, contends that such a latent 
meaning exists. He depends upon an implicit division between philosophical 
discourse and historical discourse, on the one hand, and reason and unreason, 
on the other. Foucault both assumes such divisions, for without them he 
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would simply have nothing to uncover, and yet if his historical narrative is 
true, then it must transcend these divisions in order to give an account of 
them. 
Derrida contends that it is rather the equivocality of the concept of the 
sign and signification itself, which gives rise to the differentiation between 
latent and manifest meaning, to the possibility of interpretation itself. This 
equivocality or indeterminateness in conceptuality itself, in reason itself, 
"means" that the meaning of a sign in general can never be fully presented: 
The latent content of a dream (and of any behaviour and of 
consciousness in general) communicates with the manifest 
content only through the unity of a language -a language that 
the analyst must speak as well as possible. ... As well as 
possible: progress in the knowledge and practice of a language 
being by nature infinitely open (first by virtue of the original and 
essential equivocality of the signifier, at least in the language of 
"everyday life, " its indeterminateness and playing space being 
precisely that which liberates the difference between hidden and 
stated meaning; then, by virtue of the original and essential 
communication between different languages throughout history; 
finally, by virtue of the play, the relation to itself, or 
"sedimentation, " of every language), are not the insecurities and 
insufficiencies of analysis axiomatic or irreducible? And does 
not the historian of philosophy, whatever his method, abandon 
himself to the same dangers? [CHM p. 307-8] 
This is a problem faced by all hermeneutics. Foucault's discourse is a 
historical one, and therefore places this problem of understanding the sign 
and its meaning within the matrix of a historical interpretation. But is the 
nature of the sign in relation to its meaning or possible meanings such that it 
can be grasped and fully accounted for from a historical perspective? Even 
if the meaning of Descartes' text could be fully understood, is its meaning, 
and meaning in general, in every way historical? 
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21. The Madness of the Project 
Derrida, however, detects another project within Foucault's book, which he 
holds to exceed and even neutralise the project of an archaeology. This is 
Foucault's attempt to uncover the space in which the language of reason and 
unreason are made possible. This would indicate the possibility of a mark of 
thought, of the Cogito, beyond its captivation in speech and in determinate 
meaning - the origin of sense and non-sense before their division was 
accomplished. This other project is the attempt to articulate the possibility 
of this division between reason and unreason from the side of unreason: 
as he experiences a necessity of speaking which must escape 
the objectivist project of classical reason -a necessity of 
speaking even at the price of a war declared by the language of 
reason against itself, a war in which language would recapture 
itself, destroy itself, or unceasingly revive the act of its own 
destruction - the allegation of an archaeology of silence, a 
purist, intransigent, nonviolent, nondialectical allegation, is 
often counterbalanced, equilibrated, I should even say 
contradicted by a discourse in Foucault's book that is not only 
the admission of a difficulty, but the formation of another 
project, a project that is not an expediency, but a different and 
more ambitious one, a project more effectively ambitious than 
the first one. [CHM p. 36] 
This project contradicts an historical archaeology because it is not the 
formulation of the unthinkable. It is rather the attempt to allow it to say itself 
in the very impossibility of having a voice. It would be the trace of the mark 
of madness in its very non-sense, within rational thought itself. This project 
is no less rational than that of an archaeology of knowledge except that the 
mark or sign which it attempts to articulate can never be made sensible, 
because it belongs neither to a determinate sense, nor to a determinate non- 
sense. The trace of such a mark points back to an understanding in which the 
division between sense and non-sense had not 'yet' been made. " This 
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understanding, always in the form of a logos, or a determinate form of the 
logos, would be older, more originary, than the rationality of the classical 
epoch, which would then appear as an effect rather than cause of the division 
between reason and madness. 
Foucault's projected language would thus be the attempt to articulate 
itself along an axis which is other than the sense of reason, that is, from 
beyond the support offered by sense: 
The admission of this difficulty can be found in such sentences 
as these ...: "The perception which seeks to grasp them 
[in 
question are the miseries and murmurings of madness] in their 
wild state, necessarily belongs to a world that has already 
captured them. The liberty of madness can be understood only 
from high in the fortress that holds madness prisoner. And there 
madness possesses only the morose sum of its prison 
experiences, its mute experience of persecution. And we - we 
possess only its description as a man wanted. " And, later, 
Foucault speaks of a madness "whose wild state can never be 
restored in and of itself' and of an "inaccessible primitive 
" pity. 
Because this difficulty, or this impossibility, must 
reverberate within the language used to describe this history of 
madness, Foucault, in effect, acknowledges the necessity of 
maintaining his discourse within what he calls a "relativity 
without recourse, " that is, without support from an absolute 
reason or logos. The simultaneous necessity and impossibility 
of what Foucault elsewhere calls "a language without support, " 
that is to say, a language declining, in principle if not in fact, to 
articulate itself along the lines of the syntax of reason. [CHM 
p. 37] 
This attempt agrees in principle with Derrida's critique of the project of an 
archaeology, and undermines it along the same lines as Derrida's critique. 
Foucault's historical account of madness is undermined by his project of 
letting madness say itself outside of the support of sense., This means that 
there is an implicit binding between the concept of sense and the concept of 
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history - the two support each other in an economy of circulation and 
correspondence. Before examining this we should look at the manner in 
which this history, and history in general, is undermined by the attempt to let 
madness say itself, that is, to allow its source to be articulated. 
The Mark of Reason's Madness 
The project of letting madness speak is, however, problematic, even 
impossible. Foucault must posit madness in an a priori relation to reason, in 
which the two determine each other. For, if this division takes place, and is 
posited from the side of reason, then madness must be a place of silence in 
terms of sense and meaning. Within this space reason has no voice, and the 
voice has no reason. The attempt to say or to think the space of this division 
is, in other words, the mark of madness - it has no destination, can arrive at 
no singular meaning, it articulates nothing. As Foucault says: 
Joining vision and blindness, image and judgements, 
hallucination and language, sleep and waking, day and night, 
madness is ultimately nothing, for it unites in them all that is 
negative. But the paradox of this nothing is to manifest itself, to 
explode in signs, in words, in gestures. [MC p. 107] 
This means that although madness can be marked, its mark has no 
determinate meaning. Madness exceeds the sense given it in the logos, and 
therefore cannot be said. Which, means that every "true" mark of madness 
stands beyond the order of sensible articulation, which includes its historical 
account, which belongs to this order as soon as it claims to account for 
something. Foucault is well aware of this fact when he states: 
Meaningless disorder as madness, it [reason] reveals, when it 
examines it, only ordered classifications, rigorous mechanisms 
in soul and body, language articulated according to a visible 
logic. All that madness can say of itself is merely reason, though 
it is itself the negation of reason. In short, a rational hold over 
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madness is always possible and necessary, to the very degree 
that madness is non-reason. 
There is only one word which summarizes this experience, 
Unreason. [MC p. 107] 
This perspective throws the whole enterprise of an archaeological study of 
the classical age, in which this period is prioritised as the epoch in which this 
division took place, into question. For if all that madness can say of itself is 
reason then it must be construed as having always been so. This is because 
the only history that madness could ever have had would be one of 
rationality. It would be impossible for madness to narrate its own history. 
Madness, understood as the mark of unreason, as the opposite of rational 
cognition, is, in its sovereign right as a subject of enunciation belonging to the 
space of unreason, the oblivion of history in general. In other words, the 
concept of madness marks the radical absence of memory, or rather, a certain 
memory which could secure the sense of madness in that it can recall and 
project the sense of the sentence uttered from the space of madness, if 
"madness" itself could still be said to truly exist. 
However, if all that can be said of madness in general is reason, then 
the division between reason and madness or unreason cannot be historically, 
or even philosophically, located 49 This has a second, wider consequence. If 
madness can only be sensibly marked within the sphere of reason, even if this 
mark is nonsensical, then reason must be' other than conceived by Foucault. 
It cannot be so alienated from the experience of madness as he proposes. This 
can be seen, for example, in the very fact that reason marks madness as a 
49 It should be noted here that it is difficult to tell from Foucault's book whether madness 
is, in general, simply the negation of reason as unreason, orI whether madness has a 
specific locus within the space of unreason. This difficulty is not thematically resolved, but 
it can be said that, in general, madness obtains specificity in Foucault's discourse through 
its empirical study, whilst in principle its analysis is restricted to the division between 
reason and unreason. 
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domain for study, for articulation, in the very knowledge that it is 
inarticulatable. Nonetheless madness functions in Foucault's book, if 
nowhere else, as a concept, albeit one that exceeds its own conceptualisation. 
This experience and this project of grasping madness is, in itself, a form of 
rational "madness, " as is often vividly portrayed by Foucault's account of 
rationality's grasp of madness in its empirical formation. Perhaps the clearest 
sign of rationality's own madness is given by the manner in which doctors 
have attempted to treat madness, and their rational justification of these 
treatments. Foucault always follows this movement with an eye on what it is 
to be really mad: 
Fallowes explains the beneficial mechanism of his oleum 
cephalicum; in madness, "black vapours clog the very fine 
blood vessels through which the animal spirits must pass"; the 
blood is thus deprived. of direction; it encumbers the veins of the 
brain where it stagnates, unless it is agitated by a confused 
movement "that distracts the ideas. " Oleum cephalicum has the 
advantage of provoking "little pustules on the head"; they are 
anointed with oil to keep them from drying out and so that "the 
black vapours lodged in the brain" may continue to escape. But 
burning and cauterising the body at any point produces the same 
effect. ... In 
his Instructions of 1785 ... Francois Doublet 
recommends that if bleedings, purges, baths and showers do not 
cure mania, the use of "cauters, setons, superficial abscesses, 
inoculation of scabies" will. [MC p. 164] 
If madness is shown here, is made present, it is through the madness of the 
division which is enacted by the voice of reason. Reason, insofar as it testifies 
its own reasonableness, cannot say that it is mad, but that does not mean that 
it is not mad. Reason must always run the risk of being mad - of uttering non- 
sense - before the reflection and judgement of the sense of this utterance. 
Again, the question as to whether this attestation - reason's attestation of its 
own reasonableness - is in itself madness or not, cannot be posed in the 
199 
moment of its reflection. It cannot, with meaning, reflect that it is mad, say 
that it is mad, because it has already decided that madness is the limit of 
sense, it is non-sense. Reason, insofar as it makes a claim for sense, must 
always run the gauntlet of non-sense at the very point of the enunciation of 
sense because, from the perspective of rationality, the sense of this 
enunciation only obtains insofar as it is not mad. Reason is not mad insofar 
as it can articulate its rationality and can recall that it has made this 
attestation. The point is, however, that this recall is necessary, but at the same 
time, through this very same movement, impossible. The possibility of 
madness infects reason at every point of enunciation. If we experience a 
tension in Foucault's work it is precisely at this point of the enunciation of 
madness in the very recognition of its impossibility. It is at this point that 
Foucault takes us to the very limits of language itself in the experience of the 
division between madness and reason. It is at this point that he is most 
profound and escapes Derrida's criticism of him for proposing a totalitarian 
account of madness, but also undermines his own historical account of the 
rise of madness, in which this division between reason and unreason is 
located in the so called Classical period. 
Nonetheless, there remains in Madness and Civilisation the historical 
account and interpretation of the Cartesian Cogito. We should, therefore, 
finally turn to the interpretation of Descartes in order to see the locus of this 
critique, and the internment thereby enacted. Through this analysis we wish 
to show the relation of the subject to the possibility both of its history and its 
madness. 
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22. Hiistoly or Fiction - the Madness of the Cogito 
Foucault accuses Descartes of excluding madness from the methodological 
movement of doubt in establishing of the truth of the subject's Cogito. He 
claims that this exclusion takes place in the first stages of the Meditations, 
that is, at the stage of natural doubt. For Foucault, the fact that Descartes says 
he cannot be mad when he refers to the certainty of the perception of his body 
means that he excludes madness from the possibility of thought. Madness 
belongs to the realm of the unthinkable, and is immediately expelled outside 
the realm of reason. He understands Descartes as saying that it is better to 
take dreams as an example for the fact that I can doubt the existence of my 
body, for a reasonable man can dream, and still argue, whereas a madman 
can never be reasonable, could never seriously present an argument. Foucault 
argues that through this circumvention of madness in favour of dreaming, 
Descartes secures the subject's knowledge of certain objects. Foucault holds 
that dreaming and error always leave a residue of truth. For example, simple 
primary elements of cognition, such as colours, or numbers and their relations 
which madness would threaten if it were not excluded from the possibility of 
the thinking subject. Foucault asserts that "I cannot be mad because I think. " 
For madness it is otherwise; if its dangers do not threaten the 
methodology, or the essence of its truth, it is not simply because 
this thing, even in the thought of the madman, cannot be false; 
it is rather that because it is me that thinks, then I cannot be 
mad. When I believe that I have a body, how can I ascertain 
that this is a more pertinent truth than that held by the one who 
imagines he has a body of glass? Most certainly because: "these 
are madmen, and I would not be less extravagant if I were to 
follow their example. " It is not the permanence of truth which 
guarantees thought against, madness, in the same way as 
it permits thought to remove itself from error, or to emerge from 
the dream; it is an impossibility to be mad that is essential not 
IA. 
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to the object of thought, but to the thinking subject. 50 
Foucault thus holds that Descartes excludes the possibility of madness from 
thought without justification. Descartes assumes that he knows what madness 
already is, and never seriously considers it as a possible form of cognition. 
Foucault further argues that this exclusion marks a new historical epoch, the 
formulation of the Cogito by Descartes being a symptom of this historical 
period. 
Madness; Dreaming; and Evil Demons 
Derrida argues that Foucault concentrates only on the first movement of the 
Meditations, which remains at the level of natural rather than metaphysical 
doubt. Even if madness is replaced by the example of dreaming, it is not 
circumvented by this example. This is not because madness subjects thought 
to a too radical an experience of doubt, but because it is not a sufficient 
experience of doubt. It is neither universal enough to be used as a pedagogic 
example, nor, in its empirical natural state, is its epistemological threat to 
truth wide ranging enough. Madness does not always place reality in doubt, 
only sometimes, whereas dreaming always does. Dreaming is the 
hyperbolical exasperation of madness, which takes the epistemological threat 
of madness to its extreme at the stage of natural doubt. This stage is where 
simple intelligible truths, such as mathematical axioms, remain as a residuum 
of certain truths. Dreaming also has the advantage over madness that it is a 
more acceptable example to the layman who would otherwise recoil from the 
threat of madness, even though the threat to' truth operating within the scope 
of dreaming is stronger than the threat of madness. As Derrida argues: 
50 Translation of Michel Foucault, Histoire de la`folie Page classioue, Nouvelle Edition, 
Paris, Gallimard, 1972, p. 56-59. 
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The reference to dreams ... constitutes ... the hyperbolical 
exasperation of the hypothesis of madness. ... Moreover, Descartes is concerned here not with determining the concept 
of madness but with utilizing the popular notion of insanity for 
juridical and methodological ends, in order to ask questions of 
principle regarding only the truth of ideas. ... From this point of 
view the sleeper, or the dreamer, is madder than the madman.... 
It is in the case of sleep and not in that of insanity, that the 
absolute totality of ideas of sensory origin becomes suspect ... 
. The 
hypothesis of insanity is therefore not a good example ... for at least two reasons. (a) It does not cover the totality of the 
field of sensory perception. ... (b) It is 
not a useful ... example 
pedagogically, because it meets the resistance of the non- 
philosopher who does not have the audacity to follow the 
philosopher when the latter agrees that he might indeed be mad 
at the very moment when he speaks. [CHM p. 51 ] 
The real point is that madness is not circumvented by Descartes in this 
movement from madness to dreaming because dreaming itself is not 
considered a radical enough moment of doubt by Descartes. It is a rhetorical 
step which paves the way for, and is itself eclipsed by, the most radical 
moment of doubt experienceable by the subject. This is the hyperbolic 
moment of the evil genius or demon - literally the moment of the demonic 
within thought. This moment will obliterate every step taken by the path of 
natural doubt, for it will threaten everything natural with the possibility of 
epistemological obliteration. The idea of Man himself as doubting subject will 
be open to this obliteration. This is because, at the summit of the doubting 
subject, all sensible intuition, all marks of sense, all marks of articulation and 
reason, will be subject to the scope of doubt opened by its hyperbolisation in 
the hypothesis of the evil demon. This is the true metaphysical stage of the 
methodology of doubt, and subjects the totality of sensory and intellectual 
knowledge to the possibility of a literal derangement. The hyperbole of the 
evil demon introduces the subject's Cogito to the possibility of a 
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metaphysical madness, from which the subject will never escaper 
Now, the recourse to the fiction of the evil genius will evoke, 
conjure up, the possibility of a total madness, a total 
derangement over which I could have no control because it is 
inflicted upon me - hypothetically - leaving me no responsibility 
for it. Total derangement is the possibility of a madness that is 
no longer a disorder of the body, of the object, the body-object 
outside the boundaries of the res cogitans, outside the 
boundaries of the policed city, secure in its existence as thinking 
subjectivity, but is a madness that will bring subversion to pure 
thought and to its purely intelligible objects, to the field of its 
clear and distinct ideas, to the realm of the mathematical truths 
which escape natural doubt. [CHM p. 52-53] 
Two things are emphasised here, the most obvious being that the hypothesis 
of the evil demon constitutes the ruination of all knowledge. All objects of 
thought are thus subjected to the possibility of doubt through the 
metaphysical hyperbolisation: This is posited by Descartes when he interrupts 
his reverie of natural doubt. 
Nevertheless, I have for a long time had in my mind the belief 
that there is a God who is all-powerful and by whom I was 
created and made as I am. And who can give me the assurance 
that this God has not arranged that there should be no earth, no 
heaven, no extended body, no figure, no magnitude, or place, 
and that nevertheless I should have the perception of all these 
things, and the persuasion that they do not exist other than as I 
see them? And, further, as I sometimes think that others are 
mistaken, even in the things that they think they know most 
certainly, it is possible that God has wished that I should be 
deceived every time I add two and three or count the sides of a 
square, or form some - judgement even simpler,, if anything 
simpler than that can be imagined. [NIFP p. 98] 
The second point emphasised by Derrida is that this hypothesis takes the form 
of a fiction. It should here be noted that the possible existence of an all- 
powerful god and of an all-powerful deceiving demon can be posited within 
the scope of this fiction. For, 'within the scope of this fiction, we experience 
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a doubt of such radicality that we can even doubt the word of Descartes - the 
sense of this narrative - to the point where no recollection of this experience 
is possible. One would have to identify with Descartes' experienced intention 
at the very moment of its conception. But because this moment of cognition 
is only ever formal, and never determinate, it is structurally impossible to 
recall the determinate meaning of this moment of cognition. That is, the 
Cogito "itself' can neither be perceived nor reflected. 
23. Recollection and Repression of the Cogs 
The attempt to recollect this point of the Cogito would constitute the 
confinement of this point of excess, as Foucault himself has argued, but at 
another point in the progression of the Meditations. Derrida does not dispute 
that Descartes does, later on, repress the fundamental non-objectivity, or 
indeterminacy, of this point by determining it within the confines of a 
knowledge secured by the existence of a supremely good God. But this can 
only be seen to be a repression of this point of the Cogito because, within the 
ellipsis opened by the hyperbole of the demon, all judgement is suspended. 
At this point it does not matter whether the hypothesis is of a God or of a 
demon, whether the suspension of all judgement is morally good or morally 
bad, because this judgement is itself suspended, and reality and truth fall 
solely within the realm of the possible. It is within the scope of this 
suspension that Descartes can say "everything said here about a God is a 
fable" [Meditations p. 99], and can with complete equanimity introduce the 
1,1 111 11 1 fable of the evil demon. This is because the idea of an omnipotent being, and 
of an evil demon, register only in the space of possibility. Within the scope 
of this fable the only thing which can exist is a thinking subject. It is of 
absolutely no consequence whether the thought of the thinking subject is mad 
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or sane. Thus Derrida will later say that: 
The Cogito escapes madness only because at its own moment, 
under its own authority, it is valid even if I am mad, even if my 
thoughts are completely mad. There is a value and a meaning of 
the Cogito, as of existence, which escape the alternative of a 
determined madness or a determined reason. ... The hyperbolical audacity of the Cartesian Cogito, its mad audacity 
... would consist in the return to an original point which no longer belongs to either a determined reason or a determined 
unreason, no longer belongs to them as opposition or 
alternative. Whether I am mad or not, Cogito, sum. Madness is 
therefore, in every sense of the word, only one case of thought 
(within thought). [CHM pp. 55-56] 
This includes the determinate recollection - the reflection - of the Cogito in 
memory, in other words, the first moment of its history. History, at this point 
of the Cogito, falls into the realm of possibility, which means that its 
objective truth is suspended. This suspension, the possibility of this 
suspension, is precisely the opening of the historicity of the subject - the very 
possibility of its existence, the very possibility of sense itself. For it is only 
against this background of the transcendent infinity of the Cogito that the 
determinate recollection of history in general can begin its narrative. 
At first glance this appears to defy the very possibility of this point in 
Descartes' enterprise - if this is so, how could Descartes even begin the 
project of doubt? It would undermine the possibility of ascertaining that 
Descartes himself historically undertook this experiment, that we could recall 
this point of his experience in the establishment of the Cogito. But this is 
precisely Derrida's argument. We are indeed unable to objectively ascertain 
that Descartes, as a determinate subject, ever reached this point, just as 
Descartes himself, as a determinate subject, could not recollect this point. For 
this point of thought is valid beyond all determinate forms of thought - that 
is, it is has a meaning which transcends all possible determination, and thus 
206 
moves in the direction of infinity. Understood in these terms, Descartes as a 
determinate subject in the history of reason can only ever obtain validity in 
the register of possibility, and not in the register of objective truth, which is 
also the register of an objective history. We cannot decide whether this 
possibility of cognition is ever true or false, real or fictional, because it 
remains structurally indeterminate. This indeterminacy of the Cogito - its 
transcendent infinity - forms the very possibility of determinate, reflective 
thought, but itself remains beyond the determination of judgement in general. 
This is not to say that there is no history, and no memory within the 
scope of the Cogito of the thinking subject. On the contrary, within the 
formation of the "I think therefore I am, " a possible history and a possible 
memory -a possible sense or meaning of the subject - is always posited. Such 
a history, or, in other words, a content of cognition, can only be formulated 
in terms of the subject's relation to the infinite, that is, to possibility in 
general. Possible meaning is thus necessarily prior to all determinate meaning 
as its condition, but it is also the mark of the impossibility of a total 
determination of meaning. The total determination of the meaning of the 
subject can only ever be the project of the subject in its attempt to secure its 
foundations, in relation to an infinity which it can never transcend. This 
attempt to transcend infinity is reason's madness - the attempt to say the 
unsayable - from out of which meaning, the meaning of the subject - its 
determinate history and sense, its very direction and orientation - must stem. 
As Derrida says: 
"Madness is the absence of a work. " This, is a fundamental 
motif of Foucault's book. Now, the work starts with the most 
elementary discourse, with the first articulation of a meaning, 
with the first syntactical usage of an "as such, " for to make a 
sentence is to manifest a possible meaning. By its essence, the 





that I am, because I necessarily state this in relation to infinity, my memory 
of myself as being "as such" is constituted as a possibility of my existence, 
and at the same time is erased in the possibility of not being true. In this 
moment the temporality of the subject is stripped of its objective truth. This 
is because this point of the Cogito is at all times formally repeatable, and at 
all times singularly unique - it exists only under its own erasure from all 
determinate forms of perception. It is in this sense that Derrida criticises 
Foucault's reading of Descartes, when he says: 
The extent to which doubt and the Cartesian Cogito are 
punctuated by this project of a singular and unprecedented 
excess ... 
is also the extent to which any effort to reduce this 
project, to enclose it within a determined historical structure, 
however comprehensive, risks missing the essential, risks 
dulling the point itself. Such an effort risks doing violence to 
this project in turn .. and a violence of a totalitarian and historicist style which eludes meaning and the origin of 
meaning. ... Structuralist totalitarianism here would 
be 
responsible for an internment of the Cogito similar to the 
violences of the classical age. ... I think, therefore, that 
(in 
Descartes) everything can be reduced to a determined historical 
totality except the hyperbolical project. Now, this project 
belongs to the narration narrating itself and not to the narration 
narrated by Foucault. It cannot be recounted, cannot be 
objectified as an event in determined history. [CHM p. 58] 
This point is nothing other than the mark of the hyperbolical project as the 
necessary moment of fictionality = within determinate rationality, or, as 
Heidegger would say, of untruth in truth. It can, in other contexts, be read as 
the mark of madness, or of silence, or of literature within rationality, and 
signals both the possibility and impossibility of the subject discursively 
grasping its existence. This conceptual reflection of the subject upon itself 
relies on the assumption that the identity and meaning of the subject remain 
substantially the same. This - can only be verified through memory - the 
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subject's certainty of its continual identity in time. This memory is all that can 
separate the cognition of the rational subject from that of the madman. 
We have seen, however, through Derrida's argument, that the subject's 
Cogito transcends this memory, and thus the possibility of reassuring itself 
that its thought is not mad falls away. In this sense Foucault is utterly correct 
to say that reason has entombed the possibility of its own madness, but not 
at the point of the Cartesian Cogito. This occurs rather at the stage when the 
subject attempts to reassure itself of the validity of its perception by deferring 
its reflection to a moment of absolute objectivity, in other words, God. It is 
the belief in the absolute objectivity of God which assures the subject of the 
truth of its perception, of its reflection and of its memory or history. The 
concept of history itself is only possible on the basis of this belief, and thus 
represents the subject's reassurance of its own rational cognition and 
meaning. We have already seen in our readings of both Descartes and Husserl 
that this reference of the Cogito to objectivity cannot secure a determinate 
identity or meaning for the subject, the transcendence of this realm thwarting 
every determinate, finite, that is, historical judgement. Determinate or finite 
thought is, however, no less thwarted by the transcendence of the Cogito's 
existence itself, the meaning of which stretches beyond both a determinate 
rationality and a determinate" madness. Determinate thought, rational 
judgement, only exists through the repression of this madness: that of 
transcendence within the subject. The subject can only speak or express itself 
against this transcendence, which is its own. The validation of a singular 
meaning and memory of the subject as the subject tries to say itself and 
reassure itself within the locus of this saying: this is the madness and the 
crisis which haunts the truth of subjectivity: 
Crisis or oblivion is perhaps not an accident, but rather the 
210 
destiny of speaking philosophy - the philosophy which lives 
only by imprisoning madness, but which would die as thought, 
and by a still worse violence, if a new speech did not at every 
instant liberate previous madness while enclosing within itself, 
in its present existence, the madman of the day. It is only by 
virtue of this oppression of madness that finite thought, that is 
to say, history, can reign. Extending this truth to historicity in 
general, without keeping to a determined historical moment, one 
could say that the reign of finite thought can be established only 
on the basis of the more or less disguised internment, 
humiliation, fettering and mockery of the madman within us, of 
the madman who can only be the fool of a logos which is father, 
master, and king. [CHM p. 61] 
25. Summary of Section III 
In the preceding chapters we have seen that the subject's Cogito exists in a 
moment which necessarily transcends all determinate or finite thought. This 
means that the Cogito both exceeds and resists the attempt to reduce its 
meaning to an underlying constitutive historical reality. 
In our reading of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche we have tried 
to demonstrate that the referentiality of the subject's Cogito is grounded in 
the necessary reference of subjectivity to- a "concept" of justice, which 
exceeds any finite, i. e. reflexive determination. It is this reference which 
renders the determinate, judgement which characterises the so-called 
metaphysical epoch illegitimate in its attempt to reduce the meaning of the 
Cogito to a determinate historical form or structure. 
For this reason we also suggested that Heidegger, despite his analysis, 
is guilty of such, a reduction -in that 
he repeatedly translates Nietzsche's 
thought in terms of the history of the forgetting of Being, by means of which 
Heidegger characterises the metaphysical epoch to which he holds Nietzsche 
belongs. This reduction illegitimately excludes a moment of the Cogito, so we 
211' 
have termed this reduction repressive. 
In our reading of Derrida and Foucault we have tried to outline exactly 
what constitutes this necessary moment of cognition. Following Derrida's 
interpretation of the Cartesian Cogito we have argued that the Cogito, 
articulated as ego cogito ergo sum, exceeds all forms of determinate thought. 
We have thus defended Descartes' argument that the subject's Cogito has a 
meaning whether its content is true or fictional. 
We further argued that the reflection of this meaning, i. e. the 
determination what the Cogito actually means introduces the possibility of 
historical narrative, or memory into subjectivity. It is by means of the 
illegitimate determination of this possibility that the subject's reflection can 
be assured of the sense of its judgement. 
This, however, relies upon a determinate or finite judgement upon the 
ego cogito itself, which effectively posits that its meaning remains the same, 
whatever the content of its thought. We have therefore, with Derrida, argued 
that such a determination is illegitimate. This means that the assertion that the 
meaning of the subject's Cogito remains substantially the same over time is 
of the order of a belief. We have therefore argued that the objective 
judgement as to the determinate meaning of the subject's Cogito, whether its 
meaning makes sense or is mad is, in both cases, a belief which represses the 
infinite transcendence of thought itself. 
It remains to be seen, however, how this assertion of the truth operates 
within the concept of the subject and subjectivity. In the final chapters on 
Freud and Derrida's critique of Lacan we will therefore attempt to show the 
relationship and operation of truth and fiction within the concept of the 
subject. In our interpretation of Freud we will attempt to demonstrate that 
theory itself, understood in terms of the idea of a thesis or thematisation, 
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breaks down in its attempt to explain consciousness because, in the face of 
the infinite transcendence of thought, it has no recourse to truth. In other 
words, the idea of reducing subjectivity to a thesis or principle, in the 
articulation of the truth of subjective or conscious life, will be shown to be a 
fiction. The assertion of the truth of such a fiction will constitute what Freud 
understands as repression. 
In our reading of Derrida's critique of Lacan we will try to show how 
truth itself operates in the repressional production of such a thesis about 
subjectivity, and why such a repression can never be complete. 
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Section IV: The Truth of the Subject's Transcendence 
Part I: Freud's Truth 
Now let us call "conscious" the If we are to die ourselves, and 
conception which is present to our first to lose in death those 
consciousness and of which we are who are dearest to us, it is 
aware, and let this be the only easier to submit to a 
meaning of the term conscious .... We remorseless law of nature, to 
were accustomed to think that every the sublime ananke 
latent idea was so because it was [Necessity], than to a chance 
weak and that it grew conscious as which might perhaps have 
soon as it was strong. We have now been escaped. It may be, 
gained the conviction that there are however, that this belief in the 
some latent ideas which do not internal necessity of dying is 
penetrate into consciousness, only another of those illusions 
however strong they may have which we have created `um 
become. Therefore we may call the die Schwere des Daseins zu 
latent ideas of the first type ertragen. ' It is certainly not a 
foreconscious, whilst we reserve the primeval belief. [OM p. 317] 
term unconscious for the latter type ... The term unconscious designates 
especially ideas with a certain 
dynamic character, ideas keeping apart 
from consciousness in spite of their 
intensity and activity. [OM p. 50-53] 
In "Le Facteur De La Verite" Derrida engages in a reading of Lacan's 
"Seminar on The Purloined Letter. " In this reading he attempts to displace the 
framework through which Lacan levers out the message that. Poe's "The 
Purloined Letter" apparently sends regarding the "repetition compulsion. " 
Before embarking on a discussion of this reading we will take a look at the 
question and the text which motivates and, organises this "confrontation. " 
This is Freud's essay "Beyond The Pleasure Principle" [OM p. 275], which 
tackles the problem that the repetition compulsion presents to psychoanalytic 
theory and praxis. .. _ ; 
ý`ý. . 
.. ý .,, . .ý,, x 
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The interpretation put forward is based upon Derrida's reading of this 
essay in his "To Speculate - On Freud" [PSF pp. 257-409]. Derrida's 
interpretation is highly intricate. I have restricted the analyses to reproducing 
two essential steps in Derrida's reading. 1. The speculative play between the 
hypotheses of conflicting life and death instincts which determine psychic 
activity. 2. The speculative nature of these hypotheses. 
26. The Compulsion to Repeat 
At the beginning of "Beyond The Pleasure Principle" Freud's question is: 
what is it that compels, for instance, a traumatised person to repeat the 
unpleasurable details of the trauma, in opposition to the Pleasure Principle? 
This principle is the instinct which drives the psyche towards the attainment 
of pleasure. Pleasure is defined as the attainment of constancy, keeping the 
levels of excitation as low as possible. It stands as the highest principle of 
psychic functioning, as the instinct which governs all psychical behaviour. 
Freud goes on to reiterate this problem in other examples, in which he 
observes this compulsion to repeat at work. A child, for example, on seeing 
his mother leave him, to return later, obsessively takes to a game which 
ostensibly repeats this unpleasurable experience. The child achieves this 
repetition of the original experience by throwing objects away from himself 
again and again, whilst uttering the sound ö-o-o-o, which both Freud and the 
Mother, after prolonged observation, came to understand as the German word 
`fort' meaning `gone'. The full economy of this game was realised by Freud: 
One day I made the observation which confirmed my view. The 
child had a. wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it. It 
never occurred to him to pull it'alöng the floor behind him, for 
instance, and play at its being a carriage. What he did was to 
hold the reel by the string and veryskilfully, throw it over, the 
edge of his curtained °cot, ' sö'thät it disappeared into it, it the 
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same time uttering his expressive `o-o-o-o'. He then pulled the 
reel out of the cot again by the string and hailed its 
reappearance with a joyful `da' [there]. This, then, was the 
complete game - disappearance and return. [OM p. 284] 
It is possible to explain the game in terms of the child mastering the loss of 
the mother. Such an explanation would obviously be in accordance with the 
Pleasure Principle. However, in the first instance, the unpleasurable 
experience must have been repeated by the child, irrespective of, and in 
opposition to, the Pleasure Principle. 
These two examples, of traumatised patients and a small child are, 
however, extreme cases. On a more general level, Freud finds that this 
repetitive behaviour can be observed in 
the lives of some normal people. The impression they give is of 
being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some 
`daemonic' power .:. . The compulsion which 
is here in 
evidence differs in no way from the compulsion to repeat we 
have found in neurotics, even though the people we are now 
considering have never shown any signs of dealing with a 
neurotic conflict by producing symptoms. Thus we have come 
across people all of whose human relationships have the same 
outcome: such as the benefactor who is abandoned in anger 
after a time by each of his proteges ... ; or the man whose friendships all end in betrayal by his friend; ... or again, the lover each of whose love affairs with a woman passes through 
the same phases and reaches the same conclusion. This 
`perpetual occurrence, of the same thing' causes us no 
astonishment when it relates to active behaviour on the part of 
the person concerned and when we can discern in him an 
essential character-trait which always remains the same and 
which is compelled to find expression in a repetition of the 
same experiences. [OM p. 292-3]-,,, 
This repetitive behaviour, however, cannot be said to lower the excitation 
levels of the psyche, and -can even 'serve to raise them. These factors of 
repetition thus stand in opposition, or at least serve as aý delay to, or 
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modification of, the Pleasure Principle. This leads Freud to posit this 
compulsion to repeat as a characteristic of the instinctual life of the psyche 
which stretches beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
Derrida argues that the status of this beyond is problematic from the 
perspective either of the Pleasure Principle, or of the compulsion to repeat. 
This is especially because the theoretical sovereignty of the Pleasure Principle 
seems indubitable, for without it desire, whether conscious or unconscious, 
would make little sense. Freud thus finds himself in need of certain 
speculations, possibly even a new kind of speculation altogether, which 
would serve to explain these two instinctual characteristics which must 
oppose each other, whilst at the same time maintaining that the Pleasure 
Principle retains its validity. 
The Play of Life and Death 
This speculation leads to the positing of two types of instinct. On the one 
hand the compulsion to repeat which Freud maintains is a desire to return to 
an earlier state of things. This, if taken to its extreme, becomes nothing less 
than a desire for death, (which comes under the general term of the death 
instincts). These desires are described by Freud as the ego instincts, and are 
characterised by the Reality Principle. This principle marks the recognition 
that immediate gratification will, in some cases, lead to the destruction of the 
organism - to its death. Such instincts serve to dampen the excesses of desire. 
On the other hand, there are the sexual instincts. These are the desires to 
proliferate, to grow and to change - the life instincts. These are unconscious 
and are aligned with the Pleasure Principle. 
This characterisation of psychic life in terms of a fundamental duality 
of the instincts leads Freud to undermine the, opposition' between the `two' 
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instinctual drives. After positing the distinction between the sexual instincts 
and the ego instincts he traverses this opposition by insisting that both share 
similar values in certain conditions. 
By rerouting the sexual instincts, the ego can save the organism's life. 
This can lead to pleasure at some stages, even if an excitation of energy 
levels in the psyche occurs in the process. This excitation is unpleasurable, 
and therefore can not be explained purely in terms of the Pleasure Principle. 
The ego therefore acts in terms of a self preservation which eventually might 
end in pleasure. The possibility of this end - the teleological structure inherent 
in the Pleasure Principle - rests upon its deferment. This is in accordance with 
the Pleasure Principle, and along the lines of the libidinal instincts, but cannot 
be wholly accounted for by them. 
Similarly, but from the other side, he notes that: 
From the very first we recognised the presence of a sadistic 
component in the sexual instinct. As we know, it can make itself 
independent and can, in the form of a perversion, dominate an 
individual's entire sexual activity. It also emerges as a 
predominant component instinct in one of the `pregenital 
organisations, ' as I have named them. But how can the sadistic 
instinct, whose aim it is to injure the object, be derived from 
Eros, the preserver of life? Is it not plausible to suppose that this 
sadism is in fact a death instinct which, under the influence of 
the narcissistic libido, has been forced away from the ego and 
has consequently only emerged in relation to the object? It now 
enters the service of the sexual function. [OM p. 327] 
Despite this intermixing of the life and death instincts Freud maintains that his 
`theory', or speculations in this matter remain thoroughly dualistic. In 
maintaining this he admits that a catch remains: 
The dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous 
life in general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to 
remove internal tension due to stimuli :.. -a tendency which 
finds expression in the Pleasure Principle; and our recognition 
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of that fact is one of our strongest reasons for believing in the 
existence of death instincts. 
But we still feel our line of thought appreciably hampered 
by the fact that we cannot ascribe to the sexual instinct the 
characteristic of a compulsion to repeat which first put us on the 
track of the death instincts. [OM p. 329] 
This is a problem for Freud insofar as he believes the sexual instinct provides 
a principle through which psychic activity can be explained. However, the 
existence of a death instinct cannot be explained from the perspective of the 
Pleasure Principle. 
This theoretical impasse results from the nature of Freud's speculation. 
For what Freud proposes here cannot be understood as simply a dialectical 
opposition. The beyond of the Pleasure Principle will always thwart any a 
dialectical harmonisation in the form of a third term. This is most easily 
understood in terms of his description of the opposition between life and 
death instincts. If the sexual instincts were not delayed in some way then the 
organism would certainly die. Similarly if the death instincts were 
experienced purely - the desire to return to an earlier state of being, then the 
organism would just as surely die. The condition of instinctual life would thus 
be the deferral of the satisfaction of the instincts. Thus we have as this 
condition, on the one hand, the deferral of the sexual instincts, articulated by 
the Pleasure Principle, and on the other hand, the deferral of the repetition 
compulsion, or death instincts. Derrida argues that: 
Pure Pleasure and pure reality are ideal limits, which is as much 
to say fictions. The one is as destructive and mortal as the other. 
Between the two the dferant detour therefore forms the very 
actuality of the process, of the "psychic", process as a "living" 
process. Such an "actuality, then, is never present or given .. 
. Therefore one cannot speak of effective actuality, of Wirklichkeit, if at least, - and in the extent to which, it is 
coordinated with the value of presence. [PSF p. 284] 
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The description of the psyche in terms of this "dualism" of life and death 
instincts creates conceptual problems. For, if the function of psychic activity 
is explained by the play of deferral of these instincts, then this explanation 
cannot present the functioning of the psyche in full. The Pleasure Principle, 
understood as the organising principle of the psyche, can never be the sole 
principle of psychic activity, but neither can the compulsion to repeat, 
understood in terms of the Reality Principle, explain or describe it in full. 
Since both are conceived of only in terms of their mutual opposition and 
mutual deferral neither can we conceive of a third term within which their 
relationship could be presented. The description and explanation of the 
psyche in terms of a death instinct such as the Reality Principle, cannot be 
translated or made meaningful in terms of the Pleasure Principle, and vice 
versa. To do so would mean to articulate and make present the differential 
relation which separates these two principles. Since this would only be 
possible in terms of either the Pleasure Principle or the Reality Principle, such 
an articulation - the thesis as to what this difference really is - is structurally 
impossible. Derrida traces such a differential relation with the term d fferance 
because such a term defies its full presentation, and makes it clear that the 
accepted understanding of presence is itself uncertain, and thus cannot 
legitimately be used to define this relation. 
The "hypothesis" with which I read this text and several others 
would go in the direction of disengaging that which is engaged 
here between the first principle 
, 
and that which appears as its 
other, to wit, the reality principle as its other, the death drive as 
its other: a structure of alteration, without Y, opposition. That 
which seems, then, to make the belonging -a belonging without 
interiority - of death to pleasure more continuous, more 
immanent, and more natural too, also makes it more scandalous 
as concerns a dialectics or a logic of `opposition, of position, or 
of thesis. There is no thesis of this d fferance. The thesis would 
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be the death sentence (arret de mort) of differance. [PSF p. 285] 
Thus, the compulsion to repeat renders the Pleasure Principle meaningless, 
because it must come before the Pleasure Principle, and vice versa. Each is 
haunted by the other, as the possibility of the other's death. 
27. The Abyss of the Unconscious 
One might argue that this collapse could be explained by Freud's analysis of 
the unconscious as resistant to conscious representation. Unconscious ideas 
are representations which are active, but never present to consciousness. 
Conscious ideas, on the other hand, are defined by Freud as those which are 
present to consciousness. If we are to explain the functioning of the psyche - 
how the unconscious produces consciousness, and how consciousness acts 
upon the unconscious - then we must describe unconscious activity. 
Unconscious psychic activity is not, however, something which can be simply 
presented in the same way that we represent the activities of our digestive 
processes. " The realm of consciousness is designated by Freud in terms of 
Presence, a presence which unconscious activity serves to produce. This 
raises the question whether the unconscious activity of the psyche can be 
presented and explained in terms of a governing principle such as the 
51 Cf. Georg Groddeck Sigmund Freud: Briefwechsel, where Freud writes "Denn das 
Unbewußtsein ist doch nur etwas Phänomenales, ein Kennzeichen in Ermanglung einer 
besseren Bekanntschaft, wie wenn ich sagen würde:. der Herr im Havelock, dessen Gesicht 
ich nicht deutlich sehen kann. Was mache ich, wenn er einmal ohne dieses Kleidungsstück 
auftritt? " [p. 52-53] - "The unconsciousness is really only something phenomenal, a 
characteristic for lack of better acquaintance, just as I would say: the man from Havelock 
whose face I can't clearly see. What should I do if he once turns up without this 
garment? " [My translation]. Properly speaking the unconscious is a provisional aid in 
describing and explaining psychic processes. The problem in explaining these processes, 
however, is not simply that the unconscious is not an entity which could then be described. 
It is rather that the processes that it designates are conceived of as partly producing 
conscious ideas through which these processes would then be described and presented. 
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Pleasure Principle. One could never be certain whether such a principle 
described and explained unconscious activity "itself' or the effects of such 
activity, of which it would also be a product. The explanation of unconscious 
activity would always indicate a beyond which it could not appropriate, could 
not present, and could not explain. Thus, in the dichotomy of the life and 
death instincts, the play between the two principles always designates a space 
beyond their opposition, beyond our conceptions of "life" and "death. " This 
beyond renders the validity of their explanation of psychic activity uncertain, 
and yet it is only through the opposition and play of these two principles that 
we can trace this beyond - perhaps the mark of unconscious activity "itself. " 
This theoretical uncertainty, says Freud, is generated by: 
our being obliged to operate with the scientific terms, that is to 
say with the figurative language, peculiar to psychology (or, 
more precisely, to depth psychology). We could not otherwise 
describe the processes at all, and indeed we could not have 
become aware of them. [OM p. 334] 
At the extremity of this speculation, and in accordance with this uncertainty, 
Freud `locates' the origin of the sexual instincts beyond scientific rationale, 
in a hypothesis 
of so fantastic a kind -a myth rather than a scientific 
explanation - that I should not venture to produce it here, were 
it not that it fulfils precisely the one condition whose fulfilment 
we desire. For it traces the origin of an instinct to a need to 
restore an earlier state of things. [OM p. 331] 
The myth concerns the origin of love between the sexes as described by Plato 
in the Symposium. Aristophanes, Socrates's prime protagonist, recounts the 
myth: 
Everything about these primaeval men was double: 'they had 
four hands and four feet, two faces, two privy parts, and so on. 
Eventually Zeus decided to cut these men in two, `like a sorb- 
apple which is halved for pickling'. * After' the division had been 
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made, `the two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came 
together, and threw their arms about one another eager to grow 
into one'. [OM p. 33 1] 
From this it might appear that the principles of psychoanalysis are located in 
an original living unity which was rent asunder, and, struggling against the 
obstacles which nature puts forward, through various diversions, seeks to 
return to its original state. Such an origin would restore the theoretical 
primacy of the Pleasure Principle, rendering the death instinct a secondary 
phenomenon of this original desire. Freud, however, here breaks off in his 
speculations, and leaves the truth suspended in the midst of the myth. Derrida 
holds that this suspension is not simply fortuitous. 
He points out that this myth is not just any old myth, nor is the 
Symposium irrelevant to Freud's subject matter - Eros. Neither is 
Aristophanes simply another protagonist for Plato, whom he held at least 
partly responsible for Socrates's death. And yet Freud never even bothers to 
name the prime figure in this discourse, Socrates. Derrida argues that such 
omissions are hardly accidental: 
Freud omits the scene of the text, including the placing in abime 
of the memories of lacunae ... . In this great omission he 
forgets 
Socrates. He leaves Plato alone with Aristophanes, he leaves it 
to Plato to leave it to Aristophanes to develop the theory .... To 
omit Socrates when one writes, is not to omit just anything or 
anyone, especially when one is writing about Plato. Especially 
when one is writing about a dialogue of Plato's in which 
Socrates, a Socrates and the Socrates, is not a simple 
supernumerary.... If Freud in his turn erases Socrates, which 
only accentuates his profile in what remains here of the 
Symposium, is this in order to pay homage to Plato for an 
acknowledgement of debt? ... No, on the contrary. It is in order 
to take the origin away from Plato, and to make him, already, an 
heir. Not of Socrates, who is too close and too proper to him. 
But of someone much further away. It would be to exaggerate - 
a bit - to read this passage as a destitution of Plato. It would be 
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to exaggerate, a bit, to say that Freud is vehemently determined 
to secondarize, to minimize, to devalue, but in the end he does 
insist a great deal on the fact that Plato has invented nothing, 
that his lack of originality is indeed the sign of the truth of what 
he says, that he had to inherit an entire tradition, etc. [PSF 
p. 374] 
As Derrida earlier says, Freud's speculations on the origins of the psyche, 
cast the idea of an origin itself in the form of a speculation which suspends 
the truth of this idea. Freud disturbs the Platonic idea of both ori gin and truth, 
breaking down the oppositional structure which would separate mimetic 
forms, such as myths, stories and fictions, from their "true origins. " 
The Platonic Determination of Mimesis 
Plato creates this distinction in order to be able to determine, appropriate and 
control those structures of representation, which might otherwise threaten his 
theory of forms with dissemblance. Plato must at all costs maintain that the 
true nature of things lies in their idea, and not in their representation. If he 
does not then he cannot maintain that it is the philosopher, rather than the 
artist or poet, who understands what is right and true because he busies 
himself with ideas. He therefore characterises the artist or poet as secondary 
to the philosopher through the reflection and determination of the work of the 
artist - mimesis - as reproductive representation which copies an original 
exemplar, rather than representing, the . original itself, as the philosopher 
supposedly does. 
What is meant by character? A powerful elucidation of this term has 
been given by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe; in his essay "Typography. ')')52 The 
52 Lacoue-Labarthe, P., "Typography, " in: Typography: imeci , 
Philosophy. Politics. 
Referred to as TYP. 'ýý 
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argument, briefly, is as follows: In the Re ublic53 Plato determines mimesis 
as imitation. Imitation is always a secondary, inferior copy of an originary 
exemplarity. Therefore art, as an imperfect copy of reality, has no place in the 
perfection of the just Polis - it is improper. As improper, however, mimesis 
necessarily returns to trouble the philosopher's city state since it can only be 
ejected by a mimetic ruse. That is, it is represented by philosophy as properly 
improper, but this representation is itself then improper. Thus philosophical 
representation itself is always contaminated by the improper. 
Several consequences arise from this. Firstly, the Greek notion of truth, 
aletheia (unconcealment) is threatened by a displacement in that presentation 
would always already be inflected by a representation. 
Mimesis, as Plato experiences it (but not necessarily thinks it, 
even when he `theorises' about it), requires the supposition that 
something governs or precedes aletheia itself, or more 
precisely, de-stabilises aletheia - something that is not 
unrelated, strange as it may seem, to that determination of truth 
that Heidegger always endeavoured to consider as secondary 
and derived (the determination of truth as homoiosis, as 
adequation, similitude, or resemblance), but that would in its 
turn be displaced, in any case removed from the horizon of 
accuracy and of exactitude (of e-vidence), never being 
rigorously where one expects to see it or precisely what one 
wants to know. [TYP p. 121 ] 
In order to guard against this destabilisation of the truth Plato resorts to the 
above mimetic ruse, but in doing so, necessarily produces the figure (or form) 
as a representative or incarnation of that which is to be excluded from the 
state, in this case the poet: 
given that the operation in question gets underway, in Plato, 
with the choice of the poet as, the privileged figure of mimetism 
in general, it allows us to understand ... that the determination 
53 Plato, The Republic. Referred to as REP. ' 
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of a scapegoat, the selection of a representative of mimesis, is 
strictly inevitable from the moment when an act of expulsion 
(differentiation and rejection) is involved and what is to be 
expelled - because it is nothing other than mimetic 
representation `itself, ' that is, mimesis as the unassignable 
danger that representation might be primal, or, what amounts to 
the same thing, the danger of an originary absence of subjective 
`property' or `propriety' - can only be the externalised, scenic 
spectacular mimesis. For it is quite necessary, in the rejection of 
the `bearer of mimesis, ' that the victim incarnate in one way or 
another this impropriety, this lack of being proper necessarily 
supposed, as Plato knows very well, by the mimetic fact. [TYP 
p. 115] 
For Lacoue-Labarthe this decision is an "onto-ideo-logical reduction" (TYP 
p. 95) of mimesis by philosophy, which, in demarcating the figure of mimesis, 
and thus the figure in general, creates the figure of an author-subject who 
carries out the work of mimesis. The authority assigned to the figure of the 
subject is produced through the subjection of "mimesis"in its determinative 
representation as being only a work of imitation. 
But if the subjection of mimesis produces the subject, then this subject 
is always already typecast - the imitation of a character who always imitates. 
Philosophy cannot finally arrest its inherent instability, even through the 
earliest, most rigorous education, as Plato would attempt, because this 
education would already be typographical, a repetition and aggravation of the 
`mimetic' exclusion. And if character is an (anti)-mimetic production, in 
which, and through which, mimesis ; "confirms, even as it unsettles, 
typography, ... 
between ethos and tupos", (TYP. p. 128) it brings into play 
desire. This desire would be essentially doubled, on the one hand the desire 
of the subject (represented by the philosopher as essentially decidable, that 
is, imprintable - malleable, but firm enough to bear the stamp of the "dike, the 
ontologico-political law par excellence"(TYP, p. 129)), and on the other hand, 
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the desire of the philosopher ruler, which will be represented as the Law of 
the Polis. 
Thus, in The Republic, the book's penultimate chapter consists of a 
rejection of mimesis as that which leads away from the truth: 
The dramatic poet produces a similarly bad state of affairs in the 
mind [psuche - character/mind] of the individual, by 
encouraging the unreasoning part of it, which cannot distinguish 
greater and less but the thinks the same things are now large and 
now small, and by creating images far removed from the truth. 
[REP p. 435] 
This argument, however, functions for Plato as a charm whose recitation 
wards of the evils of the charms presented by the poet or the painter (cf. REP 
p. 439). For Lacoue-Labarthe, this charm [pharmakon] appears to be situated 
at the level of theorisation, through which the type of character which would 
make up an artist (particularly the `bad' dissimulating type of artist) can be 
thrown out of the city state. This, it would seem, is not immediately an easy 
thing to do, since if the mimetician is the dissembler par excellence, it still 
remains to identify and catch him. Plato, with all his cunning, catches him in 
the mirror. The analogy of the artist as mirror carrier - his `work' being 
produced through the reflection of the mirror - significantly reduces the artist 
through the displacement of the abyssal structure of mimesis in terms of the 
reflecting subject and no longer in terms of mimetician `himself. 
But the abyssal structure erected by Plato is quite simply false. For 
Plato has installed the mimetician within the mirror - has represented him, but 
unfairly. Instead of the question , 
"who is the mimetician? " we have the 
question "what is mimesis? " The mimetician is caught in the reflection of the 
mirror and is essentially reduced within a theoretical reflection of reflection. 
With this trick of the mirror we see the-- paradigm, , of a whole discourse 
revolving around theory and theorisation, which in the same movement traps 
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the mimetician in the reflective glance, whilst removing from him all authority 
over mimesis. Mimesis is theoretically represented as being nothing other 
than a mirror -a tool through which one can imitate or represent things. These 
imitations, since they can mislead, are always of the order of a lie or a 
falsehood - artistic fiction is thus always perceived in terms of a lie. The artist 
or painter is theoretically reflected as the one who simply carries this mirror. 
Implicitly Plato argues that since we can all do that, his activities are not 
simply of no merit, but felicitous, since the artist, at least in Plato's eyes, 
claims that he himself has produced these imitations. Mimesis is 
(mis)appropriated by and through this theorisation, forcefully defined as 
imitation. Under the gaze of the mirror of theoretical reflection the type(s) of 
character(s) who are mimetic are defined as fictioneers, or in less polite 
terms, liars. This is where the he, in its opposition to truth as presentation, 
comes in. But the whole manoeuvre is itself a trick of the mirror -a fiction. 
Through it Plato surreptitiously undermines the laws he espouses. 
The consequences, says Lacoue-Labarthe, are far reaching. What is 
caught (holding the mirror) in the mirror (but as a fiction) is the reflecting 
subject produced as subjected, or determined, by theorisation. And it is 
subjected precisely to quell (or expel, -or even assassinate) that in the subject 
which would undermine the propriety of the law of identification: 
Because of this it is perhaps not abusive to suggest that the 
victim is always, whatever his status, a mimos. That is, in effect, 
anyone at all, by a `just anyone' who signals himself ... as `such, ' who exhibits `his' non-identity, who brings along `his' 
history (Oedipus) or `his' function (the king), in `his' ethos (the 
fool) or `his' trade (the actor, - the artist), the' dreaded evidence 
of the primal status and undivided rule of mimetic confusion. 
The victim is not arbitrary : , The , choice of a representative of 
mimesis - of a `better qualified' representative of mimesis, a 
`specialist' - always bears in the fact on the one who shows 
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himself (i. e. shows `himself) as being at once everything - and 
nothing. The pharmakos, individual or collective, is always a 
monster (it is well known that every society maintains or creates 
such monsters). [TYP p. 116]" 
This movement of mimetic expulsion further requires Plato to install an onto- 
ideo-typo-logy through the imposition of a dichotomy between 
truth/falsehood or, more precisely, a dichotomy between good/bad fiction, 
given that his own theoretical schema is a fiction, and as such, is constituted 
on the basis of a lie. If this seems implausible, Lacoue-Labarthe points out 
that there is always a decision in Plato regarding the status of myth or fiction, 
whether it is good or bad, especially in terms of the education of the citizens 
of the Polis. 
Why, in reality, and on what conditions, can we say that myths 
lie? where, exactly, does their power come from? How is it that 
they (re)present an image of man so little appropriate and that 
the lessons they teach are only, so to speak, `lessons of 
depropriation? ' Upon what, finally, can the ethical 
condemnation of myths be founded? And why defend the truth? 
These questions are all the more pressing in that the lie, in itself, 
is not strictly condemned. It is judged at any rate inevitable - 
politically inevitable - when, for example, it is a matter of the 
`interest of the state, ' of safeguarding what has been installed, 
of truth in its proper sense. In other words, these questions are 
all the more pressing in that the he is a pharmakon that must be 
handled delicately ... and something whose usage - that 
is to 
say, whose conversion into a political remedy - requires that one 
know what to abide by; it is a pharmakon, if you will, which 
54 Also cf: '7o this list one might add, by way of example, thinking of a famous passage 
from The Gay Science (Aphorism 361), `the' Jew and `the' woman: in short everyone 
(and history has ceaselessly confirmed this in a terrifying way) of whom `one' 
, 
can say that 
they do not have visibly - do not manifest - any property, that they always offer 
themselves as (something they `are' not). Thus all of those, as well, to whom `one' denies, 
in the very name of proprietary defensiveness, the right to property. As we know, an 
entire economy of fear (and consequently of stupidity) is at play here. " [TYP p. 116, fn. 
117] 
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can be manipulated only if we have already decided its case. 
[TYP 132] 
Mimesis, then, returns, but this time in state service through its 
circumscription in theory. But this circumscription is, in reality, a conscription 
through which the subject is produced as subjected, that is, inscribed within 
the laws of the city state. However, the very undecidability of mimesis always 
produces a delay with respect to this conscription, and as such, complicates 
everything. That is to say, the figure engendered by the characterisation of the 
mimetician, which is achieved through the trick of the mirror, from the 
standpoint of which mimesis (not the mimetician) is decided upon as imitation 
-a fall or degradation of the real - this figure is mimetically constituted, and 
repeats the abyssal structure in itself. The figure through which subjective 
property might be decided upon remains undecideable. If the subject is to be 
(and can only be) decided upon with respect to this figure, it will always 
exceed or escape this determination, which in turn only serves to redouble the 
attempt of determination, through the failure of the installation of the figure 
or, in other words, the failure of the installation of a paradigm (that of the 
mirror - theoretical reflection). 
One can argue that Freud speculates on the failure of just such a 
paradigm to explain the nature of psychical activity. The nature of Freud's 
speculations indicates that his object, - the psyche -, cannot be explained in 
terms of the Platonic determination of "truth" and "origin" because these are 
constituted by (unconscious) structures which by definition lie beyond the 
scope of these concepts. When we attempt to describe these structures in 
terms of these concepts we are lured into a mode of speculation which 
undermines the very idea of a determinate object or structure which can be 
presented as such. 
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The catch which Freud discerned in the compulsion to repeat is thus 
displaced as the figure of truth caught within the net of mythology, but 
without any reference through which this myth can be discerned as truly 
mythological. In truth, the origin and the site of the compulsion to repeat 
would be mythological - which is, at least according to Plato, a mimetic 
structure, and therefore not true. Derrida therefore argues that what is at stake 
for Freud is undoing the Platonic idea of truth. 
In other words: the movement and lure of the instincts. On the one 
hand there is the movement of desire itself - self-preservation in terms of 
immediate satisfaction of desire, in terms of the Pleasure Principle. But if this 
is achieved without check then the organism achieves the lowest possible 
energy level - its death. On the other hand there are the death instincts, which, 
in terms of the compulsion, to repeat, seek to return to an earlier state of 
things. But again, without the vacillation introduced by the life instincts this 
leads the organism to its death. The lure of the truth in either instinct, where 
the instinct is understood as the true determining principle of the organism, 
as an absolute rule and condition of its life, culminates abruptly in non- 
inscription - in death. 
If this effect and movement of the unconscious within consciousness 
occurs at the level suggested here, at the level of truth, fiction and 
conceptualisation, then we should be able to see its play and its consequences 
in the `confrontation' between Derrida and Lacan. This is because both texts 
offer an interpretation of the compulsion to repeat which poses the question 
of truth in psychoanalysis in its relation to the structures of the subjectivity 
which it must analyse, and to fiction: 
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Part II: The Subject of Confrontation 
The principle of the vis inertiae, 
for example, seems to be identical 
in physics and metaphysics. It is 
not more true in the former, that a 
large body is with more difficulty 
set in motion than a smaller one, 
and that its subsequent momentum 
is commensurate with this 
difficulty, than it is in the latter, 
that intellects of vaster capacity, 
while more forcible, more constant, 
and more eventful in their 
movements than those of inferior 
grade, are yet the less readily 
moved. - The Purloined Letter. 
[PP p. 20] 
Anyone who is acquainted with the sheer complexity, especially at the level 
of presentation and style, of the work of both Lacan and Derrida, might well 
be dismayed at the confrontation enacted in Derrida's attack on Lacan's work 
in "Le Facteur de la Verite". In his reading of Lacan's "Seminar on `The 
Purloined Letter, "' Derrida accuses Lacan of violently framing the text of 
"The Purloined Letter" in order to produce the psychoanalytic meaning and 
truth that Lacan wishes to see validated. This accusation, however, seems to 
miss a certain element of the refusal of truth which is evident in Lacan's style 
and procedure. It appears that in this confrontation it is Derrida who frames 
Lacan framing the "The Purloined Letter". 
However, before looking at Derrida's characterisation and criticism of 
Lacan's Seminar, it is worthwhile examining the overall orientation of his 
critique. 
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28. Derrida's Critique of Lacan 
Derrida's work on the dissemination of the classical logocentric and 
phallocentric conceptual apparatus of metaphysics maintains a subtle 
connection with psychoanalysis through the concept of castration. Castration 
is the force and threat of the phallus, of the father, which directs the child's 
sexual desire to its proper object. However, the logic of castration exceeds 
the law and direction of the phallus, disseminating the logic of identity which 
constitutes, and is supported by, the law of the phallus. For Derrida 
dissemination is this disruption of the symbolic order of the father and 
phallus. In Positions he says: 
In effect, in these analyses [in Dissemination] the concept of 
castration is indissociable from that of dissemination. But 
dissemination situates the more or less that indefinitely resists - 
and equally situates that which resists against - the effect of 
subjectivity, of subjectivation, of appropriation ... What Lacan 
calls ... the order of the "symbolic" Escapes 
it and disorganizes 
it, makes it drift, marks its writing, with all the implied risks, but 
without letting itself be conceived in the categories of the 
"imaginary" or "real, " I have never been convinced of the 
necessity of this conceptual tripartition. ... [Dissemination] 
is 
also the possibility of deconstructing ... of unsewing ... the 
symbolic order in its general structure and in its modifications, 
in the general and determined forms of sociality, the "family" or 
culture. [PS pp. 83-85] 
The logic of the relation between castration and dissemination can be outlined 
as follows: The cut of castration determines the sexuality of the child either 
in terms of the dominant force of the phallus whose rule is enforced through 
the threat of castration, or in terms of the castrated woman who is already 
subordinated to the law of the phallus in that she lacks precisely this force. 
This is the logic of the so-called Oedipal structure. 
However, this firstly presumes a matrix of inscription beyond the 
.t... 
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simple duality of masculine and feminine upon which the threat of the cut 
operates. The threat of castration seeks to bring this multiplicity under the 
control of its law in the dual determination of sexuality, a law which would 
always be threatened by that which resists identification, being neither purely 
male nor female. It is also worth noting that such states of `fluidity' are also 
beyond the scope of psychoanalysis - such as schizophrenia and psychotic 7 
states where the processes of identification are impaired, rather than neurosis. 
What interests Derrida is that the logic of castration threatens the law 
of the phallus, which can only erect itself through the force of a violent 
repression of this multiplicity, whilst the conditions of this force - the 
multiplicity `itself - remain beyond its control. The cut threatened by the 
phallus is only able to threaten the phallus and those structures which come 
under its law. This threat of castration can thus only operate after the sexual 
determination in which the law and threat of the phallus is already recognised. 
Sexual identity in these terms is thus based upon a fallacy and is 
riddled through and through with the possibility of doubling and quadrupling. 
The law of the phallus is supported precisely by this identification structure 
in which the possibility of doubling and dissimulation is always present, and 
as such it can never be the law of determination. When represented as fully 
present it therefore acts in terms of a repression of this duplicity. However, 
the agency of this repression is itself double edged, and thus threatens the law 
of the Phallus itself with dissemination. 
What occurs here is a mimetic act whose inherent dissembling effects 
are severely controlled through a delineation and determination of mimesis 
itself, according to the traditional categories of rationality, as a limited field 
of representation generally given the heading `art, ' `literature, ' or fiction in 
general. The law of the phallus acts as if its law were singularly significant, 
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and its agency singularly real. In order to do so it must control the doubling 
effects of this mimetic act in particular, and mimesis in general. It must 
therefore determine mimesis as purely and simply reproductive representation 
and then effect a scission between `proper' and `improper' representation 
according to its own law of repression. It represents what mimesis is, and 
holds that this representation is more proper, and more true than the 
representation offered by "mimesis. " Whatever is then designated as mimetic 
is framed within the matrix and truth of the law of the phallus. This division, 
however, can never operate to full effect, since this determination of mimesis 
is itself a mimetic act, and, in the logic of this repression, must itself be 
`improper' or illegitimate. Mimesis "itself' thus, by definition, remains 
fundamentally uncontrollable. Thus Derrida says: 
What is at stake, what is in question, is a certain turn of writing 
which in effect is often indicated under the heading of 
"literature" or "art, " but which can be defined only from the 
vantage point of a general deconstruction which resists against 
(or against which resists) not psychoanalysis in general (on the 
contrary), but a certain capacity, a certain determined pertinence 
of psychoanalytic concepts that can' be measured here, at a 
certain stage of their development. From this point of view, 
certain "literary" texts have an "analytic" and deconstructive 
capacity greater than certain psychoanalytic discourses which 
apply their theoretical apparatus to these texts, or "apply" a 
given state of their theoretical apparatus, with its openings, but 
also with its presuppositions, at "a given moment of its 
elaboration. Such would be the relation between the theoretical 
apparatus supporting the "Seminar on `The Purloined Letter, "' 
Poe's text, and doubtless several others. [PS pp. 112-113] 
Thus Derrida locates his confrontation with Lacan in the context of the 
dissemination of a phallologocentrism which plays a dominant role in cert ain 
psychoanalytic discourses. 
This is not, however, a charge simply against Lacan. Rather it is 
235 
directed against a certain conceptual context of psychoanalysis which can be 
placed under the general term "analysis", particularly applied analysis. 
 This structure, as we have seen, marks the space of an undermining of 
its phallogocentric determination, as much as it resists it. The scene of 
psychoanalysis in general overflows its own phallogocentric structure, but at 
certain points this structure remains dominant and resists its dispersion with 
a repressive interpretative violence. Derrida notes that at these loci Lacan's 
discourse displays a remarkable evasion, centring around certain difficulties 
and questions which might disorganise this dominant role of phallogocentric 
analysis. 
These evasions nonetheless remain in Lacan's discourse, and in 
relation to what they avoid they cannot simply be accidental. Their crux, and 
the crux of the questions covered over, is the possibility of the psychoanalytic 
scene of confrontation - the point of face to face analysis between analyst and 
analysand. What, according to Derrida, is being evaded, suspended, placed 
under control, is this confrontation itself, with its implicit assumption and 
assurance of the identity of analyst and analysand, the analyst being the 
dominant and guiding figure in this opposition. It is this strict delineation 
which is subject to a duplicitous disorganisation. 
The question implicitly pushed forward by Derrida is whether this 
confrontation ever happens? Or does the analyst simply project the tools of 
his trade and construct the representation of the patient, in other words, his 
subject? The question raised here is how does Derrida analyse this closure of 
the analytic scene itself, how does he confront Lacan? 
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29. The Confrontation 
Derrida's discourse ostensibly presents itself as a critical analysis of Lacan's 
interpretation of Poe's "The Purloined Letter. " However, its criticisms are 
directed at the status of truth and fiction (mimesis) in analytic discourse. Thus 
he says that the economy of truth in the Seminar is such that: 
In truth, the truth inhabits fiction as the master of the house, as 
the law of the house, as the economy of fiction. The truth 
executes the economy of fiction, directs, organizes, and makes 
possible fiction: "It is that truth, let us note, which makes the 
very existence of truth possible. " 
The issue then is to ground fiction in truth, to guarantee 
fiction its conditions of possibility in truth, and to do so without 
even indicating, as does Das Unheimliche, literary fiction's 
eternally renewed resistance to the general law of 
psychoanalytic knowledge. [PSF p. 426] 
Derrida's general critique is that Lacan decides upon the true nature of the 
object of his analysis, in this case Poe's literary text, before he has even 
justified this decision. Lacan firstly designates Poe's story a fiction, without 
even asking what really comprises fiction, and then proceeds to demonstrate 
how this fiction illustrates the truth of (his) psychoanalytic explanation of 
subjective intentions and roles. Derrida's objection to this is that Lacan 
reduces his object of analysis to the interpretational matrix which he uses to 
analyse it. In this manner Lacan cannot fail to demonstrate the "truth" of his 
explanation of the characters' actions in the story, because his analysis only 
conforms to its truth. The thrust of Derrida's objection to this sees what ý 
procedure is threefold. 
I 
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The Fiction Of the Psychoanalytic Frame 
The first limit [of the analysis] contains the entire Seminar, and 
it reprints its marks indefinitely on it: what the literary example 
yields is a message. Which will have to be deciphered on the 
basis of Freud's teaching. [PSF p. 427] 
Derrida holds that this singular meaning is produced by Lacan's reduction of 
the fiction of "The Purloined Letter" by placing it under the classical 
tripartite frame of psychoanalytic discourse - the Oedipal triangle, or, in 
Lacanian terms, the symbolic, the real, and the imaginary. It is within this 
frame and limit that the psychoanalytic interpretation of the story's meaning 
or message is true; and the true message of the story will be found to accord 
with its reference to the psychoanalytic frame: 
Without ever saying a word about it, Lacan excludes the textual 
fiction from within which he has extracted the so-called general 
narration. An operation made that much easier, and all too self- 
evidently easier, by the fact that the narration does not surpass 
by a word the fiction that is entitled "The Purloined Letter". But 
that is the fiction. There is an invisible, but structurally 
irreducible, frame around the narration. [PSF p. 431 ]. 
According to Lacan this meaning is the movement of the letter in the story - 
its misappropriation and reappropriation to its proper place, the true and 
proper trajectory of which is authentically understood from the position of the 
analyst - Dupin. Lacan interprets the movement of the letter as the circular 
movement of a pure signifier. He equates this movement of the pure signifier 
as the unconscious movement within the story, the, necessary trajectory of 
which produces the subjective roles of the characters according to the, law of 
castration. It is the letter's lack ofa determinable location which determines 
its trajectory, and this trajectory determines the characters' subjective roles. 
Within this trajectory, however, the letter, or pure 'signifier,, has' a` proper 
destination, which the subjective position of the analyst is able to determine. 
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Thus Derrida will later say: 
This determination of the proper, of the law of the proper, of 
economy, therefore leads back to castration as, truth, to the 
figure of woman as the figure of castration and of truth, to 
castration as truth. Which above all does not mean, as one might 
tend to believe, to truth as essential dislocation and irreducible 
fragmentation. Castration-truth, on the contrary, is that which 
contracts itself (stricture of the ring) in order to bring the 
phallus, the signifier, the letter, or the fetish back into their 
oikos, their familial dwelling, their proper place. [PSF p. 441] 
The Reductive Effect of the Frame 
Since the psychoanalytic frame serves to translate its object of analysis into 
its own terms, by means of a violent reduction of its scope, the truth which 
it identifies is of course its own truth, organised by the referential structure 
of the frame. This translation and reduction serve to exclude those terms 
which remain untranslatable by the scope of its language. In this case, argues 
Derrida, the narrating function of the narrator is `neutralised' by the frame as 
not being effective in the determination of the subjectivity of the characters - 
i. e. it is a purely transparent medium which has no effect. This exclusion is 
the hermeneutic moment of the analysis in which fiction is related, and 
brought back to, its true meaning: 
There is here, first of all, a formal limit of the, analysis. The, 
formal structure of the text is overlooked .... The structure of fiction is reduced at the very Moment when it is related to its 
condition of truth. This, leads to ; poor 
formalism. 
... This formalism is rigidly illogical once, on the pretext of excluding 
the author, one no ý longer takes, ' into account either the 
"scription-fiction" and the "scriptor-fictor, " or the narrating 
narration and the narrator. This formalism guarantees, as 
always, the surreptitious extraction of a semantic content within 
which psychoanalysis applies, its entire interpretive,, work. 
Formalism and hermeneutic semanticism always support one 
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another: question of the frame. [PSF p. 432] 
Within this psychoanalytic frame the structure of the story is reduced to two 
`triangular' scenes where the letter is stolen, first from the Queen by the 
minister, and then from the minister by Dupin. This triangulation omits 
several narrated passages which locate the story in a wider field of reference: 
By framing [the narrator] in this violent way, by cutting the 
narrated figure itself from a fourth side in order to see only, 
triangles, one evades perhaps a certain complication, perhaps of 
the Oedipal structure, which is announced in the scene of 
writing. [PSF p. 433] 
It is, according to Derrida, in terms of this double triangulation that Lacan 
reads Poe's story. The letter, which, for Lacan, signifies nothing in itself and 
is thus a pure signifier, determines the meaning and actions of the characters 
into whose possession it falls, whilst itself lacking any determinate meaning. 
Thus for Lacan the meaning or message of Poe's story is restricted to the 
double theft and movement of the letter, and the analyst - Dupin, who can 
detect its true movement and place. 
Derrida holds that it is only through isolating these two scenes from the 
rest of the narrative structure that Lacan is able to interpret the true message 
of the story as the determination of the subjective and intersubjective roles 
which the characters play by the movement of the letter. Lacan posits these 
roles in terms of a triadic structure which is contained within the analytic look 
which each successive subjective position is capable of in relation to the 
letter. Thus there is the position of the, person who sees nothing; the position 
of the person who sees the first seeing nothing, but maintains the illusion that 
nothing is seen; and the final position of the person who sees the position of 
the other two and is able to take the letter. The first position is occupied 
respectively by the King and the police -. the upholders of the law; the second 
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is occupied respectively by the Queen and the minister; whilst the last is 
occupied by the minister and then Dupin - the master analyst who delivers the 
letter back to its proper place. 
This repetition, which Lacan understands in terms of the compulsion 
to repeat, is explained in the Seminar according to the trajectory of the letter 
itself. For Lacan the notion that the subjectivity of the characters lies beyond 
this determination is illusory, and thus their action as `free' and `independent' 
subjects is strictly determined as imaginary. 
The structure of their actions, however, reveals itself, to the eye of the 
analyst, as subject to the law of the symbolic order, the necessary order 
imposed by the movement of the signifier - the lack of meaning - in its 
production of meaning. The letter, as pure signifier, reveals the contours and 
movement of this order. In these terms the letter has no real or proper place, 
1 
but must, as a letter, have a proper itinerary and destination, from which it has 
been diverted, and to which, if the law which it both threatens and symbolises 
is to be upheld, it must be returned. The lack, which the letter is, must, at all 
costs, be returned to its proper destination, for it is on this basis that. the 
subject is properly constituted. 
It is this diversion of the signifier from its proper object which 
determines the characters in their repetitive uptake of the respective positions. 
Because the letter has no determinate meaning outside of its circulation, 
because the letter itself has no place which can be empirically verified, and 
because it symbolises the social pact between King and Queen the general 
social order - through its threat to that pact upon its diversion from its proper 
destination, every character touched by it is subject to its law of circulation. 
As soon as the Queen `hides'. the letter by, leaving it in the open, she is 
helpless before the action of the minister. Similarly, the minister, who 
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disguises the letter with his own feminine handwriting, is helpless before the 
eyes of Dupin - if he wishes to keep the letter `hidden' he must do precisely 
nothing, acting as if the letter means something else. And finally Dupin 
himself is rendered helpless at the end of the story, for if his designed revenge 
upon the minister is to be accomplished then he must also act as if nothing 
had occurred. From this Lacan points out that the planned downfall of the 
minister is in no way assured, and never can be because Dupin, in the 
position of letter bearer, is unable to effect anything without alerting the 
minister to the fact of the purloined letter. 
The letter is thus the true subject of the tale for Lacan. Its circulation 
constitutes the subjects' actions in an intersubjective triad which in turn 
guarantees the return of the letter, the pure signifier, to its proper site, its 
proper destination as a letter, as a signifier. At the same time this circulation 
guarantees its truth, its unveiling as the (veiled) truth and meaning of "The 
Purloined Letter" through the constitution of an authentic analytic position in 
which the proper site of this lack of the signified - the truth of this circulation 
and story - can be read. This is both in terms of the truth itself and, as Derrida 
pertinently says, in terms of the truth of the phallic law - castration. This is 
the third position in the triad, as occupied successively by. the minister, 
Dupin, and, lastly, Lacan, which determines who can successfully deliver, 
present, the message of the letter: 
This proper place [of the letter], known to'Dupin, and to the 
psychoanalyst, who in oscillating fashion ..., occupies Dupin's 
position, is the place of castration-* woman as the unveiled site 
of the lack of a penis, as the truth of the phallus, that is of 
castration. The truth of the, purloined letter is the truth, its 
meaning is meaning, its law'is the law, the'contract of truth with 
itself in the logos. Beneath this notion of the pact (and therefore 
of adequation), the notion of veiling/unveiling tunes the entire ý"ýýtf.. r. 
242 
Seminar to the Heideggerian discourse on truth. 
Veiling/unveiling here concerns a hole, a non-being: the truth of 
Being as non-being. [PSF p. 439] - 
Within this structure the delivery of the letter, the circulation of the signifier 
is always guaranteed, as is the indestructibility of its truth as not having 
meaning: 
In castration, the phallus is indivisible, and therefore 
indestructible, like the letter which takes its place. And this is 
why the motivated, never demonstrated presupposition of the 
materiality of the letter as indivisibility is indispensable for this 
restricted economy, this circulation of the proper. [PSF p. 441 ] 
The analyst, authentically verified in his subjective position as analyst, 
verifies the true trajectory of this circulation. It is he who successfully 
delivers the misdirected message, the lack (of signification), the message and 
law of the unconscious, to its proper place - the site of castration - in 
accordance with its law. 
This economy of truth, in which all terms are made to refer to a first 
and final transcendental term or paradigm, is therefore central to Lacan's 
analysis of Poe's text. Thus it is unsurprising that Derrida identifies in 
Lacan's argument the traditional conceptual structure in which every term 
which might disrupt this structure is idealised, interiorised and homogenised 
i ý 
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through the function of the frame. In Lacan's case the meaning of the story 
is contained in the movement of the letter, in which the letter always reaches 
its final, proper destination, never failing to deliver the determining message 
of the unconscious, lying beyond the possibility of division or destruction. 
The analysis itself thus can be authentically verified in reference back to this 
structure according to what Derrida terms a phallogocentric conceptual 
organisation in which every term is located by the frame as referring to the 
frame, and has a focal point from which this truth can be presented or said: 
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Both imports of the value of truth are represented in the 
Seminar, as we have seen. 1. Adequation, in the circular return 
and proper course, from the origin to the end, from the 
signifier's place of detachment to its place of reattachment ... . 2. Veiling-unveiling as the structure of the lack: castration, the 
proper site of the signifier, origin and destination of its letter, 
shows nothing in its veiling. Therefore, it veils itself in 
unveiling. But this operation of the truth has a proper place: its 
contours being [etant] the place of the lack of Being [manque 
a etre] on the basis of which the signifier detaches itself for its 
literal circuit. These two values of truth lean and support each 
other [s'etaient]. They are indissociable. They need speech or 
the phonetization of the letter as soon as the phallus has to be 
kept [garde], has to return to its point of departure, has not to be 
disseminated en route. [PSF pp. 463-464] 
Within this structure, the patient remains firmly fixed to the couch, the 
duplicitous possibilities of a mise en abIme between patient and analyst kept 
strictly under the control of the purveyor of this truth and law. 
The Truth of the Frame 
The final fold of Derrida's argument is to demonstrate, by rigorously 
following the logic of this framing and translation, that the'truth it produces 
and pronounces disrupts this frame according to the structures we have seen 
above. This truth is ceaselessly inscribed by'an element of fiction that it 
cannot contain or interiorise, and must always remain blind to. Thus, Derrida 
points out that if, as Lacan says, all the characters are determined, in 
rotational fashion, by the movement 'of the letter, ' in which each character 
successively occupies each subjective position, then both Dupin and the 
analyst (Lacan) are necessarily subject to a blind spot as soon as they pluck 
the letter - the signifier - from the place where they know it is to be found. As 
soon as Lacan holds onto the position of the all seeing, all saying analyst - 
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Dupin in his mastery of the drama - he enforces a distinction between the 
authentic and inauthentic analyst - the second and third positions in the 
intersubjective triad. This distinction, and the hierarchy which implicitly 
supports and facilitates it, serves as a repression of the inherent and necessary 
duplicity of the characters in the story, the story itself, and of the conceptual 
character of fiction, within which both are inscribed. This duplicity, or rather 
the inherent possibility of the formation of simulacra occurs "before" any 
determination of the characters' subjective identity under Lacan's analysis: 
The fancy of an identification between two doubled doubles, the 
major investment in a relationship which engages Dupin outside 
of the "intersubjective triads" of the "real drama" and the 
narrator "inside" what he narrates, the circulation of desires and 
capital, of signifiers and letters, before and beyond the "two 
triangles, " the "primal" and secondary ones, the consecutive 
fissioning of the positions, starting with the position of Lacan, 
who like all the characters, inside and outside the narration, 
successively occupies all the places - all of this makes of 
triangular logic a very limited play within the play. And 'if the 
dual relation between two doubles (which Lacan would reduce 
to the imaginary) includes and envelopes the entire space said 
to be of the symbolic, overflows and simulates it, ceaselessly 
ruining it and disorganising it, then the opposition of the 
imaginary and the symbolic, and above all its implicit hierarchy, 
appears to be of very limited pertinence: that is, if 'one measures 
it against the squaring of such a scene of writing. [PSF p. 490- 
492] 
Lacan's accounting of the letter, as the agency of the unconscious, thus 
serves to fix the subject in its proper place in accordance with the laws of the 
proper object of psychoanalysis - the unconscious. As has been said, every 
moment of disruption through the possible positing-of simulacra is_brought 
under control or neutralised. However, this possibility is the condition of I 
Lacan's conceptual system itself. The movement of the letter depends in the 
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first instance upon the possibility of its simulacrum. The minister must have 
another similar letter in his pocket before he is able to steal the "original. " 
Similarly, Dupin must be able to duplicate the form of the letter if his theft 
and revenge are to take effect. Similarly each character must be able to 
duplicate the. other. as condition of the letter's circulation, -rather-than as a 
consequence of it. This means, in effect, that the letter's circulation, as Lacan 
perceives it, is never assured, it might always go astray, or even get 
destroyed. It is precisely this possibility, argues Derrida, that forms the threat 
of the letter within the story - that it might never be found: 
Not that the letter never arrives at its destination, but that it 
belongs to the structure of the letter to be capable, always, of 
not arriving. And without this threat (breach of contract, 
division or multiplication, the separation without return from the 
phallus which was begun for a moment by the Queen, that is, by 
every "subject"), the circuit of the letter would not have even 
begun. But with this threat, the circuit can always not finish. 
Here dissemination threatens the -law of the signifier and of 
castration as the contract of the truth. It broaches, breaches 
[entamer] the unity of the signifier; that is, of the phallus. [PSF 
p. 444] 
If its return was assured, if it were indestructible and indivisible, as Lacan 
posits, there would be no point at which the letter would form a threat, would 
create anxiety, would motivate the actions of the characters. The letter would 
never have moved -a dead letter so to speak.. 
This pattern is repeated at the level of the story itself, entitled "The 
Purloined Letter. " It forms a part of a trilogy together with "The Murders of 
the Rue Morgue" and "The Mystery of Marie Roget", both of which it'refers 
to in a series of literary references, which;? according to Derrida, is omitted 
in Lacan's Seminar. If, as Lacan posits, the letter and its circulation is the 
meaning of "The Purloined Letter, " then how can this meaning account for 
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the intertwining threads between the three stories within the trilogy, and the 
references within this trilogy to literature "itself'? In other words, if, as Lacan 
asserts, the purloined letter is the true subject of "The Purloined Letter", and 
"The Purloined Letter" refers beyond itself, or inscribes itself within a net of 
literature (beginning with its reference to books and libraries, and ending in 
a quoted quote from Crebillon's Aree et Thyeste - which is also referred to 
in "The Murders in the Rue Morgue'- an ancient tale of betrayal via a stolen 
letter) then how can its meaning be confined simply to the singular letter 
(which was never singular in the first instance)? Thus Derrida says: 
The text entitled "The Purloined Letter" imprints (itself in) these 
effects of indirection. I have indicated only the most salient ones 
in order to begin to unlock a reading: the play of doubles, 
divisibility without end, textual references from fac-simile to 
fac-simile, the framing of the frames, the interminable 
supplementarity of the quotation marks .... The mise en abime 
of the title above all: "The Purloined Letter" is the_text, the-text 
in_a text .... The title-is a 
title, 
-of 
the text, it names the_text,, it 
names itself, and thus includes itself by pretending to name an 
object described in the text. "The Purloined Letter'-' operates as 
a text which evades every assignable destination, and produces, 
or rather induces by deducing itself, this unassignableness at the 
precise moment when it narrates the arrival of a letter. It feigns 
meaning to say something, and letting one think that "a letter, . always arrives . at its destination, " authentic, intact and 
undivided, at the moment when and in the place where the feint, 
written before the letter, by itself separates from itself. [PSF 
pp. 492-493] 
It is only through the perspective of the frame that Lacan is able to posit the 
"true meaning" of the story as the circulation, beginning to end, loss to return, 
" 't 
of the letter. He believes this to be the movement of the pure signifier, which 
is also the signified, of the story; which respectively determines the subjective 
positions and actions of the characters in the story. However, Ythis is also 'a 
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discourse upon the truth of psychoanalytic explanation and analysis as 
demonstrated in a story, and how it is possible that an analyst can 
authentically identify this truth in the analysis of his subject. This subject is 
brought severely under the control of the analyst's framework, in the 
psychoanalytic delineation of its truth. These are thus the stakes in question - 
the true scene of the subject itself - the subject under analysis, or the subject 
subjected through analysis: 
What thus finds itself controlled is Unheimlichkeit, and the 
anguishing disarray which can be provoked - without any hope 
of reappropriation, of closure, or of truth - by reference from 
simulacrum to simulacrum, from double to double. If one 
wished to make it the example of a law at any price, the Dupin 
trilogy ... exemplifies this uncontrollability, disrupting every 
verification of an identity. By neutralising the . 
double in the 
trilogy, the Seminar does everything necessary to avoid what 
"Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis" calls "uncontrollable anxiety. " 
The analysand's anxiety of course. [PSF p. 460-1] 
According to the general structure of the argument, what this deduction lacks 
is therefore precisely a frame of reference which it will not' find it since it has 
been framed out of the picture. For, if this is the `true message' of the story, 
then it will remain uncertain whether it is the analyst (Läcan in this case) who 
determines the truth of the text (a piece of fiction), or whether the text 
determines the analyst. This perpetual uncertainty disturbs the frame in terms 
of the triadic structure of the symbolic, the real, and the imaginary in which. 
Lacan/the analyst pronounces his truth upon his subject, because it 
continually and necessarily reintroduces the. text ' as lying beyond, or 
exceeding the meaning given to it by the analyst. The text to be analysed, the 
subject under analysis, thus always threatens the identification of its meaning 
by the analyst with rupture. The analyst's judgement, his subjective role, will 
thus always represent an illegitimate repression of the analysand, since it will 
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already be infected by its own concept of fictionality in its determination of 
the meaning of a certain fiction called the determinate subject. 
30. The Subject under Analysis 
Derrida's criticisms are an attempt to undermine the distinction between 
analyst and analysand. Derrida argues that there would be no final axis of 
reference for the analyst to verify what the analysand means. However, the 
fact remains that it is Derrida who identifies both Lacan and the systematic 
structure in his work as the subject of his confrontation. Surely there is 
something amiss here. 
Such a question has already been covered by Derrida. In Positions he 
points to the `heart' of his writing, holding that: 
I try to write (in) the space in which is posed the question of 
speech and meaning. I try to write the, question: (what is) 
meaning to say? Therefore it is necessary in such a space, and 
guided by such a question, that writing literally mean nothing. 
Not that it is absurd in the way that absurdity has always been 
in solidarity with metaphysical meaning. It simply tempts'itself, 
tenders itself, attempts to keep itself at . the point of the 
exhaustion of meaning .... It is in this sense that I risk meaning 
nothing that can simply be understood, or that is a simple affair 
of hearing. [PS p. 14 translation modified] 
We have already seen that the contextual complexities and considerations 
which motivate Denida already serve to undermine or defer the location and 
identification of a singular Lacan; or a singular Lacanian doctrine. This 
structure of contextual deferral is further complicated by the fact that Derrida 
shows how truth is always already infected with a mimetic structure which 
it seeks to control, how it is infected with its own fictionality. Its telling is an 
act, as much in the sense of a theatrical staging as an authentic reality. ", : 
In accordance with this fact Derrida enacts a scene of confrontation 
, 
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and analysis, in which the logic of analysis itself, that is, reason, is played to 
its full, to the extent that its staging comes into the play. Derrida cannot step 
outside the play of this logic in order straightforwardly to denounce it - to 
take a position against another position - because the distinction between 
outside and inside, between two opposing positions, is already a necessary 
scene prescribed by this logic. Rather he follows its play to the point where 
it becomes untenable in its own terms, to a point of slippage of the structures 
which support it, including his own analysis. 
This means that the conceptual framework with which he works is 
subject to a constant and explicit slippage within which it is shown that no 
single term can be located as the meaning of his analysis. At all points of such 
a location there occurs an essential equivocation between, for instance, the 
signifier and its signified, or the performative and the constative. Derrida 
enacts an analysis of Lacan, much of which is resisted by the equivocal nature 
of Lacan's writing. He thus, as it were, paints a picture of Lacan's analysis 
through the process of analysis itself, framing the frame of analysis in general, 
through the articulation and dislocation of the concept of the frame itself, and 
truth of the subject which it produces. 
Thus Derrida's argument `against' Lacan maintains an equivocal status 
between, for instance, accusing Lacan himself, or a generalised reading which 
can be organised within Lacan's text. Through this equivocation Demda's 
text undermines the distinctions which would support such a confrontation 
both between himself and Lacan, and within psychoanalysis itself .. 
It is the confrontation itself, in the scene of analysis, which Derrida` 
seeks to undermine. This is because it is precisely the scene of analysis 'which 
determines the subject(s) of the confrontation, decides the outcome of the 
confrontation, on the assumption that there is a delimitable confrontation. ; The 
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outcome of the analysis will thus be exactly what the analysis seeks - the 
truth of its explanations will always be verified. In the case of psychoanalysis 
Derrida argues that this truth comes down to a non-oppositional 
determination of the libido as singularly masculine in accord with the 
dominant structure of rational analysis: reason itself: 
The reason for this never elucidated characteristic [the non 
oppositional determination of the libido as singularly masculine] 
can, in effect, only be "glimpsed": because there is no reason 
for it: it is reason. Before, during, and, after Freud. The 
characteristic drawn from reason. By it, for it, beneath it. In the 
logic said to be "of the kettle" (a check drawn from reason), 
reason will always be right. [PSF pp. 482-3 my italics] 
The scene of analysis, of psychoanalysis, thus always finds, with insistent 
repetition, its real subject (and this scene determines subjectivity itself). In its 
`confrontation' with its subject it discovers that the truth of its subject is 
always its own truth. This entails a repression of the conditions of the 
analysis of the subject or patient. These conditions remain beyond the scope 
of such an analysis, forming, as it were, its unconscious, or its other. Thus, 
in the face of what we have earlier termed a transcendent infinity inseparable 
from the idea of the subject and its subjectivity, such an analysis can only 
repeat itself in terms of a more violent repression, which if taken to its final 
conclusion would mean nothing other, than the death of the subject. The 
compulsion to repeat - the death instinct - is thus seated in reason itself, 
prescribed in the analytic scene of confrontation, and will only be resisted 
insofar as this conclusion is deferred in the dissemination of reason.. -~ 
Derrida's `confrontation' with Lacan. is, thus constantly deferred 
through the undermining of the distinction between analyst and analysand. 
What is opened up is a textual network in which a certain set of questions can 




psychoanalytic scene `itself, ' in which analyst confronts analysand, as the 
two subjects of the prescribed scene. It could be said that what is thrown into 
question here is the relation between subjectivity or consciousness; the 
determinate concept of the subject and the concept of confrontation in truth 
assumed by the traditional psychoanalytic scene. As we have seen, certain of 
Freud's speculations demand a radical rethinking of the possibility of thinking 
a determinate subject and subjectivity in relation to truth. However, it appears 
that certain analytic tools of psychoanalysis remain rooted in traditional forms 
of conceptualisation. This conceptualisation includes, at the heart of the 
psychoanalytic scene, the traditional repressive determination of the subject 
and subjectivity in terms of a determinate rationality. 
31.. imm , of 
Section IV. 
In the preceding chapters we have examined the relationship of truth and 
fiction in the analysis of the meaning of the subject and subjectivity in the 
particular case of psychoanalysis. This relationship was explored both in 
terms of general psychoanalytic theory, in our reading of Freud, and in terms 
of the application of this theory in the practical analytic scene. 
Our reading of Freud suggested that an analysis which attempts to 
present a determinate meaning of subjectivity or consciousness would always 
be untrue because it must refer to terms which remain outside the scope of its 
articulation. Such terms, ideas, or representations, for example, the idea of 
death, although necessary to an analytic determination of the, meaning of 
subjectivity or consciousness form the unconscious or other of this analytic. 
In other words, the necessary reference of subjectivity or consciousness to a 
beyond, an unconscious, or its other, always defers the presentation of its 
determinate meaning in analysis. This calls for new ways of describing and 
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understanding subjectivity beyond determining its singular meaning, some of 
which have been followed in this thesis, which would resist or disrupt the 
repression of what we have termed the transcendent infinite in subjectivity. 
Our reading of Derrida's critique of Lacan demonstrated how, in 
applied psychoanalysis, the movement and values of truth as adequation and 
veiling/unveiling support and reinforce the general repressive structure of 
determinate thought in the production of a determinate meaning of the subject 
and subjectivity. We have argued that such a movement represses and seeks 
to control and determine an irreducible and indeterminate moment necessary 
to the conception of subjectivity through the determination of this moment as 
mimetic or fictional. This moment threatens the truth of every applied analysis 
of subjectivity in general, and the particular subject or analysand under- 
analysis, with dissemblance. This is because the truth of, such an analysis is 
always already itself constituted by this moment of indeterminacy which it 
seeks to bring under control through the concept of mimesis. 
We have argued that the assertion of the truth of such an analysis is 
therefore a repression of this moment through the application of a determined 
concept of mimesis or fiction within the concept of the subject and 
subjectivity. Without such a repression the analytic confrontation between 
analyst and analysand, in which the analyst determines the meaning of the 
analysand's subjectivity or conscious activity through his understanding of its 
unconscious determination, is impossible. If we understand this confrontation 
as a structure of repression, however, then it is rendered illegitimate - it 
cannot uphold its claim to being a true "confrontation, " in which the meaning 
of the analysand's subjective life is determined by the analyst. 
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32. Conclusion 
Our readings of the concept of the subject and its relationship to what we 
have called the transcendent infinite can be seen to consist of three moments 
of simultaneous repression and resistance against this repression. It is through 
these repressions of the transcendent infinite that subject-based knowledge 
can be believed to be a realisable possibility. We can detect these moments 
of repression insofar as the subject's necessary relation to a transcendent 
infinity exceeds and disrupts them. The concept of the subject can therefore 
be said to be rent or split across three aporias of the transcendent infinite, and 
the subsequent attempt to repress and appropriate these aporias. These three 
moments of repression can be delineated as follows: 
1. The first moment of the repression of the subject's relation to the 
transcendent infinite resides in the attempt to reduce an essentially irreducible 
referentiality of the subject's Cogito to a singular, determinate horizon of time 
understood as Presence, the Here and Now. The Cogito's necessary relation 
to the transcendent infinite must always exceed this horizonal determination 
of what the subject is because - it is a relation to - what . 
is essentially 
indeterminable. 
This means, as we have seen in our interpretations of Kant, Heidegger 
and Husserl, that the thought of the transcendent infinite in relation to this 
attempted horizonal determination, will always be represented as other than 
time. Within the representational structure belonging to this repression, this 
other, the irreducible condition of representation itself, willalways be 
determined as a secondary horizon, of the subject,, dependent upon, the 
temporal horizon (the schematism of time) for its meaning. . 
The necessary and 
irreducible exteriority of the transcendent infinite is therefore, in its relation 
to the horizon of time,., reappropriated, controlled . and reduced to a 
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determinate spatial horizon of the subject. 
This repressive reduction is consistent with the belief that the relation 
between the transcendent infinite and the subject is one of determination 
through which we could know what the transcendent infinite is within the 
scope of this relation. Since we have already seen in the reading of Kant and 
Descartes that this is an impossibility, this reduction amounts to an attempt 
to enforce a rigorous, hierarchical distinction between a temporal horizon of 
the subject and a spatial one. 
This distinction in turn illegitimately enforces, and is reinforced by, the 
distinction between an outer and inner (spatial and temporal) meaning or 
sense of the subject. Here, as before, the outer spatial or extended meaning - 
the realm of objects - is always determined by the subject's inner temporal 
meaning. 
We have already seen, however, in Kant's postulation of the 
schematism, that although the temporal inner sense of the subject determines 
the outer "objective, " "spatial, " sense, we can never legitimately distinguish 
between the "pure" intuitions of time and space. The representation of each 
intuition necessarily refers beyond the determinate scope of the' particular 
intuition to a transcendent indeterminacy. This means that we can never 
legitimately know whether the transcendental conditions of space and time 
are fu filled. Such a knowledge amounts to a transcendental illusion, or belief, ' 
and represses the necessary referentiality of the subject to the transcendent 
infinite. 
In our reading of Husserl, following Derrida's critique, we examined 
the reduction of this necessary referentiality of the meaning of the Cogito to 
a singular horizon of meaning, in this case represented by the reference to the 
ideality of a transcendent world; We. saw, how ý this ideality is always 
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threatened with disruption by the necessary reference to concepts or terms, 
in this case the concept of the empirical, the meaning of which cannot be 
explained or articulated in ideal terms. We argued that this is because Husserl 
makes a strong distinction between the ideality of the subject's meaning, and 
the reality of the world, the transcendence of which it must refer to in its 
judgement if there is to be anything like an understanding of objective 
thought. The reality of the world, however, to which the concept or term 
empirical belongs in Husserl (at least, according to Derrida's interpretation), 
is accessible to Husserl's phenomenological subject. only in terms Of its 
ideality, i. e. in the mode of the transcendental reduction. 
We have followed Derrida's argument that this reduction is only 
possible on the basis of a prior de jure distinction between ideality and 
reality, value and fact, and, more generally, between the inside and outside 
of the subject's intentional realm before the transcendental reduction has 
taken place. However, according to Husserl's conception , of : the 
phenomenological subject, constituted in the transcendental reduction, such 
a distinction cannot be legitimately made because the meaning of reality, fact, 
and the empirical world cannot be known apodictically in itself, it can only 
be known ideally after the transcendental reduction has taken place. This 
means that the meaning of such terms :, remains . obscured. by the 
phenomenological reduction, and that the phenomenological description of 
the intentional structures of the subject, i. e. the description: of what the 
subject means in its ideality, will carry over this obscurity into the meaning 
of the subject. 
This also means, however, that this meaning will never be simply a 
determinate, constituted meaning. - Every determination of this meaning will 
always necessarily be other than ä singular determinate horizon, whether. 
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temporal or spatial. It is therefore possible to read this determination of 
meaning, constituted within a temporal horizon, as a repressional structure 
which would obscure, hide away, and never mention a negotiation with the 
transcendent infinite - what is other than, or exceeds, determinate thought. 
This negotiation is, however, absolutely necessary if we are to legitimately 
approach our guiding question, if we are ever to "do" justice to, what 
someone means, to what the subject of writing, gesture, or speech, means. 
We have attempted such a negotiation through our, readings of the 
necessary externality within the thought and meaning of the subject. 
2. The second moment of repression of the necessary relation of the subject 
to the transcendent infinite resides in the attempt to decide the legitimate 
scope of the subject's judgement, i. e. the scope of the subject's legitimate, 
proper sense and meaning. We have already seen, in the short analysis of 
Descartes' Meditations, why it is necessary for him to fall back upon the 
illegitimate assertion that deception is degenerate, whilst truth is, always good, 
and is thus assured by a good God, if he is to establish the legitimacy of the 
subject's objective judgement, over and above the transcendent infinity of the 
Cogito's meaning. 
This assertion amounts to establishing a history of the subject, within 
which the subject's identity is assured, and the, irruptive force of the 
transcendent infinite is entombed and regulated. This is necessary if objective 
judgement is to be justified, for if I do not remember, ' from instance to 
instance, that it was "I, " the very same "I, " who judged or thought this or, 
that, then I cannot be assured of the truth of "my" judgement -I could not be 
assured that this judgement in fact belonged to me. °. , 
This is because I could not be assured that I have not fantasised, 
dreamt, imagined or simply falsified a judgement that is given to me' in 
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memory. Without this assurance, which, in Descartes, is provided by the God 
who would not deceive, the subject could never be certain of the sense of its 
own judgement. The subject could not be certain whether the content of a 
thought was given by something other than the subject, outside of the subject 
or whether it stemmed from the subject's own capacity to judge. 
The subject could thus, in general, never be certain whether a 
particular judgement about an object was, in the first instance, true or false. 
This is because the subject could no longer locate the sense of the object. 
Without this location it could not decide whether this sense originated in the 
subject, in its judgement, in which case it must make sense for the subject, or 
if the subject fantasised the sense of the judgement. This would entail the 
possibility that the judgement came from elsewhere outside the subject, in 
which case this sense is no longer that of the subject - it is non-sense, or 
madness, for the subject. 
The enforcement of the assurance of the subject's proper,, objective 
memory, therefore consists in the attempt to enforce a decision about the 
proper and rightful sense of the subject's judgement in the face of the 
transcendent infinite of the subject's Cogito. This thought insists upon the 
justification of the subject's own objective judgement, whilst simultaneously 
disinheriting the subject from judgement and thought determined as' a 
property belonging to the subject. The subject subsists, desists, in this very 
disenfranchisement, which is thought itself - the relation, between the 
subject's Cogito and the transcendent infinite. We have thus 'argued in our 
reading of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche that the concept of the 
subject and subjectivity makes a necessary reference to a prior"concept" of 
justice or right, the terms of which always exceed determinate thought. 
Without this reference the Cogito itself could make no legitimate claim to its 
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existence, for this existence only has meaning in the very idea of being able 
to make the claim ego cogito ergo sum. Since this existence is defined only 
in terms of this claim, and not in terms of a determinate right - which would 
be to say what the Cogito is, or means - its meaning is always indeterminate. 
This means that the enforcement of the rightful sense of the subject's 
judgement will always be an illegitimate decision. This, is seen I in the 
insistence that this sense belongs to the subject, that it, is, ' in its very 
properness, a property of the subject. Such a decision, and its enforcement,, -, 
insists that judgement remain within its proper bounds, within the interiority 
of the subject. Within the representational structure inherent within such a 
decision, the transcendent infinite, which is inherent in the Cogito itself, is 
necessarily represented in relation to this sense as non-sense, as madness, a 
threat to the proper sense of the subject. As such it must be regulated; kept 
within its proper bounds outside of the subject's sense, locked out, and 
incarcerated as a thought never to be remembered, because it is not thought 
proper. 
In the illegitimate enforcement of the distinction between sense and 
non-sense, although the latter is just as inherent. in the former, non-sense will 
always be the secondary, derivative category. The assumption of a proper 
sense of the subject attempts to incarcerate the irruptive thought, of the 
transcendent infinite. This incarceration is - always, inherent -within 'the 
"theoretical" differentiation between the . 
inner and . outer, temporal . and 
spatial, horizons of the subject, reinforcing the sovereignty of the subject's 
judgement. This is because these distinctions support the 
. 
distinction between 
the "inner" theoretical realm of the subject, and an "outer" realm of reality in 
which the subject practically acts. 
. 
We have seen, however, in our reading of Descartes, that it is precisely 
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the transcendent infinite which institutes the very possibility of the sense of 
the subject, a sense beyond the determined sense of judgement, and the 
determined non-sense of madness. In our reading of Derrida's critique of 
Foucault we have argued that the incarceration of this thought occurs within 
the establishment of a certain memory -a memory which would enforce the 
rightful property of the subject. This incarceration is marked by, and can be 
read through, an illegitimate enforcement of the sense of the subject. .. 
This enforcement of the objective judgement of the subject marks a 
necessary transgression, breaking through or exceeding the distinction 
between the theoretical and the practical, even though it must uphold this 
distinction. It supports this distinction in the assertion of the reality of. a 
localisation of sense and non-sense, in the social. incarceration of what is 
interpreted as madness. A history, or memory, of the subject, necessarily 
insists upon a sense of reality of the events which structure _ 
its . course. 
Anything which threatens this sense of reality must, for the, sake of the 
assurance proffered by the subject's history, be regulated, ' . controlled, 
incarcerated. This regulation, control and incarceration must; however, 
partake of the reality it assures, for it is only so that, such a repressional 
structure can enforce and ensure its own continuation. 
In this necessity, the distinction between the : "theoretical" and . the 
"practical, " or, more generally, the distinction between the ''ideal" and the 
"real, " is enforced by being transgressed. This transgression ensures that the 
theoretical positing of a totality of sense is never purely ideal. Its effects are 
never limited purely to an ideal realm, but also serve to practically enforce a 
reality which in turn supports the truth of the theoretical (its ideality) in the 
name of the posited totality. This means that the decision about the rightful 
scope and sense of the subject, does not simply entail a (harmless) ideal 
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incarceration of what is other to the proper sense of the subject as non-sense 
or an ideal madness. This decision is always the effect of a practical, real, 
physical, incarceration and repression of what is other to the sense of the 
subject, in that this decision is the attempt to enforce such a reality. 
We have seen in our reading of Foucault, and Derrida's critique of him, 
how this incarceration is made in the name of Reason to defend it against its 
own inherent madness. The meaning of the subject - its relation, to, the 
transcendent infinite - thus takes on a necessary practical dimension within 
its very justification - its ethos. In other words, the determination of the sense 
of the subject, a repressional structure which operates through a determinate, ' 
bodily localisation of thought, is never simply theoretical, but is already part 
of a "practical" repression. This "practical"- repression 'suppresses the 
necessary irruption of what we can call the ethical moment of the subject - 
precisely its relation to the transcendent infinite. In order to read this moment, 
and its suppression - to do justice to the meaning of the subject we have tried r 
to negotiate the possibility and incarceration of the madness of the subject. 
3.. The third moment of the repression of the transcendent infinite resides in 
the attempt, in accordance with the "decision" about the legitimate scope and 
sense of the subject, to enforce the truth of this delimitation, to make certain 
that the course of such a decision always arrives at its proper destination.. 
Such an enforcement attempts to ensure that the course of the subject's 
judgement always arrives, always comes back to, truth, and is not dissembled 
in fiction, fantasy, or a mirage of the truth. As such; this amounts to the 
illegitimate regulation and policing of an economy of truth, which tries to, 
ensure that the highest values - truth, freedom, the moral virtues - always 
belong to and always return to their proper place - the reflective subject. We 
have attempted to examine this economy of truth in Our readings 'of Hegel, 
261" 
Freud and Derrida's critique of Lacan. 
We have already seen that the values attributed to the subject can 
never simply be idealities. The attempt to substantialise, or to ground, or 
ontologize the subject, cannot be a purely theoretical activity. This is because 
the condition of possibility of such an attempt is that its. effects always 
transgress the distinction between the theoretical and the practical, the ideal 
and the real, in the very attempt to enforce these distinctions as a totality. -, 
This transgression, which, in effect, is the relation of the Cogito to the 
transcendent infinite, is precisely that which this enforcement seeks to bring 
under control. Thus, in our reading of Lacan, we have seen how the analyst 
institutes a scene of "confrontation" between analysand and analyst, the truth 
and reality of which is determined and controlled by the subjective position 
of the analyst. 
We have already seen that the condition of this appropriation is the 
relation of the subject's Cogito to the transcendent infinite. In our reading of 
Freud it was possible to interpret this relation in terms of the relation between 
consciousness, understood as what is present, and the unconsciöüs. This 
relation not only necessarily exceeds this determination, but also renders its 
enforcement a priori illegitimate, since, . in this, transgressive excess, it 
deprives the subject of every determinate .: property. 
x, This ' power. of 
transgression, an originary non-appropriable -violence, = thus haunts this 
appropriation with the ever-present . possibility .: of ,' its , legitimate 
disappropriation. It threatens the "realities', ' which the "subject" claims as its 
own legitimate and true property with their own legitimate transgression. - It 
threatens them with the possibility that they are neither true, nor real, nor 
legitimate. The substantialisation of the subject. in terms. of a thesis. or 
explaining principle therefore belongs to a network of effects which make up 
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the attempt to secure total control over this transgressional power within an 
instituted order. Reason is always necessarily bound up with this call to 
order, whether it be social, political or theoretical, as the discourse through 
which one is brought to believe in the possibility of an order in general. And 
the establishment of such an order means the establishment and maintenance 
of authority, rule and control. 
In order to achieve this control it is necessary to situate the inherently 
transgressive and dispersive power of the transcendent infinite within an 
authoritative body of control. This is attempted in the substantialisation or 
ontologization of the subject. We have already seen two movements of this 
enforcement, this first being the reduction . of. the, externality, of, the 
transcendent infinite to the secondary spatial horizon in order to ground the 
subject's knowledge in general; the second being the more or less physical, 
social, real, enforcement of this knowledge, in a history. which would both 
assure the subject in the legitimacy of the sense of its judgement, and justify 
the incarceration of all that would threaten this sense. The third movement is 
the attempt to enforce these incarcerations in order . that the ' subject can, 
pretend to itself that it knows that these incarcerations are legitimate. 
In this instance of repression it is not enough to simply incarcerate and 
subdue what is perceived or interpreted as being a threat to this order. Reason 
must also have control over the fantasy of this threat. Reason must have 
control over fantasy - the imagined, the fictional, the fantastical - itself. And 
it attempts to do so through the no less "fantastical" concepts of fantasy, - the 
imagined, the fictional, the fantastical. It must be ascertained that, truth - the 
highest value of the subject's cognition - determines mimesis or fiction in all 
its possibilities, and that through this determination the transgressive power 
inherent in mimesis is always brought back to its proper place, cured of its 
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transgressive wanderings. The problem is that the content of these concepts 
necessarily exceeds their articulation because they are themselves mimetically 
constituted. 
However, if the order of reason, expressed in the substantialisation of 
the subject, is to maintain its position of authority, if authority in general is 
to maintain its stance of sovereignty, it must appropriate and ' control this 
power of dispersion for itself. It cannot accept that this` power to disperse 
exceeds the possibility of its appropriation, even though, or rather precisely 
because, this authorial body uses this dispersive and transgressive power to 
establish its own reality through appropriation. It cannot accept that its own 
"reality" is no more true than the "reality" proffered by, for example; the 
fiction of the evil demon, in Descartes, or, - in Hegel, ° the fiction of the 
master's risk and the slave. 's fear, and in Lacan, the analyst's fear of das 
Unheimliche, but also fiction in general, even though they have the "same" 
ongm. 
We have thus explicated in our reading of Derrida`and Lacan how this 
repression is achieved through a reductive translation of the 'relationship of 
the' Cogito to what we have called the transcendent infinite. This has been' 
shown to be the condition of possibility of both the transgressive nature of 
both fiction and truth and yet is reduced to the category of fiction in general, 
in which fiction, or mimesis is defined by its lack of truth. This determination 
of the truth of fiction by the frame of truth itself ensures that the passage of 
thought -a judgement - always comes back to, is always adequate to, this 
value of truth. By cutting out the necessary relation of the Cogito to the 
possibility of its fictive determination, the possibility that its truth is also a 
fiction, it is ensured that meaning only has value in that it refers to truth. The 
definition of fiction or mimesis as imitation, i. e. that it lacks truth (in truth), 
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that its truth is not there, is hidden, or veiled, itself shows or unveils, in its 
ed. 
form and contours, the proper place of this lack of true meaning. This lack 
ensures the (almost) complete detachment of the Cogito from truth and its 
subsequent return to its proper place - to the reflected truth of the subject. 
The Cogito - the subjectivity of the subject - is thus determined by Reason 
as in reality being a fiction which is produced by the laws of Reason. The 
movement of the Cogito demonstrates the truth of this determination.. This 
determination, however, is only possible on the condition of the repression 
of the Cogito's necessary mimetic indeterminacy, and the mimetic nature of 
Reason's representation of mimesis itself. This takes place in the - repression 
of the necessary relation between the truth of the Cogito and the necessary 
possibility of its fictionality - in other words the relation of the Cogito to the 
transcendent infinite. 
The last section of the thesis also introduces a psychoanalytic language 
and analysis through which we are able to re-read the thesis in the conclusion 
in terms of the concept of repression. Would repression thus be the last word 
on the subject and its necessary relation to a transcendent infinite? It allows 
us to return to the subject and re-interpret, it in terms 'of. a movement of 
'repression. However, if we adopt this re-reading as the "truth" of the subject, 
does not this reading commit us to repeating the very gesture of repression 
which we have criticised? What is this movement which we have described 
as repression? Does it not remain fully inscribed and determined within the 
history of metaphysics? Or it is rather that repression can no longer be simply 
understood as a concept? I 
>, w Freud says "that the essence of repression lies. simply in turning 
something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious" [OM 
p. 147]. This formulation, and the whole theoretical apparatus 
which supports 
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it and makes it possible, namely the relation between the unconscious and 
consciousness, the Pleasure principle and the reality principle, renders the 
presentation of every term within this conceptual matrix problematic. - 
This is because the thought of repression is both historically, and 
conceptually derived from the idea that consciousness intentionally decides 
what meaning is. So long as all meaning is subjected to the concept of the 
'subject, whereby the subjectivity of the subject designates a realm of 
presence to which all meaning eventually belongs, or is gathered, in the act 
of thought, the co-agitatio, then the act of thought itself must be determined 
f as the subject's will. The subject's will is thus the essence of subjectivity, and 
the highest principle of all meaning. It is only on the basis of the formulation 
of this principle, which is nothing other than Freud's formulation of the 
Pleasure Principle, that repression can be articulated: 
We have followed the historical development 'of this principle from 
Descartes, in his original formulation of the ego cogito, through to Kant and 
. Hegel. In Kant the realm of meaning 
is first restricted to what the subject puts, 
into its object. In Hegel the subject reveals itself to be its, own and only 
proper object in the notion of Spirit, the essence of which is shown to be 
desire. 
In our readings of more "contemporary" descriptions of the subject we 
have seen that the articulation of the subject in terms of a highest principle is 
impossible. This is because the full presentation' of the subject's, meaning 
results in the "death" or obliteration-, of this meaning. -Mus, Husserl's 
phenomenological formulation of the intentional subject can only function on 
the basis of a certain "forgetting. " The necessary referentiality of the 
phenomenological subject is omitted by Husserl. On the other, hand, in 
Foucault, we have seen that we cannot legitimately reduce the meaning of the 
266 
subject to what philosophy has supposedly forgotten : in its historical 
production of the concept of the subject. This too is based upon a forgetting 
or omission of a necessary referentiality of the subject to what is other than 
its principle of organisation. In Lacan, however, we have also seen that these 
"facts" do not allow us to locate the truth of the subject in the simple absence 
of a determined principle, in the absence of the phallus, or in the "pure" 
arbitrariness of the "pure" signifier. 
This appears to leave us in a quandary in trying to think and describe 
the concept of the subject and subjectivity. However, the readings, of 
Heidegger and Freud, which supplement those of Derrida's texts, serve to 
indicate a development in thought which goes , "beyond"- av classical - 
metaphysics of the subject. 
In our initial reading of Heidegger we have seen how in general there 
is a necessary referentiality within meaning which always defers any total 
reduction of meaning to a singular matrix of interpretation. Thus, for example, 
the` ontological analyses of Dasein in terms of the ready-to-hand, is always 
deferred in terms of its necessary ontical presentation in terms of the present- 
}s 
at-hand, and vice versa. 
In our second reading of Heidegger, ' this analysis is located within 
Heidegger's understanding of subjectivity. ' Here he shows that the highest 
principle of subjectivity, namely the will, must necessarily, refer to a prior 
`, `concept" of justice, which cannot be determined in terms of this principle. 
The reduction of the subject to either a concept of the will, or to a, determined 
concept of justice, is thus always deferred This necessary reference to justice 
also explains why the omission of such a referral can then be understood in 
ý, ý ng ýý ýn... i Sr 
terms of legitimacy. ý_. x: 
As soon as we understand consciousness in general in terms of its 
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legitimation, or, more precisely, its non-legitimation, rather than in terms of 
its being, then we enter into the language and question of power and 
repression. Heidegger effectively demonstrates this in, his reading of 
Nietzsche's Will to Power. For, if the operation of the will of the subject is 
shown to be illegitimate, then this can only be thought on the basis of a' 
differential of competing forces. 
Legitimacy is understood in terms of a demand which must ' be 
answered, in the sense that a term, element or concept necessary to the 
function of a given conceptual system cannot be legitimately excluded from 
that system. Such a necessity means that the exclusion of such a term would 
be impossible since it would mean the demise of the conceptual system. - Such 
"exclusions" can thus only be thought on the basis of a difference in the 
particular forces of signification within a conceptual system, in which certain 
terms, elements and concepts are prioritised at the expense of others. " =The 
55 Cf. Derrida's "Force and Signification": `By its very articulation force becomes'a- 
phenomenon. Hegel demonstrated convincingly that the explication of a phenomenon by 
a force is a tautology. But in saying this, one must refer to language's peculiar inability. 
to emerge from itself in order to articulate its origin, and not to the thought of force. 
Force is the other of language without which language would not be what it is. " (Whljng 
and Difference, p. 26-27). Derrida's notion of force, which is here being taken up, is 
Nietzschean, (cf. "Difference" in Margins of Philosophy). Here the condition of force is* 
its differentiation in quantative terms - "Force itself is never present; it is only a play of 
differences and quantities. " (Margins. p. 17). Within this play of differences force `is' the 
condition of displacement, but it is only qualified as such (valued as a phenomenon) 
through the quantative differentiation of its effects (in Kantian terms the constitution of 
a manifold of different objects of cognition). `As such, force in itself is never realised - the 
phenomenon of force traces an essence which, if thinkable at all, could only be thought 
from within an order which is completely other to, and yet the positive condition of, the 
discursive order in which language is situated. Thus, for Derrida, the force of discourse 
is its differentiation from and displacement of, the discursive context in which it is set. 
This is to be understood in a thoroughly historicised way. The history of Western thought 
"is" this displacement, the deferral and differentiation of its own conventions and 
normatives. For Derrida, as for Heidegger, the most powerful and stable of these 




differential of these forces can only be articulated in terms of the structures 
and language of repression and production. 
Thus we come to our reading of Freud. Here we have moved from a 
philosophical discourse to a psychoanalytic one, although it is clear that the 
lineage we have traced between the two discourses makes a strict 
differentiation problematic. By following this lineage we can see that the 
Pleasure Principle can only be thought on the basis of the "essence" of the 
subject and subjectivity - the will. Freud shows, however, that the psyche can 
only function if the realisation of desire in terms of the Pleasure Principle is 
infinitely deferred, i. e. is subject to, and part of, a mechanism of repression. 
He does this from two perspectives. Firstly, the acceptance of empirical 
observation of phenomenon which would repudiate the Pleasure Principle, 
namely the repetition compulsion. Secondly, the observation that there must 
be another mechanism besides that of the Pleasure Principle because, if not, 
following it would very quickly lead to destruction. 
What is of importance here is not so much the description of the 
individual psyche, but the speculative thought which gives rise to it, and goes 
beyond the traditional descriptions of the subject. This speculation does so 
precisely by taking the logic of these descriptions to their extreme. The 
Pleasure Principle is, in one sense, the fulfilment of the will of the subject, but 
it also raises the question, makes it possible to ask; why it is impossible to 
fulfill:. This impossibility can only be couched in terms of a movement of 
The speculation which engages in this thought of repression cannot be 
described in terms of the hierarchical dichotomies of classical logic since it 
repression, in other words, of deferral., 
(... continued) 
of the thought of truth' as Presence. 
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does not conform to any of these. It cannot be described in terms of the 
Hegelian dialectic because each term would defer the presentation of the 
other without recourse to any third term or to any telos - the Pleasure 
Principle indefinitely delayed by the Reality Principle, and vice versa. This 
means, in effect, that we could never legitimately say, or present, what 
repression is within the subject, and neither could we legitimately describe 
the production of the subject through the mechanism of repression. Its 
presentation would always, in terms of its own syntax and organisation, be 
deferred. In other words, insofar as there is a concept of repression at work 
in our reading and re-reading of the subject, then it functions in terms of its 
undermining or deferral of conceptuality in general, and thus, of the concept 
of the subject itself. 
We therefore find the loci of the these structures - of repression 
organised around the aporetic logic put forward in the fourth chapter of the 
thesis. These aporias of the subject serve to disseminate or to defer any 
attempt to present a true narrative of the subject, hierarchically organised 
under a guiding concept or principle. In other words, the "movement" which 
repression designates is never simply repressive, but simultaneously 
productive, simultaneously disseminating of meaning. We have thus seen that 
the metaphysical desire to ground the subject, either ideally or substantially, 
is itself produced in the very impossibility of its fulfilment. It is this 
impossibility - the necessity of maintaining a relation with the transcendent 
infinite - which makes it possible that such a desire take on force. The subject 
we have attempted to describe in this thesis "subsists" within this movement. 
This raises a new set of questions. On the one hand we have the 
question of the object: if desire is constituted through repression, through its 
deferral, then how are to we understand pleasure? Towards exactly what does 
270 
desire strive if its fulfilment would always result in nothing other than death? 
On the other hand we have the question of the narration of this object: how 
are we to describe the relation between desire and pleasure? We have seen 
that the thesis as such - the thematic, and, eventually, the thetic, is inadequate 
to the description of its obliteration. What then, is its status? What is the 
status of a discourse which is part of the object which it analyses? These 
questions remain beyond the scope of this work. We have simply attempted 
to prepare the way for such questions. 
Thus, what we have tried to construct under the title repression, and 
in accordance with the Derrida's thought of deconstruction, is an athesis of 
the concept of the subject and subjectivity. We have attempted to tell the 
story of the subject in such a way as to undermine the idea and the authority 
of the subject. In other words we have attempted to narrate the story of the 
subject after its deconstruction. 
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